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2Influence, Information and Lobbying in the European Union: 
a Comparison of Business Sector Strategies
Abstract
The development of European Union political institutions and scope of policy-making 
has resulted in fundamental changes in the political and economic environment within 
which UK firms operate. Since 1986 in particular, the response to these developments 
has been a noted increase in business lobbying activity directed towards ’Brussels'. A 
dense network of interests has formed around key EU institutions. This includes some 
companies which have chosen to locate a permanent company representative in 
Brussels. Firms have a variety of strategies they can adopt for representation, both 
individual and collective, in addition to existing, established, national routes for 
exerting influence on EU institutions and policies.
The thesis is about why companies choose particular strategies, and the political and 
economic factors which may help determine that choice. It maintains that information 
plays a key role in the creation of opportunities for influence, and in the choice of 
influence strategies.
Chapter 2 explores theoretical contributions on influence behaviour and lobbying 
activity. Chapters 3 & 4 review the development of the EU. It shows that the 
complexity and uncertainty of its institutions and decision-making processes generate 
substantial information needs on the part of policy-makers. This in turn creates a high 
level of opportunity for business interests to exert influence. Following a brief outline 
of the approach to the empirical work contained in chapter 5, chapters 6 & 7 examine 
business response to these opportunities across two industries. Two contrasting sectors 
are analysed, Road Freight and Pharmaceuticals. These show that business response to 
such opportunities can vary significantly both at firm and at sectoral level. It links 
responses to the costs and benefits associated with various strategies, which in turn 
relate to key firm and sector characteristics. The most important of these are; firm size, 
transnational operations and sector concentration.
Chapter 8 brings together the findings from both empirical work and earlier theoretical 
contributions and assesses the similarities and differences between the Road Freight 
and Pharmaceutical sectors in terms of both firm and sector characteristics, and 
influence strategies focused on EU institutions and policy-making.
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Preface
Since commencing this research in 1994, there have been significant developments both 
within the EU political environment and within the business sectors reviewed in this 
thesis. The adoption of the title European Union (EU), rather than European 
Community (EC) since the ratification of the Treaty on European Union, is one change 
which is reflected in the thesis. However, it should be noted that much of the literature 
on the EU/EC predates this change, hence there are occasions within the text where 
the old terminology will be apparent. The reader should take the two as 
interchangeable.
Further change relates to the number of Member States within the EU. This increased 
to 15 in 1995, with the accession of Finland, Sweden and Austria. Again, some 
literature references may include the 'old' total of 12 Member States, but such instances 
are highlighted in the text.
Finally, there have been significant changes in one of the sectors under consideration in 
this research, since its commencement. The Pharmaceutical industry has seen a wave of 
mergers, and increased concentration of the industry. One of the key inputs to this 
chapter is from Glaxo Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd, which has subsequently merged with 
Wellcome. Although at the time of the research, this merger had not yet taken place, 
general references within the text have been altered to read 'GlaxoWellcome', while 
specific points attributable to company representatives or historical data have retained 
the Glaxo nomenclature.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 The Purpose of the Thesis
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how certain business sectors have responded 
to the development of the EU in terms of their influence strategies. It looks at the 
opportunities for influence created by EU institutions, the response of business sectors 
to those opportunities, and the factors which underlie both opportunity and response. It 
is about the network of organisations which exert influence on political decision­
makers, including companies, and the factors which shape those networks. The 
research therefore looks at company influence strategy as well as how those strategies 
are translated at sectoral level. In particular it examines why some firms and interest 
groups invest in directly approaching EU decision-makers, in some cases even 
appointing a 'Brussels based' lobbyist.
In order to address these themes, the network of organisations within two business 
sectors are described and analysed. This analysis is set within the context of the 
opportunities for influence within the EU political arena, why those opportunities arise, 
and the key role that information issues play in both the creation of opportunities for 
influence, and the potential costs and benefits of accessing those opportunities.
1.2 Context of the Thesis
Since the establishment of the European Community through the Treaty of Rome in 
1957, the development of Community institutions and enhancement of policy-making 
powers through further Treaty amendments has introduced significant changes in the 
political and economic environment in which firms operate (Andersen, 1992, p. 17). 
Examples of this change are abundant, from the harmonisation of regulations governing 
company products and services, to the negotiation of trade agreements in an 
international context. All have their effect on the 'market' in which firms operate, as a 
new set of governmental institutions have developed and implemented policies which 
have furthered their own political, social and economic goals.
Until recently, such activities have largely been the prerogative of national 
governments. However, the establishment and development of EU institutions and their 
policy-making powers has added a new dimension in the European context which has 
produced major change for individuals, firms, and national governments. Not only has
13
it created a new political environment within which firms have to operate, and 
therefore a new focus for influencing political decision-makers, but through the 
development of EU institutions it has created a new economic actor which pursues 
economic objectives linked to the competitiveness of the EU within the international 
economy.
The context of the thesis is the new political environment created by the development 
of the EU, its institutions, policies and decision-making processes. The assumption at 
the outset is that companies will attempt to influence political institutions, recognising 
the effects both positive and negative these may have on the economic environment. 
What this study shows however, is that the way they do this may differ considerably, 
both in terms of approach and the benefits which accrue from this activity.
There are a number of approaches companies may use in order to exert influence on 
governmental agencies, whether national or EU. They may choose to invest in 
individual representation, act collectively, or pursue a 'multiple strategy' which 
combines both individual and collective representation. The first is likely to involve a 
higher cost to the firm than the second. Since 1986 and the ratification of the Single 
European Act, an overall increase in lobbying activity has been noted (Andersen & 
Eliassen, 1993, p.3; Mazey & Richardson, 1993a, p.6). A characteristic of this increase 
has been the development of individual lobbying capabilities by some firms and the 
emergence of a professional public affairs function serviced either by in-house 
expertise, or the use of professional lobbying firms. The political environment within 
which this development has occurred is complicated by the fact that although a new 
European political structure has been formed, it does not replace existing national 
government arrangements. Instead, these form an integral part of the new structure, 
while still retaining a high degree of independence and authority. It is therefore an 
environment which is in may ways unique - a clear departure from current forms of 
national government, yet distinct from current forms of intergovernmental organisation. 
It is a new form of political institution which is still in the process of evolution 
(Schmitter, 1996, p i4).
1.3 Definitions: Power, Influence and Lobbying
There have been various attempts at the definition of power and its relationship to 
influence, from Weber to the more recent contribution of Stephen Lukes. Weber's idea 
of power was the ability to impose binding decisions on others and influence as the 
ability to affect those decisions. This makes clear distinction between the two terms 
based on the concept of authority. As the literature on EU lobbying will show however,
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such neat distinctions may not fit the reality of the complexities of modem political and 
economic life. Today, the economic power of some of the world’s largest corporations 
is obvious. The growth of competition among national governments for investment 
from these organisations is a feature of the changing international scene, accompanied 
by the development of regional strategies which encourage firms to locate their 
activities in particular areas (Porter, 1986, p.6). For some companies, relationships 
with government are more characterised by negotiation and influence rather than the 
ability to coerce (Wallace & Wallace, 1996, pp 32-37).
More appropriate therefore is Stephen Lukes broader definition of power which 
maintains that it is the ability to get someone to do what they would otherwise not have 
done. This encompasses the ability to influence decisions, shape the political agenda, 
or control thought through manipulation (Lukes, 1974). These ideas echo the picture 
of EU lobbying which emerges from existing research (Mazey & 
Richardson, 1991,1993a; Pedler & Van Schendelen, 1994; Greenwood, Grote & Ronit, 
1992). The object of lobbying is to influence policy decisions, to be involved at the 
early stages of decision-making in order to help shape the agenda, and to use the 
substantial information resources often available to business interests as a means of 
influence.
Within this definition, the ability of business interests, either individual firms, or groups 
of firms, to influence decision-making could be classified as a form of power. In a 
European context, this may explain why pressure to limit or at least control more 
formally the activities of lobbyists has arisen primarily from the European Parliament, 
and not from the Commission. As the following chapters will show, the Commission 
may have a vested interest in allowing lobbying activity, linked to its information needs, 
which is not present to the same degree for members of the European Parliament. For 
MEPs, therefore, lobbying by private interests may well be seen as more of a threat or 
nuisance, in comparison with officials of the Commission.
The debate about power and influence is a subject in its own right and it is not the 
intention here to develop the theme in more detail. However, it provides an important 
insight into the reciprocal nature of some of the relationships which underpin EU 
lobbying, i.e. it is not simply a question of policy-decisions being imposed by 
government on business, as these decisions are subject to various forms of influence.
Influence activities may take many forms. They may involve the use of information in 
order to logically persuade, they may involve intimidation, bribery, or favours granted 
as part of special networks of relationships. For the purpose o f  the thesis the focus is
15
the use of information, although all four manifestations of influence are closely linked 
in the public's mind. Here the use o f information is the defining characteristic of 
lobbying. It is also, therefore, about bargaining, negotiation, and the compromises 
which are reached as a result of these activities. All lobbying activities, within this 
definition are a form of influence, but not all influence is exerted through lobbying.
Lobbying is also used to describe one of the strategies that may be employed by a 
company seeking to influence decision-makers. In the context of this research, it is the 
attempt to influence EU governmental decisions by accessing decision-makers 
directly. This definition draws a distinction between lobbying and the broader 
perspective of influencing. For example, if firms exert influence on EU decisions 
through their trade association, then it is likely to be the trade association which 
'lobbies', not the firm.
Lobbying activity directed towards European Union institutions has been the subject of 
increasing interest amongst researchers over the past few years. Attention has focused 
in particular on the response of interest groups to the development of the governmental 
capabilities of EU institutions. The change in the level of EU lobbying activity is well 
documented (Mazey & Richardson, 1993, p.5; Andersen & Eliassen, 1993 p.39; 
Greenwood* Grote & Ronit, 1992, p.28). Although overall activity seems to have 
increased, there is also evidence of a shift in focus to the EU from national 
government. Sectoral studies by authors such as Cawson (1992), Greenwood, Grote 
& Ronit (1992) and McLaughlin (1994) provide a more detailed analysis of influencing 
strategies and lobbying activity, taking into account industry characteristics. They focus 
in particular on the collective action of firms, rather than on firms as individual actors. 
However, the implied starting point is the same. This is the importance of firm 
characteristics, the industry structure and competitive environment. These are defined 
by factors such as the concentration or fragmentation of the industry, and the products 
or services offered. This research follows the same reasoning in that it investigates and 
compares the influence strategies across two sectors which represent contrasting 
structures.
1.4 Subject and Key Themes
The thesis develops findings from existing analyses of sectoral and company behaviour 
as well containing new, empirical work (Road Freight). The chapter on 
Pharmaceuticals is also adjusted in part through new empirical work to develop 
existing studies. Two sectors are assessed in order to be able to extract and examine 
differences and similarities.
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The starting point is that influencing strategies, and lobbying activity are developed as 
the result of both political and economic factors. First, the development of the EU, its 
institutions, policy competence and decision-making processes provide the opportunity 
for influence. They also impact established approaches to, and relationships with 
national government agencies and decision-makers. Second however, the existence of 
such opportunities does not in itself account for the response of companies, either 
collectively or as individuals. The size of firms, their transnational operations, and the 
economic concentration of their activities also provide factors which are important in 
understanding firm behaviour and sectoral patterns of influence.
In terms of the sectoral investigations which form the core of the thesis, the 
expectation is that there will be evidence of a re-focusing of influence strategies and 
lobbying activity, towards the EU. However, the organisation of this response will 
differ according to firm and industry specific factors. The relative cost of different 
strategies against the value of potential benefits from lobbying (i.e. direct contact with 
decision-makers), is driven by these factors. The key themes which are investigated as 
part of this objective are:
• The Opportunities for Influence: the institutional development and growing 
policy competence of the EU is important in understanding the opportunities for 
influence this presents to business. The particular characteristics of EU institutional 
arrangements, policies and decision-making processes facilitate greater 
opportunities for influence than some national arrangements. Key to this are the 
information needs of EU decision-makers, which firms and their collective interests 
may be well placed to provide. As chapter 3 will show, within the EU decision­
makers are open to contact, and have even stated this as a policy (CEC 92, (2272) 
An Open And Structured Dialogue between the Commission and Interest Groups).
• The Costs & Benefits of Influence: the fact that there are more, or less 
opportunities for influence created by the particular characteristics of the political 
environment does not necessarily mean that all companies will seek to take 
advantage of these. The exercise of influence involves cost to companies, whether 
they take individual action and decide to engage in their own lobbying, or whether 
they seek collective representation through interest groups. A basic assumption 
here is that they will take decisions about their approach on the basis of both the 
costs and the benefits involved and therefore they are acting in a rational, self 
interested way. Understanding the potential costs and benefits is therefore 
important in any assessment of influence strategies, particularly whether they are
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individual, or collective benefits. Much current literature assumes, rightly, that 
because political institutions can adversely affect the market in which firms operate 
and therefore their profits, then this generates attempts at influence. However, it is 
only by examining the nature of the costs and potential benefits that the reason for 
particular strategies becomes apparent.
• Industry Structure & the Organisation of Influence: while political 
developments may shape the opportunity for influence, it is the particular 
characteristics of companies, and the competitive relationships within industry 
sectors which will determine the response to these opportunities in terms of the 
costs and benefits of such activity. The response will be uneven across business 
groups, resulting in different influence strategies, and different decisions about 
whether to invest in lobbying activity. Important characteristics which determine 
this response are the size of firms, and the economic concentration of activities at a 
transnational level. These characteristics are particularly important in considering 
why firms adopt both collective and individual influence strategies simultaneously. 
The key question is why do firms invest in their own lobbying, despite the presence 
of professional lobbying through collective interests, and which could be 
considered more 'legitimate' by decision-makers? Is this simply a reaction to the 
potential for the dilution of their views?
• The Centrality of Information Issues: finally, information is a recurrent theme 
which underpins both the opportunities for influence, and the response to those 
opportunities by firms. Influence is essentially about bargaining and negotiation, 
where information can be critical to achieving a preferred outcome. In this context 
it is about the use of information to achieve favourable decisions by government 
decision-makers. Any information carries a cost in terms of its acquisition and 
presentation however, whether this links to individual or collective lobbying action. 
Also, for certain firms, the importance of acquiring information through the 
political environment (and being able to respond to that information) may be a 
source of competitive advantage, and help to explain the multiple strategy adopted 
by some firms, and the wide span of their information gathering and influencing 
activities.
1.5 Approach and Outline of the Thesis
There are two levels of investigation contained within the thesis. The first considers 
the political environment, the development of political institutions and policy 
competence within the EU, and the growth of influence activity. The insights
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provided by this first level of analysis are then used to provide the framework for a 
more detailed consideration of the two sectors.
The first level of analysis draws from existing literature, but also contains new 
information provided through interviews with companies and interest groups. General 
trends in lobbying are examined within this context as a backdrop to the more detailed 
sectoral investigation.
The second level of analysis concerns the specific response of particular sectors to the 
EU political framework. It does not solely concentrate on collective action through 
associations, but looks at both firm  behaviour and the sector pattern of influence, 
taking up McLaughlin, Jordan & Maloney's point about the primacy of corporate 
interests (McLaughlin et al, 1993, pp 25-26). Two contrasting sectors have been 
chosen for examination. The first sector study (road freight) represents new research. 
The second sector (ethical pharmaceuticals) draws on existing literature supplemented 
by interviews with company representatives and interest groups which give new 
insights into influence strategies and lobbying.
Although there are often problems with the definition of a 'sector', sectoral analysis has 
been used in order to capture both the individual and collective influence strategies of 
firms - to show the 'map' of interests and their relationships with EU decision-makers. 
In addition, policy issues are often sector-specific, as chapter 2 will show. There is 
evidence from a number of sources in lobbying and collective action literature that 
industry characteristics and the competitive relationship between firms in the same 
product/service market are important factors in shaping a company's influence strategy. 
This suggests that the sector is a highly appropriate unit of analysis. The two-level 
approach for the thesis is reflected in the structure outlined in figure 1. A more detailed 
methodology for the sectoral studies appears in chapter 5.
Chapter 2 examines the rationale for lobbying activity. This provides the basis for the 
overall approach to the thesis by identifying the importance of the opportunity for 
influence in a political context, the potential advantages of exploiting these 
opportunities from a competitive point of view, and the importance of industry 
structure and competitive environment on influence strategies. Chapter 3 reviews the 
opportunities presented by the development of the EU and its institutions and policies 
and the particular characteristics of the decision-making processes which support an 
increase in lobbying activity. Chapter 4 then examines the evidence of overall business 
response to the opportunities for influence presented by EU institutions. It considers 
the various means by which companies can seek to influence, and the range of options
19
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open to them, in preparation for a more detailed examination of particular business 
sectors. This maps the range of participants within the lobbying arena which seek to 
influence decision-makers, both individual companies and interest groupings, and the 
institutions they target.
Chapter 5 describes the research strategy applied to assessing the development of 
influence within different sections. The information on the Pharmaceutical industry is 
developed from existing research by Greenwood and others, supplemented by 
interviews with key industry representatives, which allows new insights into this sector 
to be developed. However, the information on Road Freight is the major contribution 
of the thesis.
Chapters 6 & 7 contain descriptions of the two sectors in terms of the industry 
structure and their competitive environment. Itlassesses EU policies relating to each 
sector, company influence strategies, and the organisation of influence within the 
sector.
Chapter 8 draws out the main conclusions from the sectoral research. The comparison 
of the two sectors addresses two main themes: how influencing strategy has evolved in 
response to the EU in each sector, including the individual company and collective 
approach to influence, and how industry structure and competitive environment help 
shape sectoral response.
The comparison between the two sectors is used to explore the reasons for the 
differences which emerge. It concludes that there has been a shift in the focus of 
lobbying strategies to the EU in both industries, although national government still 
remains an important target for influence in its own right. For companies, the use of 
strategies involving the use of direct lobbying, and in particular what Greenwood refers 
to as the 'Brussels Strategy' (Greenwood, 1992, p.28), is the prerogative only of large 
organisations with significant transnational interests. It also demonstrates that their 
lobbying activities do not remain sector specific, but can be seen to extend to 
information gathering and influence within other sectors, such that they can affect the 
collective influence strategy of those sectors. They thus appear as catalysts for change 
not just within the confines of their own sectoral environment but within a much 
broader industry context.
Seen within the context of the industry structure and competitive environment, 
information appears to be of critical importance. The opportunities that EU 
government institutions present for informational advantage for firms may help to
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explain preference for the 'Brussels strategy' (Greenwood, Grote & Ronit, 1992, p.23). 
The need for information appears to be the critical factor in explaining why some firms 
will continue to invest in their own lobbyist regardless of the strength or weakness of 
collective lobbying capability. Although this thesis is not primarily concerned with 
debates about 'pluralist', or 'corporatist' nature of the EU political environment, it does 
suggest there are likely to be more opportunities for diverse interests to influence, than 
within a national (at least UK) context. This relates to the information needs of policy­
makers, and the complexity and uncertainty of processes and outcomes within the 
current political structure. Thus 'direct' lobbying by firms as an influence strategy is 
likely to remain a feature of the network of interests which continue to develop around 
EU institutions, including large, multinational organisations.
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Chapter 2
The Rationale for Business Interest Lobbying
2.1 Background and Assumptions
Literature on EU lobbying tends to concentrate primarily on the how influence is 
organised, rather than the costs and benefits of the influence itself. However, this 
chapter draws on contributions which focus on the reasons for influence (rent seeking, 
transaction costs & management theory literature) as well as how that influence is 
organised. This does not mean that political science literature, for example, ignores the 
reasons why companies lobby, just that the emphasis tends to be on questions of 
organisation rather than the rationale.
The following section reviews various contributions on influence, the costs and benefits 
of influence activity, and closely related to this, the organisation of lobbying activity, in 
order to present a more comprehensive view. This is used to provide the basis for the 
approach to the investigation of the lobbying opportunities presented by the EU, and 
the response of different firms and business sectors, which follows in subsequent 
chapters.
The assumption stated in chapter 1 is that companies behave as 'rational' actors' in that 
they make decisions based on the costs and benefits of proposed activity. The 
rationality may be bounded, i.e. they may not always have all the information necessary 
to make the best decisions about activities, and they may not be obviously wealth- 
maximising in the classical economic sense, but they are rational in that the set of costs 
and benefits they perceive will be balanced. Influencing activity has a cost and benefit 
just as decisions about the use of technology. The important difference within the 
context of lobbying, is that the costs and benefits equation takes place within a political 
framework, that is, where government institutions define the rules of the game. The 
game, in essence, is negotiation (Wallace & Wallace, 1996, p.33). We should expect 
therefore that influence strategies will reflect the relative costs employed to achieve 
benefit through various negotiating processes. Before any negotiation can take place 
however, there must be opportunities for influence, and the next section seeks to 
outline why these occur, and the nature of the costs and benefits associated with 
different influence strategies.
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2.2 Influence Opportunities and Costs
2.2.1 Decision-Making, Influence and Information
Treatment of the costs and benefits of influence, are found in the development of 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985; Miller, 1992; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990, 1992; Taylor & Singleton, 1993). Transaction cost economics maintains that in 
addition to the costs of production and distribution, the processes of deciding, 
negotiating, changing plans, re-negotiating, and influence are a cost to firms. Important 
components of these costs are the costs of gathering and assessing information in order 
to make efficient decisions.
R. Coase first developed the idea of transaction costs as part of a theory of the firm 
(Coase, 1937). Coase posed the question that if markets present the perfect way of 
organising transactions, then why does the firm exist? He maintained that the 
fundamental problem with classical economic theory was that it assumed exchange 
processes were costless. What Coase pointed out was that this assumption did not 
square with reality. 'Exchange' processes do not occur in a vacuum. They occur in 
circumstances typified by uncertainty, where two parties to an exchange may have 
different information, and where both parties know the other may use this information 
to gain an advantage in the exchange. Information advantage therefore opens the door 
to opportunistic behaviour. Transaction costs are the costs therefore of information 
acquisition and information control associated with 'exchange' situations. Coase went 
on to propose that the hierarchical arrangement represented by the firm (as opposed to 
market), is a means of controlling these costs by lowering uncertainty.
This insight was developed further by Williamson, who maintained that the modem 
firm structure could be interpreted as a means of economising on transaction costs, 
linking this in particular to the development of the multidivisional (M-form) 
corporation. His analysis was based on developing a more detailed understanding of 
the exchange process itself. Bargaining, negotiation, and influencing are pervasive 
throughout organisations, and the organisation's response to managing these activities 
will depend on three key factors: uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity. These 
shape contractual agreements. Williamson does not rule out the presence of other 
factors, such as technology, but the main contribution for the purpose here is the 
identification of information needs as the cost factor in negotiation, and the role of 
differences in information, as the creator of potential advantage in negotiations for one 
side or another.
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The same theme is explored by Milgrom & Roberts who argue that influence activities 
arise because decisions are required which carry consequences in terms of costs and 
benefits to members of an organisation. It follows therefore that decision-making 
processes are potentially subject to attempts at influence. The influencing process itself 
involves a diversion of resource, either on the part of the individual or group, within 
the context of a firm, in order to acquire the desired decision from decision-makers, 
usually the 'management1, and within it the desired distribution of resources in one form 
or another. The key factors which determine how far decision-makers are susceptible 
to influence, lies in their need for information in order to make efficient decisions. In 
real life this information may only be accessible through referring to those parties which 
have an interest in achieving specific outcomes. This imbalance in information between 
the decision-maker and those seeking to influence has been referred to as 'information 
asymmetry' (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, p 29). The greater the information asymmetry, 
the greater the opportunities to influence decision-makers.
Milgrom & Roberts develop this idea within the context of the firm. However, they 
also make explicit the parallel between this context and the public sector (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1990, p. 86). The same parallel is drawn by Miller, who also points to similar 
issues in relation to governmental decision-making 'The basic problem is that the 
information that is necessary to guarantee an efficient outcome is essentially private' 
(Miller, 1992, p.49). This is despite the fact that government may have the authority to 
force a particular outcome to a negotiation, thus echoing the earlier definition of power 
by Stephen Lukes. The basic problem is still information asymmetry, whether decisions 
are taken within the context of a firm, or alternatively, by a government.
The core contribution of the above authors to an understanding of influence activity is 
the centrality of information issues in relation to influence. The bargaining strength of 
each party will be determined in part by the degree of information asymmetry, not just 
by the power of each party as determined by the political framework. Within the 
context of this thesis therefore, the argument would be that where firms have private 
information of value to political decision-makers, then the costs of expending resource 
on influence activities are more likely to be repaid. These costs are the costs of 
information acquisition, assessment, formulation, and use in negotiation.
The concept of information asymmetry echoes much descriptive treatment of the 
'lobbying arena' in Brussels, as chapter 3 will show. It suggests that EU institutions 
have created greater lobbying opportunities by virtue of the scale of their central 
decision-making authority and the particular information asymmetries which arise from 
the structure and resources at the disposal of decision-makers within the EU.
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2.2.2 Government, Business Interests & the Control of Uncertainty
The application of the concept of information asymmetry within a wider setting 
involving government and business is made by both Milgrom & Roberts and Miller, 
though their main focus, like that of Coase and Williamson, is on the internal 
organisation of the firm. Williamson in particular makes a clear distinction between 
what he sees as the 'political' and 'economic arenas' (Williamson, 1985, pp 124-5). 
However, another strand of thinking challenges this separation and makes explicit the 
linkage between political and economic institutions. It proposes that these two domains 
overlap (North, 1990). In addition to government providing a framework for economic 
activity, it is also an economic actor in its own right (Lindberg, Campbell & 
Hollingsworth, 1991).
North proposes that firms do not just attempt to reduce bargaining effort and thus the 
costs associated with this, but they also seek to manage what he calls the costs of 
uncertainty. His thesis is that the 'major role o f institutions is to reduce uncertainty by 
establishing a stable, i f  not efficient, structure to human interaction.' (North, 1990, 
p.48) By institutions North refers not only to government structures and other official 
organisations but also the constraints, formal and informal that exist within society. 
This encompasses both legal rules and cultural norms.
Thus while political institutions form the framework within which the economic 
interests of various groups are played out, part of the purpose of the influence activity 
of economic groups will be to try to shape both the agenda and the political structure. 
’Broadly speaking political rules in place lead to economic rules though the causality 
runs both ways. That is, property rights and hence individual contracts are specified 
and enforced by political decision-making, but the structure o f economic interests will 
also influence the political structure’ (North, 1990, p.48). It follows that organisations 
with sufficient bargaining strength will use political institutions to achieve objectives 
when the payoff for maximising in that direction exceeds the payoff for investing within 
existing constraints. They will seek to influence not only what is done, but also how it 
is done. There is reciprocal activity between political institutions and economic or 
business interests which extends beyond the influence on particular decisions, to 
transformations in the way in which the relationships between the political and 
economic interests operate. The implication here is that it is not just the policies 
themselves that they seek to influence but the interaction with the institutions 
themselves.
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The arena within which influence activities take place, and where interests may seek to 
change the rules to their advantage, exists within the overlap between political and 
economic arenas. Lindberg, Campbell & Hollingsworth also develop this idea of 
reciprocity within the concept of ’governance structures'. 'Governance structure' may 
apply either to the economy as a whole or industrial sectors and is defined as the matrix 
of organisations and the relationships between them in order to 'develop, produce, and 
market goods or services' (Lindberg, et al, 1991, p.7). Included in these are bodies 
such as industry & trade associations. Lindberg, Campbell and Hollingsworth use the 
work of North and Williamson as a starting point for their argument that 
transformation in the governance of economies result from both economic, 
technological, political and cultural change. They maintain, like North, that the 
separation of the political from the economic arena is invalid and that notion of 'state 
intervention' in the economy is too simplistic, particularly in the context of defining 
why particular governance structures emerge or change (Lindberg et al, 1991, p.365). 
Their main proposition is that governance transformations occur not only as a result of 
actors being unable to efficiently acquire the resources and information they want, but 
when they cannot control satisfactorily the terms of exchange. The key point is that 
the greater the complexity and uncertainty surrounding exchange, the more likely this 
will generate efforts to manage the exchange process and the relationships which 
underpin these in a different, more satisfactory way. That is, a way which reduces the 
uncertainty of outcomes.
Like North, Lindberg, Campbell and Hollingsworth maintain that political institutions 
matter, and have a powerful influence on the governance structures within which 
economic and political actors pursue their objectives. However, they also argue that 
government, as an actor in its own right, may pursue goals which will make the some 
relationships with business interests more salient than others. Some industries are more 
important than others, depending on the goals that are being pursued, and their ability 
to provide competitive advantage. This in turn may create a differential in the 
opportunities for influence, but may also affect the governance structure of which that 
industry is a part. For example, Lindberg & Campbell note the connection between the 
concentration of industries and preference for bilateral exchange, against multilateral 
exchange involving, amongst other things, support for collective representation. 
Although the focus is on the link between State actions and the propensity, or not, for 
associative action, the connection with the concentration of the industry is an 
interesting one in this context(Lindberg & Campbell, 1991, p 370). It re-occurs in 
other literature, pointing to the importance of industry concentration on the behaviour 
of firms' political activities.
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If Coase, Williamson, and Milgrom & Roberts point to the role of information 
asymmetry in creating the opportunity for influence, then North, Lindberg, Campbell 
and Hollingsworth confirm the importance of the characteristics of the political 
framework in shaping the interaction of economic actors with government agencies. 
These relationships may alter due to changes in the goals pursued by government, and 
therefore the political salience of particular industries. They may also however, alter 
due to the needs o f economic actors to manage the level of uncertainty within their 
environment. Political, economic, technical, or cultural changes may all increase 
uncertainty.] What emerges from economics and organisation literature is a linkage 
between information, uncertainty and complexity. This is a key linkage which will be 
explored in subsequent chapters, in relation to the characteristics of EU political 
institutions and processes.
2.2.3 Summary: Influence Opportunities & Costs
To summarise, transaction cost economics concludes that opportunities for influence 
exist where there are information differences between two or more parties to an 
exchange. In practical terms, 'exchange' may take many forms, between individuals, 
between companies, between company management and work force, or in this context 
between government decision-makers and firms.
What this literature also shows however is that the attempt to influence takes place 
within a context of government's role as both a political structure, but that within this 
structure, government is an economic actor in its own right. Therefore it both 
establishes the rules, and seeks to use these to further its own aims in the form of 
policies. These policies may determine the particular importance of various industry 
activities, and therefore the political salience of individual industry sectors.
Political institutions and their policies create the opportunity for influence. This is not 
just through their ability and authority to intervene in the activities of individuals, or 
groups and to allocate power and resources as they see fit. The opportunity exists 
because decision-makers are reliant on information in order to make decisions. They 
are reliant on others who may have a vested interest in certain outcomes, and also 
have the power to misrepresent information to obtain certain favourable outcomes. 
Any centralised decision making therefore, invites influence, because it creates 
opportunity through this information asymmetry.
Uncertainty, complexity of issues and the information required to support decisions 
may determine why political institutions and the policies provide greater or lesser
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opportunities for influence. However, the creation of influence 'opportunities' does not 
mean that these will be taken up. There are costs attached to influence activity, as 
Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985) have indicated. There are dependencies on (i) the 
relative costs compared with the nature of the benefit to individual firms and (ii) the 
ability of firms to co-operate to provide more cost-effective collective approaches to 
representation. If lobbying is a form of exchange between governmental agencies and 
firms (either acting individually or collectively), then its cost derives from the costs of 
information acquisition, assessment, and the presentation of information. The costs 
associated with capturing benefit may be direct or indirect. Direct costs are costs of 
financing lobbying activity - the cost of acquiring and assessing information, the cost 
associated with presenting information to decision-makers, and the negotiation which 
ensues. In addition it may be the cost of co-ordinating representation with other firms 
(see figure 2). It is also a cost of diverting the required resource from productive 
activities, to influence activity.
Either way, the costs must have appropriate payback for individual firms, or firms 
acting collectively. The next section therefore looks at some of the benefits that may be 
captured from influencing government, and more specifically, lobbying activity by 
firms.
2.3 The Benefits of Influence
Transaction cost economics and the thinking which has developed from it, identifies the 
importance of uncertainty, complexity and associated information issues as factors 
which shape the opportunities for influence, and the nature of the costs associated with 
capturing those opportunities. However, in order to provide a more operational basis 
on which to study the behaviour of firms and sectors, the next section examines some 
of the specific benefits companies may capture through expending resource on 
influence activities. This draws from other literature: political science; rent-seeking; 
management theory; and theories of co-operation among firms. Having identified why 
opportunities arise, the costs associated with these opportunities, and how they may be 
shaped by the political environment, it attempts to provide a closer look at the benefits 
that firms may attempt to capture through influence either collectively or as individuals. 
These contributions echo the centrality of uncertainty, complexity, and information 
issues as key drivers for influence activity. They also provide some clues about why 
individual organisations may choose to invest in lobbying within the EU as part of their 
influence strategy.
Negotiation
Information
Acquisition
Information
Presentation
Information
Assessment
Co-ordination
Figure 2 The Cost o f Influence
Management of Co-operation in a 
Competitive Environment
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2.3.1 Trading Environment Protection or Enhancement: Regulation
Much of the recent work on lobbying activities in the EU has emerged from the work 
of political scientists. The development of the European Union has created this interest 
not only because there appears to be a process of 'State' formation in progress, (Grant, 
1990, p.2) but also because this process appears to have been accompanied by a very 
visible increase in lobbying activity directed towards newly emerging governmental 
institutions. EU lobbying literature concentrates on three levels. First: general trends 
in business (and non-business lobbying), which shows how the activity has developed, 
and the extent of lobbying; second, detailed sectoral studies of business lobbying and 
individual case studies which examine lobbying issues, for example, the lobbying efforts 
of express freight carriers over postal monopolies in Europe (Campbell, 1994, p. 123). 
The main focus however, has been the development of EU institutions, and the 
importance of increasing EU policy competence. It is also about the relationship 
between these factors and certain key characteristics of individual sectors which 
produce collective action of varying degrees of cohesion at a European level. Hence 
questions of whether the relationship of business interests to EU government 
machinery is more 'pluralist' than 'corporatist', and why some national interest groups 
are more successful than others at formulating interest representation at European 
level, have occupied much of this literature.
In seeking to address these and other issues, the literature focuses on two main levels. 
The first considers general trends in lobbying behaviour and focuses particularly on the 
characteristics of the institutional environment, the 'rules of the game' in negotiations 
between decision-makers and business or non-business lobbies (Mazey & Richardson, 
1993a, 1993b; Andersen & Eliassen, 1993). The second, more extensive treatment of 
lobbying focuses on the sectoral patterns of lobbying behaviour, i.e. it is predominantly 
about the organisation of interests within the EU and how this has developed 
(Greenwood, Grote & Ronit, 1992; Jordan & McLaughlin, 1991; Cawson, 1992; 
Pedler & Van Schendelen, 1994). There are some examples of individual lobbying 
'cases' (Pedler & Van Schendelen, 1993, pp 23-199) but the predominant approach is 
sectoral.
What emerges from these complimentary treatments of lobbying is the complexity of 
decision-making processes across EU institutions, and the relative uncertainty of 
outcomes due to the interplay of national and sectoral interests (Mazey & Richardson, 
1993a, pp 22-23). Another characteristic of EU institutional arrangements is decision­
makers openness to contact. The EU political environment is characterised by complex 
bargaining processes played out in an arena where the information-processing
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capabilities of decision-makers are tested to the full. As a result, there are many 
opportunities for influence due to this openness, which is created by the need for 
information in order to make decisions and the need for these decisions to be accepted.
'The very nature o f central EC institutions implies that they have different mandates 
and roles from those o f institutions in the national systems.... This particular type o f 
system has a greater need, not only for the expertise o f interest organisations, but also 
fo r contact and acceptance by affected interests, in order to safeguard its legitimacy 
in relation to society '(Andersen & Eliassen, 1993, p.21). The fundamental point which 
emerges is that the political institutions themselves are key determinants of influencing. 
The institutional framework within which influencing takes place affects the behaviour 
of participants, providing the context within which they operate through the definition 
of formal and informal rules, thus supporting earlier contributions from North, 
Lindberg, Campbell & Hollingsworth.
The institutional framework is not, however, the only determinant, as sectoral studies 
show. Policy competence and policies also matter, and this is the starting point for 
much of the sectoral work on lobbying. Both Greenwood & Ronit, Cawson,, and 
McLaughlin each start their respective analyses of the pharmaceutical, consumer 
electronics and motor manufacturing industries by using Lowi's statement that 'policies 
make politics' i.e. that the nature of the policy will affect the political processes which 
surround its formulation. Greenwood (1992, pp 1-41) shows how pharmaceutical 
industry interests are organised against the background of European regulation of 
pharmaceuticals and discrete areas such as medicine pricing and marketing 
authorisation. Cawson (1992, pp 99-117) examines the consumer electronic industry in 
the context of European Technology policy, and McLaughlin et al consider the car 
industry (McLaughlin, Jordan & Maloney, 1993).
Policy formulation and the ensuing regulatory activity of EU institutions thus form the 
focus of sector-based investigation into interest group representation in the EU. The 
sectoral approach is justified as it more often that not represents discrete areas of 
economic activity and hence focused areas for policy formulation, but it is the policy 
context which is seen as a key determinant of the organisational form of interest 
representation. This is explicitly drawn out in Cawson's work on consumer electronics 
(Cawson, 1992, p. 101).
The underlying reason for lobbying which this literature supports is therefore twofold: 
(i) the existence of particular institutional characteristics which facilitate the influencing 
activity of firms, coupled with the development of policy competence and (ii) the
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regulatory powers which may result in 'political interventions' in the economy (Grant,
1991).
These interventions may take many forms; specific regulation, taxes, tariffs, production 
of public goods and services, or the broader allocation of resource across wide ranging 
social and economic sectors of society (Pedler & Van Schendelen, 1994, p.4) The 
response of firms, and their influence activities can be aimed at timely compliance with 
regulation, damage limitation, improvement or safeguarding of the trading 
environment, or new business opportunities (Sargent, 1993, pp 232-245).
In conclusion, this literature focuses on the power of intervention in the economic 
environment of firms, the nature of the policies which governments pursue, and the 
regulatory and resource allocation activities of government. This rationale underpins 
much of the sectoral studies on lobbying activity in the EU (e.g. Arp, 1991). With the 
possible exception of 'new business opportunities' these are largely concerned with the 
protection or enhancement of the trading environment, rather than about the potential 
for the capture of individual benefits by the firm. What it does not do is look at how 
particular firm strategies may link to types of benefit. Other literature however, makes 
this link more explicit.
2.3.2 Rent-Seeking and Rent-Capture.
If the threats or opportunities posed by particular policies or regulations provides a key 
focus for much EU lobbying literature, another perspective has emerged from a 
different literature - research into monopoly. From this the idea of 'rent-seeking', and 
rent-capture has emerged. Here the context is the cost to the economy and to society 
as a whole, of influence activities undertaken by firms or business interest groups in 
order to capture 'rent', typically in the form of monopoly, cartel, state aid, or tariffs.
The concept of 'rent-seeking' was developed by writers such as Krueger (1964) and 
Tullock (1967). The general notion is that the interventions of government in the 
economy create 'rents'. A rent is defined as an additional advantage gained over and 
above those generated by productive activities in a competitive market. Rents typically 
occur as a result of many types of intervention, and traditionally take the form of 
monopolies, tariffs, and state aid. Where these rents exist, individual firms or groups of 
firms will become involved in influencing activities in order to obtain these rents for 
themselves, and also to prevent others from obtaining them. The idea of disbenefit to 
others is an important aspect of the definition. Rent-seeking according to Tullock's 
reasoning, is a cost to society as a whole. This is the cost of influencing activity, which
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may cause the distortion of decisions, and therefore suboptimal solutions for society as 
a whole. Although costs to society are not the focus of this thesis, rent-seeking 
literature provides an insight into a particular benefit which is the appropriation of 
wealth, rather than the production of wealth, by firms. An important question which 
arises from this is whether all lobbying is in fact rent-seeking behaviour on the part of 
firms.
Tullock's view is that 'lobbying' is not just about rent in the sense defined above. He 
points out for example that it may be possible for lobbying to be directed at the 
prevention of rent-capture by companies or groups of companies. The example of the 
British Shippers; Association's ; response to the shipping companies actions, discussed 
in chapter 6, illustrates this type of action. Also, unless the concept of rent-seeking is 
extended to cover not only traditional manifestations of 'rent' such as monopoly, 
cartel, tariffs, or aid, but also to cover information, this is too simplistic. Rent-seeking 
is one of the reasons why companies or group of companies may expend resource in 
attempts to influence government, but it is not the only one.
2.3.3 Information for Competitive Advantage.
A further area of potential benefit emerges from management and organisation theory. 
Porter, Doz, Mahini & Wells (1986) identify the particular importance of interaction 
with government agencies for one particular group of firms - those with transnational 
operations. While these writers are not specifically interested in lobbying, they provide 
insights into the importance of information to these firms, and the potential for 
government agencies to supply this information.
These benefits are particularly relevant to firms operating transnationally. This often 
implies firms operating within a concentrated industry sector. Information Technology, 
Pharmaceuticals, Motor Manufacture and Chemicals are good examples. Firms within 
these sectors face high levels of uncertainty through working within different political, 
social and economic contexts, and the attendant co-ordination problems associated 
with this. The tasks of developing the right configuration and co-ordination 
mechanisms - the location of activities, the methods for controlling these - may be the 
key to competitive advantage over a small number of equally large and powerful 
competitors. Porter argues that in this context a government relations function gains in 
importance for such firms. This importance lies both in access to information, and in 
the ability to exercise power through influence. While lobbying may therefore 
traditionally be regarded as the exercise of influence, what underpins the activity is 
seeking or giving access to information which may not be otherwise obtainable. Such
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access is easier to obtain with the establishment of relationships with government 
decision-makers and agencies through investing in lobbying activity.
The idea of information as a competitive benefit in its own right is also noted by 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989, p. 102) again within the context of large, multinational 
organisations. The context of their work is the organisational development of 
multinational firms. Access to information provides one of the keys to competitive 
advantage. By implication however, this is an individual firm benefit, an advantage to 
be gained against other competitors in the market place. Obviously it is possible for 
information to be a collective benefit. For example, in the case of proposed government 
legislation, early knowledge of government intentions may allow pre-emptive action by 
business interests where proposals are felt to be harmful. Firms may also obtain 
collective benefit from the contact with each other, whilst avoiding possible action 
from government on the grounds of anti-competitive practice. Both within the United 
States, and more recently the EU, anti-trust regulations have been applied to ensure 
competitive conditions exist within industries. Participation in consultative fora may 
therefore allow firms legitimate access to information from government, and also 
facilitate inter-firm contact and information exchange. The importance of the point that 
Porter, Doz, Bartlett and Ghoshal make, is that information is not only a benefit in its 
own right, it may also provide individual firm advantage.
2.3.4 Market Stabilisation.
A further target of lobbying emerges from research into the collective action of firms in 
order to manage their competitive environment. Bowman (1988) and Galambos 
(1966) have shown that firms within particular environments may actively seek 
intervention by the State in order to stabilise their own competitive environment, and 
thereby create less uncertainty in trading conditions. Bowman's study of the 
bituminous coal industry in the United States, shows how the industry structure, the 
large number of small firms, and emphasis on price rather than differentiation of its 
products engenders fiercely competitive behaviour. This combined to make co­
operative behaviour amongst firms extremely difficult. The alternative to self­
management within the sector was to invite government to provide the stability 
through regulation. Bowman uses game theory to explore the various issues which 
faced this industry over a period of time, noting that it is industry characteristics which 
will drive the ability, or not, to gain the advantages of co-operation.
In a different context Gerlach (1992) also identifies the need for market stabilisation as 
the rationale behind the inter-firm alliances formed by Japanese companies. The co­
operative behaviour here is aimed at the improvement of their own social and economic
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well-being through managing the competitive environment in a particular way. The 
complex system of alliances formed around large corporations has emerged from the 
dramatic social and economic transformations during the post-war period and, Gerlach 
argues, these have enabled firms to become particularly successful in overcoming the 
challenges of this transformation and events such as the oil crisis.
These studies show the importance to firms of reducing the uncertainty of their 
competitive environment. What it also shows is that the particular industry structure, 
and the competitive relations between firms may or may not facilitate the co-operation 
necessary to achieve sufficient market stabilisation. Clearly, the cotton manufacturing 
and bituminous coal industries were less successful at resolving this dilemma than 
Japanese industries. Where firms are less successful they may invite government 
intervention in order to achieve the same end, usually in the form of regulation, thus 
again highlighting the importance of the management of uncertainty by business 
interests.
2.3.5 Business Opportunities
A final category of benefit which firms may attempt to capture can be overlooked in 
the lobbying context. This is the capture of specific business where government 
agencies are potential customers. Defence procurement, is an obvious example of this. 
However, government agencies are consumers of a whole range of products and 
services from photocopiers, to management consultancy, and these can represent 
substantial commercial opportunities for firms. The EU is no exception to this, though 
compared to some national government arrangements it represents a relatively small 
bureaucracy and potential market. Governments also create business opportunities in 
pursuance of particular policies, and while these may be handled through tender 
processes, or bids for research funding, the chances are that they will also attract 
varying degrees of lobbying to support individual business objectives. The importance 
of government as a source of potential business within its own right is noted by Kay 
(1993). He cites the case of BP, for example, where the company 'depends on 
government to license it exploratory activities, it pays handsomely fo r these rights 
when the outcomes is successful and its operations are an important source o f 
government revenue in many o f the jurisdictions within which it operates. The 
effective management ofpublic affairs is at the very heart o f the business o f BP (Kay, 
1993, p. 186). Government therefore can act as both the giver, or gatekeeper to such 
business opportunities.
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2.3.6 Summary: The Benefits of Influence
To summarise the above contributions, the potential benefits than can be captured 
through lobbying are: trading environment protection; market stabilisation; rent 
capture; business opportunity; and information for competitive advantage. These are 
shown in figure (3).
Trading Environment Protection/Enhancement: Companies may lobby in order to 
prevent legislation which will affect their operational costs, restrict markets or have 
other effects which have the potential to reduce profits. They may seek regulation in 
order to prevent similar effects from other economic and social changes, or take 
advantage of changes in policy to enhance their trading environment. This latter 
objective overlaps with rent seeking activities, but may not necessarily be synonymous 
with it (Sargent, 1993).
Market Stabilisation: companies may lobby in order to encourage government to 
regulate to create a more stable environment, with less uncertainty, where they cannot 
achieve this independently (Galambos,1966).
Rent: companies or groups of companies may be seeking to achieve rent in the form of 
tariffs, aid, or ultimately monopoly. They may be seeking to protect such rent 
opportunities, or on the other hand, seek government intervention in order to prevent 
or destroy such tariffs, aid, or monopoly (Tullock,1967) .
Business Opportunities: governments may create business opportunities for firms as 
potential purchasers of products or services. Defence and IT are two prime examples. 
They may also create opportunities for offsetting operating costs if they are part of 
strategic sectors. The funding for research and development programmes (for example 
RACE or ESPRIT) within the EU are good examples of this. Governments may also 
act as a gatekeeper to business opportunities (Kay, 1993).
Information: at individual firm level, companies may be seeking information to assist 
strategic internal configuration and co-ordination decisions. This may not only be 
information from government sources, but the interaction with government agencies 
may also provide a forum for interchange of ideas and information with 'competitors' 
which may otherwise be deemed illegal under anti-trust regulations (Porter et al, 1986; 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1992).
Information Individual Benefits
Business
Opportunities
Trading Environment
Rent
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Figure 3 The Benefits o f  Influence
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Some of these benefits are collective, while others are firm-specific. Information to 
achieve competitive advantage and the development of business opportunities are 
individual firm benefits. Trading environment protection, rent capture or maintenance 
may have individual or collective benefit potential. For example a monopoly or cartel 
may capture 'rent'. Finally, market stabilisation is by its nature a collective benefit 
(though this does not imply that all members of the collective will equally benefit). 
This approach builds on the ideajthat companies primarily lobby in order to instigate, 
amend or repeal regulations. This may be the means to achieve the benefit (protection 
of the trading environment, rent etc), but it is not the end in itself. Regulation is one of 
the means by which governments' operationalise their policies. These policies may 
present certain threats or opportunities to firms, industry sectors, or industry as a 
whole.
Policies and regulations therefore form the focal point for influence activities. 
However, the potential benefits identified with lobbying activity suggest certain 
important dimensions which may be key to understanding not just why lobbying 
activity at a general level occurs, but also why, as an influence strategy, it is more 
characteristic of some firms, and industry sectors, and why it may be organised in 
particular ways.
2.4 The Organisation of Influence
If influence strategies and lobbying may have several different aims from the point of 
view of an individual company, another dimension is added in terms of how that 
influence is exercised. Lobbying is not just about the potential benefits that individual 
firms may gain from diverting resource into influencing governmental agencies. It is 
also about how they choose to do this, in particular whether they choose to exert 
influence as an individual organisation or to act collectively.
2.4.1. The Costs of Co-ordinating Influence
As earlier sections established, influencing activity involves a cost. Even within the 
context of lobbying as defined here, the use o f information as a means o f persuasion, 
there are costs associated with acquisition, targeting co-ordination and presentation of 
that information. However, another level of cost is added when we consider that 
individual lobbying activity - the establishment of bi-lateral relationships with decision­
makers, is only one strategy that firms can use to influence. Interest group literature 
shows that even within a national context, lobbying by collective interests is common. 
Where this occurs, there is still the same cost of information acquisition, assessment,
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formulating positions and negotiation, albeit mitigated across the membership of the 
collective interest, but also the costs of co-ordinating group response. These are 
internal consultation costs which must be added to other costs associated with 
individual action. The costs of information acquisition, assessment, formulating 
positions, and negotiation therefore come in various guises, some related to individual 
action, others related to the cost of co-ordination involved in collective action.
At a practical level, costs can be annual subscriptions to trade, industry or other 
associations which 'lobby* government on behalf of their members (often subscriptions 
are scaled according to the size of the firm). It could be the appointment of an in- 
house lobbyist or team of lobbyists, fees payable to professional lobbying organisations, 
or the appointment of non-executive directors to the Board, typically senior ex- 
bureaucrats. It is clear from these options that firms have a number of ways in which 
they can seek to exert influence. In broad terms these can be defined as individual or 
collective strategies, and they carry different cost implications for the company. They 
are also linked to the nature of the potential benefit that can be captured from 
influence.
Within the context of the EU, the strategies available are more complex than within a 
national environment. This is because they may be not only be individual or collective, 
but individual or collective at either European or national level, or various 
combinations of these options, as Greenwood & Ronit show in the matrix of interest 
groups and potential routes to decision-makers in the EU (Greenwood, Grote & Ronit, 
1992, p.28),
A permanent lobbying representative based in Brussels can cost upwards from 
£100,000 per annum (interview: 18). It is hardly surprising therefore that EU lobbying 
literature suggests the majority of lobbying is carried out by 'interest groups' 
representing companies. What is clear from this literature is that the full realisation of 
the potential for influence through collective action does not automatically follow from 
its general desirability. The development of EU institutions, with an ever increasing 
scope of legislative competence, may have provided the impetus for the development 
of EU lobbying capability by business interests. Yet the reformulation of interest 
groups from national to European level has had varying degrees of success.
2.4.2 Co-operation, Conflict and Collective Action
Collective interest representation may be desirable not only from the perspective that 
several benefits from the activity are collective by definition (e.g. market stabilisation),
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but also because the costs of individual influence activity may be mitigated to individual 
firms. However, the literature on collective action also shows that while it may be a 
rational response to the need to influence the political environment, it is not always 
possible to gain co-operation amongst members of a group in order to achieve such 
action.
In his study of collective action, Olson singles out business lobbies as the segment of 
society which has produced the largest number of interest groups. The main thread of 
Olson's argument is that interest groups, whether business or otherwise, do not spring 
up spontaneously, and that there are costs, as well as benefits, associated with group 
activity. He assumes human nature is fundamentally opportunistic and that self-interest 
will provide the impetus for joining or defection from groups, and the tendency to 'free- 
ride', i.e. let others bear the costs of the collective action, while still reaping the benefits 
of their effort (Olson, 1965).
Individuals, or individual organisations are aware of this dilemma, and in order to 
overcome the problem, groups must, according to Olson, provide selective benefits 
both to attract members in the first place, and to prevent defection as a result of the 
'free-rider' problem. A key insight that Olson articulated was that the size of the group 
is critical to the extent of the co-operation dilemma he described. Where groups are 
small, there is potentially more homogeneity, and monitoring for defection is easier. 
With large groups, usually characterised by more diverse interests, the problem of co­
operation is more significant, as the monitoring of defection is more difficult. Olson 
suggests that in these circumstances, lobbying could suffer by being changed from the 
prime purpose of the group, to become a by-product. There is certainly evidence that 
lobbying is not a priority function (to the membership) in certain circumstances, as 
Bennett indicates in his treatment of British Chambers of Commerce (1995). This fits 
Olson's argument about the importance of specific benefits in large groups. However, 
the notion of a lobbying as a by-product' is certainly not supported in terms of the 
picture of collective lobbying activity in concentrated industry sectors described by 
Greenwood & Ronit, Grant, Cawson, Jordan & McLaughlin and others. The difference 
may lie not only in the size of the group however, but in the similarity or dissimilarity 
of interests across the membership. Selective benefits may apply to the small group as 
well the large (Jordan & McLaughlin, 1991, p.31).
The problem of co-operation/defection identified by Olson has been developed 
extensively through the application of game theory. Starting from the classic 'prisoners 
dilemma' model, other types of interaction in conflict/co-operation situations have been 
developed to explore the factors which contribute to an understanding of group
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dynamics. The key point underlying this approach is that the existence of collective 
interests does not necessarily produce collective action. There are inherent barriers to 
co-operative action which are determined by the homogeneity or heterogeneity of 
interests.
A more recent contribution to this approach by Heckathom (1995) provides an 
extensive treatment of the types of interaction that characterise co-operation dilemmas. 
In addition to specifying a comprehensive list of game scenarios, Heckathom notes the 
types of barrier to co-operative behaviour as: problems of co-ordination; bargaining 
over how gains are to be divided; and lack of trust that others will co-operate. The 
important linkage he makes is between the nature of the ‘game’ scenario (Prisoners 
Dilemma, Chicken, Altruist etc) with the relationship of individuals to the decision­
making environment, and their information needs in order to make good decisions, 
thus reflecting earlier contributions from transaction cost economics.
Both Olson's work and subsequent contributions from game theory form an important 
starting point for more specific examination of EU lobbying behaviour, and why it is 
organised in particular ways. This is because it makes the fundamental point that the 
existence of collective interests does not necessarily guarantee it is possible to organise 
collective action. There are also indications that the characteristics of a group are 
important in determining how successful they will be in overcoming the barriers to 
collective action. Olson specifically mentions group size, but contributions from other 
areas of research suggest other key features which may come into play within the 
business environment.
2.4.3 Co-operation, Conflict and the Competitive Environment
The inherent difficulties of achieving the co-operation necessary for collective action 
do not occur in a vacuum in the business world. In this context, problems of co­
operation are compounded because it is a competitive environment (Bowman, 1988). 
In exploring the effect of competition on the ability of firms to co-operate, the 
importance of industry characteristics and competitive environment emerge as key to 
the organisation of interest. The opportunity costs of co-operation are higher for firms 
because of their competitive relationships (Traxler,1991; Van Waarden, 1991; 
Bowman, 1988; Galambos, 1966). Characteristics which support higher levels of 
competitiveness, also heighten the problem of co-operation, even when individual firms 
recognise that co-operative behaviour will bring benefit. Bowman's investigation into 
the pre-World War II bituminous coal industry in the United States shows how co­
operation, which is desirable in terms of market stabilisation, is prevented by the
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particularly fragmented industry structure and fierce interfirm competitive relationships 
this generates (Bowman, 1988). Amongst the US coal producers, co-operation was 
desirable in order to stop the price-cutting and the low profits generated by fierce 
competition. However, these firms were incapable of the required self-control needed 
to break the destructive pattern of behaviour. In the end they sought assistance from 
government in order to achieve the desired control of self-interested, but ultimately 
destructive behaviour. This study of the 'fragmented' bituminous coal industry, 
contrasts with Mizruchi & Koenig's analysis of the political activities of firms in 
concentrated industry sectors (Mizruchi & Koenig, 1991), though they also place a 
strong emphasis on the role of the such factors as corporate networks part of their 
explanation. Although the context is somewhat different, the point is essentially the 
same. Sector concentration often means common interests, and assists co-operative 
behaviour, even at the level of party political preferences - 'large firms and firms in 
concentrated industries are more likely to contribute to the same candidates than are 
smaller firms and firms in more competitive industries. The finding on concentration 
is consistent with both collective action and structural arguments that a group's 
organisation is facilitated by a small number o f actors' (Mizruchi & Koenig, 1991, 
p.310).
The reverse side of this, fragmented sectoral interests, makes co-operation more 
difficult. Whatever the ultimate purpose of collective action therefore, the conclusion is 
that one cannot assume that it will be possible for firms to co-operate in the 
achievement of collective goals, of which influencing political thinking or specific 
decisions by government is one. Successful formulation of collective influence is 
shaped by certain industry characteristics, those which promote similar sets of interests. 
The concentration of an industry, characterised by fewer firms of similar, large, size 
provides greater likelihood of similar interests than does the fragmentation of an 
industry. The importance of industry concentration is also reflected in the development 
of transaction cost economics, where it has been proposed that concentration reduces 
the transaction costs of co-ordinating collective action (Taylor & Singleton, 1993, 
p. 195-214). The argument goes that where interests are too diverse, then the costs 
expended on co-ordination may be greater than the potential benefit to individual 
members.
2.4.4 EU Lobbying, Associations & Industry Structure
Streeck & Schmitter highlight the importance of associations as key contributors to 
the effective functioning of the State, community and the market. Interest associations, 
they maintain, play a key role in the complex social, economic and political
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environment in which many potential conflicts of interest need resolving (Streeck & 
Schmitter, 1985). They can contribute to the resolution of such conflict through their 
particular position as interlocutors between state, community and market social 
models. However their effectiveness, particularly with regard to the State, is dependent 
on particular characteristics, in particular, their ability to represent members views, 
control behaviour and have a monopoly over membership. Thus Streeck & Schmitter 
conclude that some associations can develop from ’one of many' interest groups to 
privileged positions in terms of influencing. This is the concept of notion of 'private 
interest government'.
Within the context of the EU, a later contribution by the same authors continues the 
theme of the importance of associational action (Streeck & Schmitter, 1991). 
However, although there may be some policy areas where relationships may develop 
along the lines noted above, their analysis concludes that 'interest associations, and 
quite a few  o f them, will have to compete fo r attention with national states, regions, 
large firms and specialised lobbyists, leaving their constituents with a wide range o f 
differing paths o f access to the Community's political centre..' (Streeck & Schmitter, 
1991, p. 159). They also note the growing importance of the sectoral association, linked 
to the need for EU competitive advantage, and the alignment of employer and labour 
interests in production sectors.
Studies of EU lobbying literature (Greenwood, 1994; Greenwood & Ronit, 1992; 
Cawson, 1992; McLaughlin & Jordan, 1993; and Pedler & Van Schendelen et al, 1994) 
confirm this picture. They identify a complex web of collective interest organisations 
that exists both at national and at European level. This offers firms access to European 
decision-makers, in addition to any direct lobbying by individual firms themselves. 
Some interest groups are set within sectoral boundaries, for example European trade 
associations, while others are European and industry-wide in nature, for example 
UNICE. Alternatively, some groups arise in order to deal with specific issues, for 
example the Pharmaceutical Partners for]Better Healthcare, noted in chapter 7. This 
network provides a series of discrete but interdependent routes for influencing 
decision-makers for the individual firm. It shows that collective response to the 
opportunities presented by the EU political framework is a key feature of the 'lobbying 
arena'.
Early assumptions about interest group formulation in response to the development of 
the EU were based on ideas that nationally organised interests would recognise 
development of policy competence within the EC and its implications for the focus of 
influencing activity and shift their activity to 'Brussels'. Further impetus was to be
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provided ' by European bureaucrats who, in their search for a constituency, would be 
more than willing to promote interest organisation on a scale coterminous with their 
supranational jurisdiction.' (Streeck & Schmitter, 1991, p. 134) As Streeck & 
Schmitter point out however, the reality was far from the predicted translation of 
established arrangements from national to European level. Instead, the development of 
the EU provoked a more fragmented pattern of interest group representation at 
European level. The level of lobbying increased, with a particular watershed following 
the proposal for the Single European Act and its subsequent implementation. The 
'lobbying explosion' (Mazey & Richardson, 1993, p.4) which has drawn the attention of 
political scientists, and resulted in a growing literature on the subject, but shows 
through sectoral studies the different arrangements that characterise how collective 
representation is organised. Key concerns are why some groups have successfully 
reformulated interest representation at EU level, the cohesiveness (i.e. strength) of 
these groups in relation to established national counterparts, and the shift in the focus 
of lobbying activity from national to EU level. While therefore Streeck & Schmitter 
conclude there will be a competitive environment for interests seeking to influence 
decision-makers, Greenwood & Ronit's investigations into the pharmaceutical industry 
suggest this sector may have achieved something approaching the kind of private 
interest government described through the strength and cohesion of collective 
representation at European level.
This literature acknowledges the importance of certain firm, and industry 
characteristics in the way influence is organised. Although the rules of interaction with 
government agencies, in this case the EU, may be determined by those agencies, the 
participants in that interaction are also influenced by firm and sector characteristics. 
Greenwood & Ronit (1992) note the importance of the 'transnational dimension', in 
shaping the response of the pharmaceutical industry to the organisation of interests at 
European level. The concentration of the industry and its international scope means 
that there is a homogeneity of interests amongst members of the group. Therefore it 
has a relatively strong collective voice through its European association. This contrasts 
with the findings from Greenwood's analysis of the tourist industry in Europe. Here he 
concludes that while certain sub-groups within the tourism industry may indeed be 
influential, overall their influence is less compared to the more concentrated sectors 
because they are less cohesive (Greenwood, 1992). The argument is that influence is 
reduced because the representation does not encompass the whole industry. The 
underlying point is that this is difficult to achieve when the interests of the members are 
too diverse.
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Yet concentration may not be the only factor. While the pharmaceutical industry 
appears to have been relatively successful in overcoming co-operation problems at a 
European level, others have had more difficulty, as shown by McLaughlin's treatment 
of the motor manufacturing industry. This is also a concentrated sector, though it is 
also an industry with strong national ties. Perhaps therefore concentration alone is not 
enough; within the context of the EU, it also has to be concentration at the 
transnational level. Greenwood & Ronit argue the transnational focus of the industry 
and its firms, is a key factor in explaining the relative strength of pharmaceutical 
industry collective representation at European level. What is important about 
transnational company interests and operations is the similarity of issues that firms face, 
compared with those operating within a single or limited number of national 
environments.
In summary, sectoral studies of lobbying show, implicitly rather than explicitly, the link 
between industry structure and the organisation of interests. The key themes which 
emerge from this are the importance of the transnational interests of firms, the relative 
concentration of the industry sector, and the significance of the activities of large firms 
on collective interest representation. This lends support to the earlier, theoretical, 
contributions (Olson, 1965; Heckathom, 1995), and research into the effect of industry 
structure and competitive environment on the co-operative behaviour of firms 
(Bowman, Galambos, Mizruchi & Koenig). The next section presents a summary of 
the costs and potential benefits of influence, and a framework for the analysis of key 
characteristics of industry structure which will inform the later detailed sectoral 
analyses.
However, before summarising key factors which emerge from the consideration of the 
organisation of influence, the relationship between potential benefits and individual and 
collective lobbying action needs some clarification. There is no implied correlation 
between collective action and collective benefit. As noted earlier some benefits may be 
both collective and individual, and the evidence from lobbying literature shows that 
firms may attempt to use collective influence strategies for the capture of firm-specific 
benefit (Cawson, 1992, p. 101). Collective action may form part of a company influence 
strategy not necessarily because it is a more cost-effective way to capture benefit, 
important though this is, but because it has value from another point of view. This is 
because it is seen as a more legitimate influence strategy within the political 
framework.
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2.4.5 The Organisation of Interests & Importance of Industry Structure
If costs and benefits highlight the importance of political institutions and their policy 
agenda as the context for company influence strategies, then there is evidence from a 
number of sources to suggest that certain industry characteristics are key to 
understanding the way influence is organised, particularly in relation to the sector's 
ability to present cohesive representation at a European level. Firm size, the 
concentration of the industry, and the transnational nature of operations emerge as 
particularly important factors in the ability to co-ordinate activities within a competitive 
environment. These and other related factors are as follows:
• Concentration & Internal Level of Competition: the concentration or 
fragmentation of industries can be represented both in terms of the number of firms 
which populate the sector, the diversity of size of firm within the sector, and the 
geographical location of firms. A concentrated industry sector is usually thought of 
as one dominated by a small number of large firms. It is an important characteristic 
because of the opportunities this presents to firms for co-operative action, and it 
has been a particular subject of interest in relation to the formation and activities of 
cartels i.e. attempts to manage the competitive environment to the group 
advantage. Following earlier arguments, the smaller the group, the easier the task 
of co-ordination and the more likely attempts at co-operative behaviour will be 
successful (Olson, 1965)
• Structural Complexity: the contrast between sectors dominated by large firms 
and those with a predominant of small operators is also reflected in the complexity 
of their structure. Transnational corporations may have investments in different 
countries, reflecting different production or service functions which need to be co­
ordinated. The decision about where to place R&D functions, and how to manage 
the logistics between geographically dispersed functions of parts manufacture and 
assembly for example, all create complexities. These are not present to the same 
degree within a purely national context. A further dimension is added for the large 
firm, particularly multinationals, as co-ordination is not confined to the boundaries 
of a single company, but involves co-ordination across various forms of inter-firm 
alliance, the best, but not the only examples of which can be found in Japanese 
industries (Gerlach, 1992).
• Transnational Operations: firms operating within a transnational context face 
particular issues with regard to competition (Porter, 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal,
1992). The emphasis is on technological advance in these sectors, and the ability to
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co-ordinate activity in advantageous ways against a background of many 
interlocking political environments. By contrast, national firms have less co­
ordination or configuration issues, and less uncertainty in terms of the political 
environment. They are dealing with one primary political environment, even if 
services and product sales to other countries are subject to different political and 
economic acts, for example exchange rate fluctuation.
• Firm Size & Strategic Importance: closely linked to the transnational or national 
operation of firms, is the issue of size. The two are obviously complimentary 
although the definition of small, medium and large enterprises may alter depending 
on whether an international or national perspective is chosen. Size of firm has been 
noted as a key factor in explaining characteristics of firm political activity (Mizruchi 
& Koenig, 1991; Bowman, 1988). The economic power of large firms, particularly 
where they are in advanced technology sectors may also be a source of competitive 
advantage for states in the international market place, and this influences attitudes 
and relationships between firms, sectors and government decision-makers (Porter 
1986).
• Profit Margin: large, transnational enterprises often inhabit sectors where the 
profit margin on goods is high. One of the best examples of this is the 
pharmaceutical company Glaxo, which has made considerable profit over the years 
through the discovery and production of the drug Zantac. Gerlach notes that 
Japanese motor manufacturers established a place in the market initially through 
low cost strategies, but have used their success to move to 'differentiated' product 
sectors, which by implication are more lucrative. If the differentiation of product 
enables higher levels of profit, then the contrast is with sectors whose products or 
services are undifferentiated, and therefore more price sensitive. Here profit 
margins are likely to be lower, and competition, based on price differentiation, 
more intense. This will in turn affect individual firm behaviour both in terms of the 
appropriateness of expending resource on influencing activities, which may produce 
largely collective goods.
• Capital Intensity: the production of high profit-margin, differentiated products by 
large firms usually involves considerable capital investment, whether this is in 
research and development facilities or in production sites. The capital intensity of 
the operation is also a barrier to entry by other potential competitors (Porter,
1986).
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The above characteristics are often linked. Industry sectors characterised by the 
presence of large firms are often those with transnational operations, high levels of 
capital investment and products or services that are differentiated by quality or 
specification, rather than simple price. They are also those which have complex 
operations. There are however, examples of sectors which have large, transnational 
firms) but which are not within concentrated industry sectors, for example
the construction industry. It is not possible therefore to independently assess each of 
the factors listed above in the empirical analysis which appears in later chapters. 
Instead a more composite approach is taken to specifying the effect of industry 
structure on the choices firms make with regard to their influencing strategy, both at 
an individual level, and in terms of their ability to co-ordinate representation through 
collective action.
2.5 Conclusion: Influence Opportunities, Costs, Benefits & Information
In conclusion, although the treatment of influence is fragmented across several 
academic disciplines and literatures, each offers a particular insight into the reasons for 
influence activities, the costs and potential benefits which maybe incurred or captured by 
investment in those activities, and the factors which may affect the organisation of 
influence. The level of opportunity for influence, and therefore potential benefit, is 
dependent on political institutions, as a means of accessing those benefits. However, 
the strategies that firms pursue, and the way sectors organise themselves to exert 
influence is the result of a complex interaction between political and economic 
organisations which are interdependent in the pursuit of their goals. Factors relating to 
the political institutions themselves, must be added others which relate to firm and 
industry characteristics.
In chapter 1, lobbying was defined as the attempt to influence through direct contact 
with decision-makers, using information as the prime method of persuasion. It is 
presented therefore as a bargaining activity. This bargaining takes place between 
political institutions and firms acting as individuals or collectively, in order to achieve 
potential benefits, taking into account the costs of the activity. The opportunities for 
influence are provided first by the particular characteristics of the political institutions 
themselves and second by their policies. These may link to broader political and social 
objectives. Firms are key to the achieving these objectives within a capitalist system. 
The subsequent chapters examine the opportunities, costs and potential benefits 
associated with the attempt by firms to exploit them. The benefits may be individual or 
collective benefits; information, business opportunities, rent, protection of the trading 
environment and market stabilisation. The costs are the costs of information
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acquisition, assessment, presentation, and negotiation/consultation. An important 
aspect of the assessment is the extent to which costs may be mitigated for individual 
firms through collective interest representation, the ability of groups of firms to co­
operate, and the cohesiveness of the representation achieved. Industry structure and the 
particular characteristics which contribute to this structure must be examined in order 
to address these issues and the link to influence strategy. The overall pattern of the 
assessment required is summarised in figure (4). The next chapters develop this 
rationale, to assess how the political institutions of the European Union have provided 
opportunities for firms to influence decision-making, arising from the uncertainty 
created by the development of new political institutions, the complexity of the political 
structure, its increasing policy-making powers, and its information needs.
Subsequent chapters will also confirm that these opportunities are not uniform for all 
business sectors, but depend on the policies pursued by different EU and government 
departments, the political salience of the sectors, and the effect of industry structure on 
the organisation of influence. The strategies pursued by firms are explained not only by 
the opportunities for influence, but also the nature of the potential benefits to be 
targeted and the information and co-ordination costs associated with different influence 
strategies. This helps to explain for example why, even in sectors with relatively 
cohesive, collective European representation, member companies may still invest in 
developing their own lobbying capability. This is because not all the potential benefits 
created by the political framework are collective benefits. The acquisition of 
information for competitive advantage is, by definition, an individual firm benefit.
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Chapter 3
Lobbying Opportunities in the European Union
3.1 The Development of the EU: Institutions & Policy Competence
The relationship between influencing activity, the presence of central decision-making 
powers, and the importance of information issues was noted in the last chapter. Based 
on contributions particularly from economics and organisation literature, the 
expectation is therefore that "the opportunities fo r influencing governmental decisions 
grow along with the size and scope o f government" (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, 
p.271). This chapter now examines the opportunities presented to companies and 
interest groups for influencing activity within the EU. This covers the development of 
the EU to its present institutional form, legislative competence, and decision-making 
processes. It will show that the EU has developed increasing powers, and that its 
institutional framework and policy-making is characterised by complexity and high 
levels of uncertainty. These are factors which increase the dependence of EU decision­
makers on information from a variety of sources, and gives rise to greater information 
asymmetries than that experienced within the national government decision-making 
context.
The European Union now comprises 15 member states. The key institutions, and newer 
additions are shown in figure (5). The additions are linked to various policy areas and 
initiatives. For example, the European Monetary Institute (EMI), the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA), the European Agency for Health and Safety at 
Work, and the European Foundation for Training. The location of each of these is 
dispersed across Member States, rather than being in Brussels. For example the EMEA 
is based in London, while the EMI is located in Frankfurt. Whether or not these 
agencies become targets for business influence activities in the future, subsequent 
chapters will confirm that the focal point for decision-making and lobbying activity are 
the major institutions noted (below. This chapter therefore concentrates on the main 
institutions, whose key responsibilities are summarised as follows:
• The | European Council is a bi-annual summit of heads of State which broadly sets 
the political agenda for the Union. It may also be called upon to deal with issues 
that have not been resolved through the Council of Ministers.
• The Commission is guardian of the Treaties and the initiator of policy proposals 
which meet the declared aims of the Treaties.
Main EU Institutions
European Council 
European Commission 
European Parliament 
European Court of Justice 
European Court of First Instance
Court of Auditors 
European Investment Bank 
Economic & Social Committee 
Committee of the Regions
New Institutions
European Agency for Health & Safety at Work 
European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training
European Drugs Observatory 
European Environment Agency 
European Foundation for Training 
European Monetary Institute 
European Office for Veterinary & Plant 
Health Inspection 
European Trademark Office 
Europol Drugs Agency
Figure 5 Main EU Institutions Source: The European Companion, 1995
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• The European Parliament is the directly elected body of representatives from 
Member States.
• The Council of Ministers is the forum of national government ministers which 
agrees or rejects the policy proposals put forward by the Commission.
• The European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Court of 
Auditors safeguard the implementation of policy across Member States, and the 
financial and procedural soundness of the operation of EU institutions.
• The Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) and the more recently formed 
Committee of the Regions, are consulted in the process of drawing up policy 
proposals. ECOSOC formalises the consultation with employer, workforce and 
sectoral interests, while the Committee of the Regions, as its name suggests, 
represents regional interests.
• The European Investment Bank grants loans for projects which further the goals of 
the EU, both within and outside its borders. It is empowered to raise finance on 
the capital markets and can offer loans at highly competitive rates.
The early origins of the current structure, and the concept of a union of European 
states may be traced back beyond the Second World War in terms of various federalist 
movements. It was the Second World War however, which gave particular impetus to 
the whole debate about the need for some form of political and economic integration 
within Europe.
While there was no unanimity of views on political and economic issues throughout the 
Member States of Western Europe, the particular set of post-war circumstances 
produced 'new realities and changed attitudes which enabled, or forced, virtually all 
states to recognise at least some commonalities and shared interest. As a consequence 
it became possible fo r new interstate European organisations to be established' 
(Nugent, 1991, p.22). The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was one of 
those organisations. It was tasked with managing all aspects of Franco-German steel 
production by means of a supranational body called the High Authority' and which 
was open to other European countries. Although set up to deal with a specific area of 
economic interest, it was intended by its founders, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, 
as part of a wider agenda for integration within Europe. It provided the foundation for 
a European federation which Schuman and others saw as indispensable for the 
preservation of peace (Schuman, 1950).
The Treaty of Paris, which agreed the formation of the ECSC amongst six European 
States, made provision for four institutions: the High Authority, the Council of
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Ministers, a Common Assembly and a Court of Justice. Both the High Authority, with 
its responsibility for maintaining and policing the coal and steel sectors across national 
boundaries, and the Court of Justice, with responsibility for arbitration and 
constitutional interpretation, were supranational in character. That is, the six European 
States recognised the authority of these institutions over national decision-making. The 
High Authority and other institutions noted above, formed the basis for the major EU 
institutions we know today, though as a result of subsequent Treaty amendments they 
have considerably altered their remit and powers. The successful development of the 
ECSC prompted further discussion amongst the 6 Member States, and resulted in a 
proposal to set up two further European 'communities', the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). These 
were agreed in 1957, and established through the Treaties of Rome.
The EEC focused on the establishment of a common market throughout the 6 
participating States. That is, the removal of obstacles to trade and harmonisation of 
economic policies across France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community), concentrated on the 
encouragement of research and industrial development in the atomic industry across 
the six countries.
Despite constant change through the enlargement of the Community and its supporting 
institutions, it was not, however, until the Single Market initiative gathered momentum 
that 'business' started to recognise the impact on its competitive environment. This 
happened not only as a result of the implementation of the 282 measures linked to the 
'1992' project, but more importantly, as a result of changes to the regulatory powers 
and institutional decision-making arrangements of the EU which underpinned it. The 
ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 marked a watershed for 
business, and the sudden increase in lobbying activity in Brussels dates from this time 
(Mazey & Richardson, 1991, p. 1).
The SEA amended the Treaty of Rome to specify new institutional arrangements, 
increasing, for example, the powers of the European Parliament. It also introduced 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers. It confirmed the internal market as 'an 
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement o f goods, services and 
capital is ensured’ (Article 13) and committed members to the completion of the 
internal market by 1992. The Act also confirmed the extension of policy competence 
into the following areas: social, environmental, research and development technology 
and economic and social cohesion.
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The impetus for the SEA was not solely political in nature. Several factors have been 
identified which contributed to the initiative; the increasing dependence on intra­
community trade, the international and economic conditions of the early 1980s 
(deterioration in trade, rising unemployment), the introduction of the European 
Monetary System and the interests of business organisations (Cameron, 1991, pp 36- 
48). There are divergent views about how critical the role of business interests were in 
taking forward the idea of the Internal Market. However, although some argue that 
business involvement in the SEA was both late and not a decisive factor in moving this 
initiative forward (Moravcsik, 1991, p.75), it is clear that leading businessmen were 
active in this process. The reasons for this have been proposed as increased economic 
integration and interdependency, the development of regional and global business 
strategies, and competition from the US and Japan (Streeck & Schmitter, 1991, p. 148; 
Andersen, 1992, pp 37-38). Such a combination of factors aligned the interests of 
multinational companies in particular with the aims of the SEA and the Commission.
The most recent Treaty amendment, the 11992 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) 
took forward the direction outlined in the SEA, and brought a number of significant 
changes. The Treaty moves beyond the notion of a purely economic association to 
encompass economic and monetary union, sustainable & non inflationary growth 
respecting the environment, and employment and social protection, amongst others. It 
provides the legal base for provisions on a common Foreign and Security Policy, and 
co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs. With these provisions, the powers of the 
Parliament have increased yet again. A new co-decision procedure has been introduced 
which in essence this gives it the right to veto legislation. In addition, the role of the 
European Council has been formally recognised as part of the institutional framework, 
and a new consultative forum, the Committee of the Regions was established.
The Treaty further extended the area of legislative competence to; aid to developing 
countries, education, public health, consumer protection, industry competitiveness and 
trans-European networks. It lays out the timetable for European Monetary Union 
(EMU) and defines the financial institutions which will support this. In common with 
the SEA, institutional changes have accompanied these developments with further 
extension of the powers of the European Parliament and the inclusion of proposals 
which will lead to the creation of a European Central Bank. With the incorporation of 
the agreement on social policy, at least among 11 of the (then) 12 Member States, and 
the potential for impact on the business environment can be seen to be extensive.
This impact is both in terms of the changed economic environment created for business 
through the Internal Market, and more specifically through the Commission's power to
European Union 
Member States
Accession
Dates
1957
France
Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
Italy
Luxembourg
1973
United
Kingdom
Ireland
Denmark
1981
Greece
1986
Spain
Portugal
1995
Sweden
Austria
Finland
Figure 6 n  Member States
57
formulate policy in areas of direct and indirect concern to business. Of the former, 
specific areas worth noting are competition policy, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
measures, and control over state aid. In each of these areas the Commission has 
powers of investigation, the ability to impose fines and annul agreements. Andersen 
gives a number of examples of actions involving both companies and Member States 
(Andersen, 1992, pp 101-145). The publicity linked to some of these cases has no 
doubt increased business awareness of the growing powers of the Commission and its 
ability and commitment to using them.
Whatever the arguments about the degree of integration, and the ultimate shape and 
remit of a European Union, the powers of EU institutions, and their direct impact on 
the way businesses operate, as well as the broader economic impact of direction in 
which the EU has developed have fundamentally changed the environment in which 
firms operate. This impact has been gradually extended over 15 Member States (see 
figure 6) with the potential for further enlargement in the future.
It might be expected therefore that business interests should focus an increasing 
amount of attention on the EU, given earlier arguments about the size and scope of 
central decision-making authorities and its effect on levels of influence activity. This 
would be a logical response to the development of a new set of governmental 
institutions, which offer both opportunities and threats for businesses. These key 
developments have also, however, been accompanied by a steady increase of policy 
competence by the EU. This is not only based on principles established in Treaties, but 
also through the development of Community law. The establishment of the supremacy 
of Community law over national law in certain fields, confirmed as a result of the 
Court's ruling in Costa v Enel (6/64), was particularly important. In this case, the 
Court of Justice ruled that 'By creating a Community o f unlimited duration, having its 
own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity o f 
representation on the international plane, and more particularly, real powers 
stemming from a limitation o f sovereignty or a transfer o f powers from the States to 
the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and have thus created a body o f law which binds both their nationals 
and themselves’ (ECR 585 Case 6/64).
The net effect of these increased powers is that decisions in certain fields are now 
binding on the 15 national governments. Following Milgrom and Roberts (1992, pp 
270-271) argument therefore, we should expect this to give rise to increasing attempts 
at influencing these institutions. In addition however, other characteristics of the EU 
governmental machinery also have the potential to enhance opportunities for influence.
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The next section therefore examines how EU institutional arrangements, policy 
formulation, and decision-making processes contribute to these opportunities through 
the complexity and uncertainty of the environment, and the information needs of 
decision-makers.
3.2 EU Institutions : Accessibility and Openness
The main EU institutions which form the target for companies and interest groups 
lobbying activities are; the Commission, Parliament and the Council of Ministers as the 
three primary institutions, and to a lesser extent the Economic and Social Committee, 
(ECOSOC) and the Committee of the Regions. With the exception of the Committee 
of the Regions, which is still relatively new, these are the institutions that 
representatives of firms and business interest groups contact as part of their attempts 
to influence decision-making. The most important of these is the Commission 
(Gardner, 1991, p.69). Although not strictly a target of'lobbying', the other institution 
which must be mentioned is the European Court of Justice. It has the power of 
decision, and has used this with significant effects for business through various rulings. 
These institutions, and the role they play, are outlined as follows:
The Commission: the Commission is the Community's executive. It is responsible for 
initiating policies in line with Treaty provisions, and for monitoring the implementation 
of policies. As such, it has a key role in the formulation of policy and decision-making 
processes. It is responsible for strategic planning, and for managing the budget and 
its structural funds.
At the head of the Commission are the President and 20 Commissioners. Each of the 
Commissioners has his or her own cabinet, appointed directly by the Commissioner and 
who are national and political appointees. The Commissioners themselves are 
nominated by Member States, each country having an allocation of one or two 
appointments to decide. Areas of responsibility are, however, decided by the President. 
These are national political appointments, and although Commissioners are required to 
place European, rather than national interests first, realism dictates a careful allocation 
of portfolios amongst candidates by any incoming President. The Commissioners may 
be responsible for one or more directorates, and remain in office for five years , in line 
with the term of election for the European Parliament.
Each of the 124 directorates is staffed by officials of various grades. It has a 
representative cross-section of 'nationals' from the Member States. These positions are 
recruited into the Commission by competition. As a result of its structure, the
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Commission tends to work in a highly compartmentalised way. It should certainly not 
be viewed as some sort of monolithic entity (Mazey & Richardson, 1993, p. 17). This 
compartmentalisation complicates the work of officials in terms of horizontal co­
ordination. as policy issues inevitably do not fit within organisational boundaries. 
Although in many ways this problem may equally occur across national government 
departmental boundaries, it is exacerbated in the Commission by different national 
viewpoints and political traditions.
Before proposals can be put to the Council of Ministers, all have to be agreed by the 
College of Commissioners, by majority vote. The weekly meeting of the College of 
Commissioners is therefore a co-ordination point at the highest level within the 
Commission. This is supported by a number of other co-ordinating activities such as 
the meetings of the Commissioners chefs-de-cabinet, ad hoc committees, task forces 
and project groups who may address particular issues, and through the work of the 
Secretariat General of the Commission. The Secretariat is charged with ensuring co­
ordination and communication takes place across the directorates of the Commission.
The complexities of internal co-ordination are mirrored by the need for extensive 
contacts with external agencies, both governmental and non-governmental. In 
developing proposals the Commission has two main aims; technical soundness and 
political acceptability. The way it manages these two aims results from both structural 
constraints and a deliberate style of approach. Structural constraints relate to the 
relative smallness of the bureaucracy, and the resources at its disposal for information 
gathering and assessment. The style of approach is driven by the need to gain 
acceptance for proposals. It is a relatively 'adolescent bureaucracy' and 'it is still very 
dependent upon national experts and groups fo r detailed information about diverse 
technical standards, legislation and organisational structures throughout the EC. The 
practical task o f knowing what policies will actually work and what is politically 
acceptable in twelve very different member states is exceedingly difficult' (Mazey & 
Richardson, 1993b, p. 40). This suggests that policy formulation within the EU is 
subject to greater information asymmetries than would be the case within the 
established national environments, and that this takes on particular importance in the 
quest for technically sound, but also politically acceptable policy proposals.
Sometimes referred to as a 'technocracy', the Commission is tasked with developing 
policies and putting these to the Council of Ministers for agreement on the basis that 
technical issues and implications are fully understood and accounted for. It is certainly 
not, however, divorced from political considerations, either the political goals 
encompassed in the Treaties, which form the basis for its policy agenda, or from the
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need to take into consideration the complex political considerations stemming from the 
15 different political systems within the Union.
According to one interviewee within the Commission, recruitment for permanent staff 
is not targeted at specific technical skills, e.g. Environment do not look specifically for 
individuals with relevant expertise, although this was attempted some years ago 
(interview code: 4). The net result is felt to be a preponderance of lawyers and 
economists. Whether or not this comment reflects the true state of affairs, a 'generalist' 
recruitment policy does question whether the title of 'technocracy', in relation to the 
Commission, is a justifiable one. Though it may be a politically astute to cultivate this 
notion, it somehow implies the Commission is divorced from political aims or 
considerations, which is not the case. As Lodge (1993, p.3) points out, this is a rather 
disingenuous view. The description by Gardner of the Commission as 'an adroit 
politicised bureaucracy' is nearer the mark (Gardner, 1991, p. 15). As an institution, its 
individual policy initiatives often focus on what appear to be 'technical' issues (for 
example, vehicle emissions and lorry weights). These require specialist input not 
necessarily available through its own resources, in order to develop acceptable 
proposals. However, these initiatives fit within the greater remit of Treaty objectives, 
for example the operation of an Internal Market. With a total permanent staff of 
around 15,000, resource is an important factor in explaining the way the Commission 
operates, and in interpreting the development of its interaction with business. The view 
of the Commission as some sort of technocracy may conveniently mask to the casual 
observer the implications of relationships between its decision-makers and business 
organisations. The interdependency created by institutional characteristics may present 
opportunities not only for business to influence, but may equally serve the long-term 
aims of a relatively new bureaucracy seeking to establish its legitimacy. Along with its 
policy initiation remit, its reliance on external resource and expertise opens up a range 
possibilities for contact with decision-makers, for those who have the necessary 
expertise in particular areas.
Officials of the Commission operate in a highly networked, complex and often informal 
structure. The limitations of its own resources may be one factor in explaining its open 
approach. It is a response to the need to gather and interpret information essential for 
the purpose of policy formulation. 'Directorates do seem to build constituencies o f 
support and with limited staffs do require to lean on the [Euro] groups fo r the 
purpose o f data collection and the pre-scrutiny o f policy proposals' (Jordan & 
McLaughlin, 1991, p.9) It is therefore not only the increasing policy competence of 
the EU which may be identified as a reason for increased business influencing activities
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(measured largely by the increase in lobbying activities), but the characteristics of the 
institutions themselves which play an important part in the patterns of influence.
At a practical level therefore, the Commission's 'open approach' may be driven to some 
extent by the resources it has at its disposal. But it may also be symptomatic of a 
political goal of encouraging the re-alignment of traditional (national) govemment- 
business networks and power dependencies at a European level (Moravcsik, 1991, 
p.44). Whether or not this is the case, any discussions about the Commission, should 
acknowledge it as governmental institution which has its own political objectives. 
Further, the role of the Commission in policy formulation, the way it is organised, and 
its approach to outside interests are factors in explaining its continuing importance as 
the main target for business lobbying.
The Council of Ministers: the Council of Ministers has the task of accepting or 
rejecting proposals put forward by the Commission. It is the ultimate arbiter of all 
proposals. The title 'Council' is something of a misnomer as it is not one council but 
several, consisting of relevant representatives from national government on finance, 
transport or other issues, depending on the agenda. For example, on average there are 
around 4 meetings of transport ministers per year. Each of these will be attended by 
one of the permanent representatives of each Member State delegation based in 
Brussels, in addition to representatives or technical experts from each national 
government department. In accepting or rejecting a proposal put to it, Council 
members are obliged, as a minimum, to review the Opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee and the European Parliament. More recently, changes to the powers of the 
European Parliament now mean that in certain policy areas (Internal Market matters) 
the Commission and the Council must negotiate the agreement of the Parliament to 
proposals through what is known as the co-decision procedure.
Attempts to influence the Council, although implying an approach to a European 
institution, are therefore essentially attempts to influence national viewpoints. This is 
usually achieved through organisations approaching national government departments. 
This means that European influence strategies may also involve a 'national' dimension. 
Because the Council is the final decision-making point, issues where business interests 
align with the national position ensures a powerful ally at the highest level of the 
decision-making process. Business interests are still keen to obtain such support 
(Kohler-Koch,1994, p.46;Greenwood & Jordan, 1994, p.77).
The work of the various 'Councils' is supported by a delegation of officials from each 
government, known as Permanent Representations. As well as performing the role of
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an embassy to the Community, these officials play a key part in the two important 
committees which service the work of the Councils. These are COREPER 1 and 
COREPER 2. Each committee meets once a week to prepare the work of the Council. 
COREPER 2 is the more senior forum, which deals with more politically sensitive 
issues and has more senior representatives attending. COREPER 1 tends to deal with 
transport, internal market, environment, and social issues (Nugent, 1991, p. 17) while a 
further committee, the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA) is a separate, but 
important forum which performs the same function as the COREPER committees 
within a specific sectoral context.
Officials from the Permanent Representations attend these meetings, but in the case of 
the UK for example these are also attended by civil servants from the relevant UK civil 
service departments. The lead role can sometimes be taken by UK officials, or the 
Permanent Representative. The main role of the Permanent Representative is to 
understand the ins-and-outs of the negotiating environment in which they are 
operating, and the likely stance of other Member States on issues. Feeding these 
meetings are a series of standing committees which are supported by the Council 
secretariat, and working parties focused on particular policy proposals. The Council 
Secretariat has a staff of around 2000 (Nugent, 1991, p. 110).
As the final arbiters of decisions on policy proposals, a first glance at the Council of 
Ministers suggests it is an intergovernmental forum. Its structure certainly points to 
this. However, the development of the voting procedures within Council have had a 
profound affect on the nature of this institution. Where unanimous voting is required 
for agreement to proposals, then it can be said with some justification to be more 
I inter-govemmental than supranational I. The increased use of majority voting has now 
resulted in a forum where decisions against the wishes of any particular Member State 
can be implemented, provided the rules on majority voting are met. The extension of 
majority voting in the Council, particularly as a result of the Single European Act 
(Nugent, 1991, p. 123) and the perceived need to stop the characteristic deadlock of 
negotiations resulting from the unanimous voting rule, have by implication altered the 
nature of this forum. In many policy areas it can now be considered more 
supranational in character, even if the role of individual state representatives remains 
focused on the appropriate positioning of national interests as a result of any decision. 
'Appropriate positioning' can sometimes be driven by national party political factors, 
the time running up to national elections being particularly sensitive to such 
considerations. But each of the Member States' negotiators need to take account of the 
views and motivations of others. Achieving an acceptable outcome from one State's
63
point of view can often involve complex bargaining and 'trade-offs' between 
representatives.
Unlike the Commission therefore, where it may be possible to influence one or more 
decision-makers in their thinking about a particular policy-line, the representatives of 
each Member State within the Council may be subject to a wide spectrum of pressures 
in the process of final agreement. These may not just be generated by the logical 
desirability, or not, of the proposals under scrutiny, that is whether policies will have a 
beneficial or deleterious effect on a particular business sector. They may also be 
affected by the myriad political considerations to which each national government is 
subject in its own national environment.
The complexities of Council decision-making, in addition to its position at the final 
point of agreement are two important factors in explaining the pattern of business 
lobbying activities, a pattern which focuses on the Commission as the prime institution 
to target. As the next chapter will show, by the time proposals reach the Council, the 
policy has already been formulated and at this stage lobbying activity is subject to the 
uncertainties of differing national political agendas. Far better therefore to expend 
available resource in shaping policy proposals in the early stages.
The European Parliament: the third major institution to consider within the context 
of business lobbying, is the European Parliament. It is perhaps the most interesting 
given the fundamental changes that have occurred in its role since originally 
constituted. These changes have involved the steady accrual of power, resulting in an 
increased role in determining legislation. Once solely an advisory body, whose 'opinion' 
was required, but which could be ignored by the Council and Commission, it now has 
the power of amendment, and in some areas, a clear right to veto proposals.
There are 626 European members of parliament (MEPs). The number has increased 
recently as a result of the inclusion of representatives for the old GDR and from the 
three new member countries of Sweden, Finland and Austria. MEPs are now directly 
elected for a five year term of office.
Parliament's role is: to participate in the legislative process by reviewing Commission 
proposals; to issue opinions on, and propose amendments to proposals; to agree the 
Community's budget; the supervision of the Commission, Council of Ministers and the 
European Council. All legislative proposals must be reviewed by the European 
Parliament, and depending on the area of policy there are different procedures which 
are invoked which are outlined below under 'decision-making processes'.
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The important point in terms of examining business interaction with EU institutions, is 
that developments in the Parliament’s legislative role have undoubtedly made it much 
more important as a target for influence. Mazey & Richardson identified that between 
1987 and 1990 the Commission accepted 1,052 of the Parliament's amendments to 
Single Market laws and of these, the Council accepted 719 (Mazey & Richardson, 
1993c, p. 18). As subsequent chapters will show, there has been an increasing interest in 
the Parliament by lobbyists.
To support its decisions, the Parliament has a number of important standing 
committees whose members are assigned at the beginning, and half-way through, each 
term of office. The committees, of which there are currently 20, have the task of 
reviewing the legislative proposals put to the Parliament by the Commission. They are 
also involved in more general discussions about future policy direction within the 
Commission, and work on 'own initiative reports'. These reports are the culmination of 
research into areas of interest which the Parliament identifies independently from any 
initiatives of the Commission.
Although the Parliament has traditionally been portrayed as rather weak compared with 
many national legislatures, its powers have been considerably enhanced over the years 
and it has both rights and supporting mechanisms which enable it to exercise influence 
over future policy direction in a way which, certainly by comparison with the UK, can 
increasingly be compared very favourably with national legislature (Nugent, 1991, 
p. 165; Jacobs, Corbett and Shackleton, 1992, p.203).
The Economic and Social Committee: the Economic and Social Committee 
(ECOSOC) was established by the Treaty of Rome as a forum in which certain 
community sectors could give their views about proposed legislation. These sectors 
are; employers, known as Group I, workers represented by the Trade Union 
movement and known as Group II, and other various interest groups such as 
consumers, environmental agencies, represented in a third sector, Group HI.
The reason for the formation of the Committee was partly that five of the six founding 
members of the Community had such bodies as part of their national institutional 
framework, and partly because at that time the European Parliament, or Assembly as it 
was known, had far fewer powers than it currently possesses. It was in some ways 
therefore an attempt to deal with what was recognised as a 'democratic deficit', by 
giving sectoral interests a voice within the decision-making process.
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The Economic and Social Committee is made up of representatives nominated by each 
of the Member States, as representatives for Groups I, II and in. The 221 members are 
appointed by the Council for a term of 5 years and membership is renewable. In the 
case of Groups I and n, representation is made up of national industry and trade union 
organisations, for example the CBI and TUC in the UK. Group ffl representatives are 
less homogenous containing many different interest group representatives.
The role of the Committee is a purely advisory one, and consists of the duty to provide 
an 'Opinion' on proposed legislation. As with the European Parliament, it is obligatory 
in certain circumstances for the Commission and Council to obtain the opinion of the 
Committee before legislation can be passed. The Commission and Council do not 
however have to act upon the Opinion of the Committee. Also, more limited policy 
areas where the Committee's Opinion is obligatory, limits influence on the legislative 
process.
Rather like the Parliament, specific work on legislation where the Committee's Opinion 
is required, is handled by a series of committees or study groups, called 'sections'. 
There are nine sections, which do not correspond to the Parliamentary arrangements. 
For example, the Parliament groups Transport and Tourism together whereas 
ECOSOC has a Transport and Communications section.
As a result of its limited powers, and to a certain extent the growth in power of the 
European Parliament, ECOSOC is generally regarded as less important in terms of 
influencing policy formulation and outcomes (Nugent,1991, p.215. Andersen, 1992, 
p.76). It does however, issue reports on matters of interest, liaise with other 
international groups, acts as a forum for the exchange of views across sectional 
interests, and generally tries to press its views to other Community institutions. It is 
therefore a potential access point for those seeking to influence decision-making in the 
EU, particularly from a national viewpoint.
The Committee of the Regions: the Treaty on European Union made provision for a 
new institution, the Committee of the Regions. As its name suggests its role is to 
advise the Commission and Council on issues which are deemed to have implications 
for particular regions within the European Union. It has 222 members who are 
appointed by Member States through the Council, for a period of 5 years. The 
members are representatives of local and regional governments, both elected 
councillors and officials.
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When the Economic and Social Committee is consulted about particular issues and an 
Opinion is requested by the Commission and Council, at the same time the Committee 
of the Regions is also informed, and 'where it considers that specific regional interests 
are involved, the Committee o f the Regions may issue an opinion on the matter' 
(Article 198c, Treaty on European Union). Like the Economic and Social Committee, 
it may also issue opinions on its own initiative though the Council and Commission are 
not obliged to act on these or any other Opinions, only to receive and review them.
In many respects therefore the Committee of the Regions has similar powers and status 
to that of ECOSOC, but its focus is a different one and is less concerned with 
corporate, or sectoral affairs. Nonetheless there are some areas of overlap and like its 
’sister' organisation, the Economic and Social Committee, it is a potential access point 
for interest groups, including business, to Community decision-making processes. As 
details further on will show, there appears to be little sign of interest in the Committee 
on the part of individual companies, though certain types of business interest groupings 
may find a natural alliance here, Chambers of Commerce, and their European 
federation, Eurochambres providing some evidence in this respect. The observations 
made by most company lobbyists canvassed in this research suggest that it is still too 
early to say what influence and role this institution will establish for itself 
(interviews: 1,2,3,6).
The European Court of Justice: the primacy of European law over national law has 
important implications for lobbying interests. Although not in itself a focus of lobbying 
activity in the sense of influence by information, the European Court of Justice is a 
forum to which individuals or groups have redress in the interpretation and the 
enforcement of EU legislation. It consists of 15 judges, supported by 9 advocates, 
appointed for a 6-year term of office. The Court of First Instance was constituted in 
order to resolve workload issues for the European Court and now deals with 
competition law cases. Mazey and Richardson note that the Court has been the focus 
of attention for groups like environmentalists and trade unions, who 'often find  
themselves frozen out o f the policy-making process at a national level' (Mazey & 
Richardson, 1993c, p. 19). The results of the Court's decision can have significant 
effects for business, both in defining and enforcing the law. For example, competition 
law resting on Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty deals with prevention of cartels 
and the abuse of dominant positions within industry sectors. These provisions means 
that contraventions can result in companies being fined in excess of £10m by the 
Commission. Such punitive action, and the response of business interests is dealt with 
by the Court. Lobbying on specific issues takes place very much within the context of 
the legal provision of treaties and the potential outcome of appeals to the Court.
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The Court is also a route for a company or association as an alternative to influence, 
to test the legality of national or European Commission decisions, or the actions of 
competitors. In the area of physical and technical barriers to trade, there is growing 
case law. An example of such actions is illustrated in the case of the Commission v 
France (Case 21/86) where 'the Commission alleged that France had violated Article 
30 by failing to approve postal franking machines from other Member States. The 
action arose out o f a complaint to the Commission by a British manufacturer which, 
despite repeated applications, had failed to secure the approval o f the French 
authorities....' (Weatherill,1992, p. 199)
This is clearly not 'lobbying' within the strict terms of the definition here, but bringing 
such cases to the attention of the Commission, and no doubt national government in 
the process, involves many aspects of lobbying; information gathering, presenting a 
case etc, looking for evidence to support the case from other business interests.
3.3 EU Decision Making Processes : Complexity and Uncertainty
EU institutions develop and ratify proposals which will move the Union closer to the 
goals outlined within the Treaties. The increasing policy competence of EU 
institutions, created through the Treaties and also through the growing legal 
framework created by the ruling of the European Court, provide evidence of growing 
incursions into the independent decision-making authority of national governments. As 
the European Court noted in the Costa v ENEL case, Member States have agreed to 
limit their sovereignty over certain fields. This shifts the focus of decision-making away 
from the national arena and towards the political framework provided by EU 
institutions and policy-making. However, national governments are still a key part of 
the EU decision-making process itself and this creates an additional level of 
complexity, which can be seen in the following description of decision-making process, 
starting with the drafting of proposals .
The Directorates of the European Commission are tasked with drafting proposals, 
using the resources of a large network of advisory committees and contacts with key 
consultation partners. These contacts are both within the Commission, and externally 
include business organisations, national government officials, as well as recognised 
social partners such as UNICE, the Union of Industry and Employers Organisations in 
Europe, and more recently, Eurochambres. The early stages of policy formulation are 
recognised by lobbyists as the key stage of the process, although the subsequent 
involvement by other institutions (e.g. the European Parliament) in ratification also 
offer opportunities for intervention.
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This consultation process culminates in proposals being reviewed by the relevant 
Commissioners and their cabinets. If the proposal is agreed, it is then passed to the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Affairs Committee, and the Committee 
of the Regions. The two committees are advisory in nature and issue an Opinion on 
the proposals, which may or may not be heeded. The European Parliament has greater 
powers, depending on the policy area under consideration. It may in certain 
circumstances propose amendments or may veto proposals. All proposals are 
categorised as falling under one of three procedures, each involving greater or lesser 
powers or amendment or veto on the part of the Parliament. These'are as follows:
The Consultation Procedure: as its name suggests this is when Parliament is solely 
asked to provide an opinion on policy proposals. Until 1986, and the Single European 
Act this was the extent of the Parliament's involvement. It was not however, a 
procedure to be ignored, as the Isoglucose ruling demonstrated. In this case the 
European Court of Justice annulled a piece of legislation on the grounds that 
Parliament had not yet given its opinion. This not only supported Parliament as an 
indispensable part of the legislative procedure, it was also used as a potential delaying 
tactic so increasing Parliament's leverage on the other two institutions (Jacobs, Corbett 
& Shackleton, 1992, p. 182).
The Co-operation Procedure: the Single European Act extended the involvement of 
the Parliament by the introduction of a second process called the co-operation 
procedure. This introduced a second reading for all proposed Community legislation, 
ensuring the initial 'Opinion' of Parliament is obtained prior to the Council of Ministers 
agreeing their position, and after which the results o f this agreement are submitted for 
a second time to Parliament. Parliament may at this point either reject or amend the 
proposed legislation
The Co-decision Procedure: the Treaty on European Union introduced a third more 
complex arrangement for some policy areas, but one which extends the power of the 
Parliament yet again. There are a number of changes in procedure which require more 
time than appropriate here to expand. However, one of these is the ability of the 
Parliament to reject outright a text in its second reading. Under the co-operation 
procedure, the Council had three months to overrule the Parliament by unanimity. In 
the new co-decision procedure, rejection by the European Parliament is absolute and 
cannot be over-ridden.
Assuming that assent from the Parliament is received, the proposals are forwarded to 
the Council of Ministers, or more precisely the representatives of national government
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that form the committees COREPER 1 and 2. These review all proposals prior to 
presenting them to the Council meetings attended by the Ministers of State from each 
country. If the proposal is agreed by the COREPER committees, it is automatically 
given assent by the Ministers of State. If however, no agreement can be reached then 
the Council of Ministers will enter into negotiations on the proposal. Some proposals 
will fall under unanimous voting rules, in which case any single country can effectively 
veto the proposal. Other policy areas are governed by majority voting rules (e.g. those 
relating to the Single Market), although this is qualified majority voting with the 
number of votes for each country weighted according to its size. Failure to agree at this 
level can be referred to the senior Council of Ministers, the meeting of Foreign 
Ministers, or in the last resort to the European Council.
Proposals which are ratified can take various forms, either those which automatically 
come into effect and are implemented by the Commission with the assistance of 
national representatives. These are called regulations and directives. A regulation 
comes into effect automatically across all Member States. A directive also comes into 
effect automatically, but may be directed at certain States, organisations or individuals. 
Alternatively, proposals may take the form of 'decisions', which are proposals in which 
the detail of implementation (within certain timescales) is left to the discretion of 
national government. Finally there are opinions and recommendations which are not 
binding on Member States, individuals, or organisations, but which act as guidance.
The above description of the decision-making process is presented in linear form, but 
the reality is often more complex, particularly at the early stages where a considerable 
amount of consultation is carried out, including discussions with representatives from 
those institutions who have to review the legislation and give an Opinion, or their 
assent. The issue for business interests is not only that lobbying arises from the 
activities of external agencies, but that it takes place against a background of 
considerable internal lobbying across and sometimes within the institutions themselves. 
It is therefore a complex environment from the point of view of the number of players 
involved, and the number of potential interventions that can be made by interested 
parties throughout the stages of the decision-making process, '...lobbying the 
European Community is a fa r from simple task. Within Brussels, lobbying is widely 
regarded as a perfectly respectable and even necessary part o f the EC policy process. 
Paradoxically, this very openness, along with the unique structural characteristics o f 
the Community's decision-making processes, poses problems fo r groups more 
accustomed to working within a national politico-administrative system' (Mazey & 
Richardson, 1991, p.l)
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Departmental differences in agenda within the UK civil service provide a parallel to 
this. However, the developing nature of EU institutions, their relative immaturity, and 
the interplay of national interests in the decision-making process lend weight to the 
argument that 'Brussels' presents the would-be lobbyist with a far more complex 
environment, but one that offers relatively more opportunities to influence. The 
interplay of various interests also makes the outcome of decision-making very hard to 
predict. It increases the uncertainty for stakeholders in any decision, particularly with 
regard to the different national perspectives. This may be an advantage, as it increases 
the potential for alliance-building, as McLaughlin shows in his discussion of the 
European car industries and the issue of Japanese import quotas. However, it is a 
disadvantage is the amount of effort required first to identify potential alliances and 
then to build them (McLaughlin, 1994). This case study demonstrates the multiple 
levels of negotiation and alliance-building that can be involved between individual 
companies within a lobbying group, at a national level with different Member and non- 
Member states, as well as within EU institutions themselves. The point is that while this 
creates opportunities for influence, complexity also increases the cost of influence 
activities compared with those incurred in a purely national context.
3.4. Conclusion: EU Institutions, Decision-Making & Information 
Asymmetry
In conclusion, the development of the EU, and the extension of its policy competence 
can be seen to have produced a central decision-making authority with considerable 
powers. The extent of the impact for business extends over a wide range of issues: 
competition policy, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures, state aid, environment, 
social and consumer policy, in addition to specific provision for certain industry sectors 
which are considered strategic, for example, information technology.
EU decision-making powers are exercised within a complex environment involving 
both national and EU governmental institutions. This demands a fine balancing act on 
the part of the Commission, as the author of policy, in order to meet policy objectives 
in ways which are technically feasible and politically acceptable across 15 Member 
States. Technical feasibility and political acceptability are key drivers of information 
need for EU decision-makers just as they are for national governments. The difference 
lies in the scale of information-gathering and assessment which is required. The 
'information asymmetry' problem which besets all decision-makers, is therefore greatly 
increased in the context of the EU, by comparison with national political frameworks.
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The greater the regulatory activity therefore, the greater the information needs, and the 
more information needs are magnified in the EU compared to national contexts. It is 
small surprise therefore that the 282 proposals which underpinned the Single European 
Act, coincided with an notable increase in lobbying activity. This was not necessarily 
related to a simple perceptions of 'threat', as broadly speaking the Single Market 
initiative was welcomed by many business sectors. The proactive response of the 
European Round Table of Industrialists is an example of this. However, it does mark a 
point of departure in terms of contact levels between business interests and the 
European administration.
The rationale for influence activities proposed in chapter 2 suggests that the 
information needs of decision-makers are key to understanding why these contact 
levels increased so dramatically. The EU political environment is both complex and 
fraught with uncertainty due to the number of inputs required to develop and agree 
policy. These make outcomes less predictable than within a purely national context. 
The number of proposals being tabled, the relatively small size of the bureaucracy, as 
well as the potential impact on the business environment, should generate influence 
activities, if the earlier arguments about the link between central authority, complexity 
and uncertainty in the decision-making environment and information needs, are correct.
The next chapter will show how business interests have responded to this political 
environment, with the formation of a dense network of organisations around EU 
institutions.
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Chapter 4
Business Lobbying in the European Union
4.1 The Growth in Business Lobbying Activity
The EU's widening areas of legislative competence and its institutional structure and 
decision-making processes present a number of strong reasons to expect an increase in 
business lobbying activities. This chapter presents an overview of the response of 
business to these developments before moving on to a more detailed look at sectoral 
and company responses in chapters 6 & 7.
Andersen & Eliassen estimate that in 1990 'about 30% o f interest groups lobbying in 
Brussels came from industry and agriculture ' (Andersen & Eliassen, 1993, p.40). This 
represents a slight reduction (from 40%) in relative terms compared with 1980, 
resulting largely from the more recent increase in representation from other areas such 
as regional and city authorities, and consumer and environmental bodies, and an 
increase in professional lobbying organisations. Another estimate for 1993 states that 
50% of Euro-groups represent commercial and employer's interests (Mazey & 
Richardson, 1993a, p.7). This reflects the importance of the Single European Act as a 
catalyst for business interest lobbying, and the subsequent Treaty on European Union 
with its shift in focus to broader areas of social and environmental concern.
The description of European institutional and decision-making arrangements given 
earlier shows the potential for business interests to acquire information and to exercise 
influence through a number of channels, either at an individual level, or through 
collective representation. The following sections look at the process of lobbying within 
the EU, in terms of which institutions are targeted, and who are the lobbying 
participants. It identifies some of the characteristics of company and sectoral response 
to this environment.
4.2 Lobbying Targets
EU institutions cannot be regarded as a single entity. As the earlier outline of the 
powers and functions of each showed, in total they present a complex range of 
opportunities for influence. Both existing lobbying literature and the findings from this 
research reveal, however, that there are some common features of business lobbying 
activity based on the characteristics of the institutions concerned and their role in 
policy formulation and decision-making processes.
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The Commission as a Prime Target: the Commission is still the prime target for 
would-be lobbyists. This is where ideas which may form threats or opportunities for 
business are generated. Access may, however, be achieved at various levels, from 
Commissioner and Cabinet, through to the various grades of official operating within 
its 23 Directorates. Organisations which have developed some expertise in lobbying 
stress the importance of contacts at 'A' and 'B' grade within the Commission, as this is 
where much of the policy formulation takes place within the guidelines set at more 
senior levels (interview: 18). This is not an environment where 'going in at the top' will 
necessarily achieve the best result, and one of the main reasons for this is that by the 
time proposals reach 'Cabinet' level, complex consultations will have already taken 
place, and expectations set in various areas, which will be more difficult to influence. A 
further reason for this preferred approach is the advantage of getting information 
earlier in the policy formulation stages, and therefore increasing the preparation time 
for response. Technically sound, well presented arguments in support of a case are 
important. Getting information as early as possible to achieve this is a key motivation 
for companies and interest groups.
Approaches to influencing the Commission may take many forms. Informally this may 
be through personal contact through meetings, telephone conversations and lunches 
and the development of a network of contacts across the various Directorates . More 
formally it may be through participation in the numerous advisory committees and 
working groups which support the work of the Directorates. For individual companies 
and nationally focused interest groups, contact is often through the relevant national 
official placed within each directorate, which is logical given cultural and linguistic 
issues.
The Council of Ministers and National Government: as the final arbiter of 
legislation, the Council is also a key target for lobbyists, but with a significant 
qualification. Its members are lobbied on issues as they affect the national interest. 
This means influence is exerted chiefly through contacts with the relevant national 
government departments, and through the various Representations of national 
government in Brussels, for example, UKREP. Exceptions can occur however. A 
recent example of lobbying activity in the shipping industry certainly demonstrated that 
if the private interests are powerful enough, senior ministers who form part of the 
Council are directly approached. The advantage is that if one's own government can be 
persuaded to adopt a favourable position as the national line, this will be defended in a 
forum in which the decisions are actually made. Though this carries some risks as a 
single strategy for lobbyists, given bargaining between different national interests in
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the Council, it is a significant target even if it is usually approached indirectly through 
national governmental channels.
The Increasing Importance of the European Parliament: the Parliament is 
regarded as an increasingly influential actor and potential access point for influence by 
those directly involved in lobbying One multinational's public affairs specialist 
commented 'it's naive to ignore the role o f the European Parliament as there is high 
level contact between Commissioners and MEPs. At all those cocktail parties 
Commissioners and MEPs are rubbing shoulders with one another and it's not just 
social chit-chat.' (interview: 2). The result of a more widespread appreciation of the 
power of the European Parliament is a growing level of lobbying activity directed 
towards MEPs, so much so that MEPs have now called for controls on lobbying 
activity, initially in the form of a register of lobbyists. Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton 
note that around 200 passes are issued every day to visitors to the Parliament and of 
these 'it is estimated that 150 per day are lobbyists’ (1992, p.257). The 'cultivation' of 
contacts with MEPs is now accepted as a necessary part of the lobbyists' activity. Even 
before the introduction of the co-decision procedure, the growing importance of the 
European Parliament was noted: 'Lobbying o f the EP continues to grow apace because 
even i f  MEPs at present have limited ability to influence policy outcomes they have 
the ability to embarrass the Council and this could be used more effectively in the 
future’ (Lodge,1993, p.33). Although companies without direct experience of contact 
with EU institutions still appear relatively unaware of the powers now vested in this 
institution since 'Maastricht' (interview: 4), business interest groups directly engaged in 
lobbying, now devote effort to cultivating contacts with MEPs of different political 
persuasions and different nationalities. For example the CBI now has a specific team 
which manages contacts with parliamentarians (although this is not part of the Brussels 
office).
4.3 Lobbying Participants
Business response is represented in a number of ways, and by a number of potential 
participants in the lobbying arena. Perhaps the most appropriate description of each of 
these is 'policy participant' (McLaughlin, 1993, p.3). This can encompass both 
individual organisations or interest groups. They may be individual companies, sectoral 
groups, cross-sectoral groups or special focus groups.
Individual companies: individual companies' attempts to influence the ELF cover a 
wide spectrum of activity, from intermittent contact with decision-makers to an office 
in Brussels. Andersen & Eliassen note that all major European firms as well as some
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American and Japanese firms engage in lobbying EU institutions and many have 
established offices in Brussels (Andersen & Eliassen,1991, p.40). Some companies 
consider the complexities of keeping track of developments and being 'on hand' to 
influence as necessary, require a presence in Brussels and are prepared to fund the 
costs of office and living expenses for one or more representatives. Marks and Spencer, 
ICL and GlaxoWellcome are some of the many examples of such companies. Others 
such as Rank Xerox and Whitbread may base their representatives within the UK and 
accept the substantial amount of travelling to and from Brussels (interviews: codes 
1,2,3). This is despite the presence of interest groups representing the interests of 
these firms (Grant, 1990, p. 10). Reasons for different approaches to the location of 
company representatives may vary from perceptions about the level of regulatory 
activity, threats and opportunities, or from considerations such as ensuring that 
representatives do not 'go native' i.e. that they primarily represent the company's 
viewpoint to the decision-makers and not the other way round. Whatever the individual 
reasons for selection, there is some suggestion that a premier league of professional 
lobbyists has formed (Van Schendelen,1994, p. 291) and this undoubtedly includes 
company lobbyists.
Companies' approach to the appointment of in-house representatives varies. Some look 
for knowledge of government machinery and will appoint ex-civil servants or diplomats 
(ICL), others stress the importance of company and product or service knowledge as 
key to presenting strong, technically sound arguments to decision-makers (Rank 
Xerox). There may also be issues relating to senior company staff being more 
comfortable with an individual from the same organisational 'culture' and to the 
sensitivity of some of the issues being managed. Common to all approaches is that 
these appointments are viewed as senior within the organisation, of strategic 
importance, and that the Board of Directors usually has a key role in deciding the 
resourcing and approach.
Professional Lobbying Organisations: the expansion of the activities of professional 
lobbying firms in Brussels has already been noted. These are often offshoots or law and 
accountancy companies, but there are also some specialist organisations, such as 
Lowebell, or Market Access. Interviews with Commission officials confirm that there 
is fairly constant dialogue with individuals representing these organisations (interviews: 
codes 31,33,34). With two exceptions that were identified within the scope of this 
research however, these 'contacts' took the form of requests for information, rather 
than the presentation of information on behalf of a company or business interest group. 
Although it would be unfair to draw firm conclusions from this, there is enough 
evidence to question Robert Hull's statement that 'the future ....lies with professional
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lobbying firm s' (Hull, 1993, p.86). Hull's views may be based on the perception that 
the EU political environment will develop along the lines of Washington, though by his 
own admittance, an equivalent lobbying arena certainly does not exist at the moment. 
The findings from this thesis do not support this view. Firms using external 
professional lobbying services appear to exploit these for guidance on who to contact 
and how to present a case, rather than as direct representatives of the company itself.
Law Firms: closely linked with professional lobbying organisations are the law firms 
which advise companies on the legal aspect of presenting a case to the EU. As the 
ELPs main output is regulation based on treaty provision, combined with growing case 
law from ECJ rulings, it offers rich business opportunities to legal firms. Their role in 
lobbying seems however to be one of monitoring legislative developments, and 
analysing the implications of these in order to produce arguments for or against 
proposals. According to one survey (Clifford Chance, 1994 p.2), they are perceived to 
be very good at this. As chapter 6 will show, there is some evidence from the research 
into Road Freight, that company legal specialists are the focal point for reviewing EU 
policy developments in firms without public affairs specialists, and they are certainly 
used by associations (interview: code 17). The growth of professional lobbying services 
coincides with the Single European Act, and with the enforcement of competition rules 
in particular. In addition a growing body of judgements from the European Court have 
made legal expertise more important across a wide range of social and economic 
issues.
National and European Sectoral Groups: the organisations which fall into this
category are trade associations or federations at national level, and federations at
European level. Interest groups such as the Association of the British Pharmaceutical
Industry (ABPI), the Freight Transport Association (FTA), the Road Haulage
Association (RHA), the Chemical Industry Association (CIA), and the National
Farmers Union (NFU) are long established business interest groups and have, over the
years developed strong ties with national government departments. Some national
organisations have representatives in Brussels, others will channel their influencing
activity through European or international federations based in Brussels, and some do
both. The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations (EFPIA), and
I*the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) are the European federations of 
national organisations. ABPI and its sister organisations across Member States are 
represented by the European federation EFPIA, while CEFIC performs a similar role 
for national chemical industry associations. Greenwood and Ronit's work on 
pharmaceutical industry interest representation and earlier work by Grant, Paterson & 
Whitston on the chemical industry shows that while these groups are not without their
*though CEFIC also has direct company membership in addition to national federations
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problems in terms of their mandate, both EFPIA and CEFIC have carved out a 
particularly strong role for themselves. Greenwood and Ronit in particular show that 
within the pharmaceutical sector EFPIA's position challenges the idea that all Euro- 
groups are weak (Greenwood, Grote & Ronit, 1992, pp 5-6). This does not deny the 
problems that both European and national trade associations face in terms of interest 
representation. Both at a national and European level they do not always represent all 
interests within a given sector, and opinion is divided on the quality of the 
representation that does take place. A recent benchmarking exercise on large trade 
associations noted in its results that ■only 44% o f [UK] associations fe lt that their 
European association was effective and there was little correlation between the size o f 
the subscription and effectiveness' (Compass Partnership, 1996, p. 13)
The fragmentation of representation is a distinct disadvantage at both national or 
European level, but particularly so for European decision-makers given the complexity 
of their environment. They are seeking to minimise the amount of effort involved in 
achieving consensus on policy proposals, and maximise the chance of successful 
adherence to the legislation which arises from this (McLaughlin, 1993, p. 14). These 
objectives are more easily achieved in a situation where trade associations have both 
membership coverage of firms within the sector, and a degree of authority in ensuring 
compliance with agreements. The more concentrated the sector, and therefore the 
fewer the firms that are involved, the easier it is to achieve these goals.
Despite such concerns however, trade associations are well placed to supply the 
Commission with technical information needed to ensure viable legislation. This is 
because of their knowledge of the industry and its products or services. Only direct 
company contact is likely to be as productive from this point of view. However, the 
advantage of the trade association over the individual firm is that it has the potential to 
deliver a consensus view. It is in the Commission's interest to consult with interests that 
can achieve a consensus for very simple reasons. It reduces the workload, speeds up 
the process, and is seen as more 'legitimate'. Conversely, this advantage from the 
Commission' point of view may be perceived as a disadvantage by an individual 
company. Hence the appeal of an individual route or combination of both individual 
and associational action.
National and European Industry Groups: these comprise a number of different 
participants, such as industry associations, Chambers of Commerce and groups such as 
the European Round Table of Industrialists.
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Industry Associations: these are agencies at national level such as the CBI in the UK, 
Confindustria in Italy, BDI in Germany which seek to represent industry and more 
specifically employers interests to national government. Though relationships with 
government and the exact brief for each may differ slightly from Member State to 
Member State, they have an industry-wide remit and are largely concerned with 
horizontal policy issues, for example social legislation, which may affect industry as a 
whole. Certainly within the CBI a very distinct line is drawn between these issues, and 
the more 'technical' sectoral issues which are seen as the preserve of the trade 
associations (interviews: 21,22). Each national industry association is a member of 
UNICE, the Union of Industrial and Employers Associations. This was established in 
1958 by the original six Member States of the European Community and is recognised 
as one of the 'social partners' through its membership of ECOSOC. UNICE's stated 
mission is 'to influence the European legislators in favour o f the competitiveness o f 
European companies and to 'help the decision-makers make better decisions' 
(Tyszkiewicz, 1996).
Although each national federation is represented by UNICE, all have established a 
presence in Brussels, with varying levels of resource dedicated to developing and 
maintaining their own long term relationships with EU decision-makers, maintaining 
links with UNICE and advising members on developments. According to one source 
within the CBI (interview: code 21) approximate numbers of staff across the various 
associations range between 4 and 8, with the CBI having gradually expanded from two 
staff to its current quota of 5. In 1996 there are 18 UNICE staff at Executive level and 
there is extensive support from various committees, commensurate with their formal 
role as consultation partner with the Commission.
The CBI was one of the earliest arrivals in Brussels, in 1971. This was before the UK's 
accession to the Community in 1973. Other industry associations, despite dedicated 
'European' offices, have not necessarily been located in Brussels until fairly recently, for 
example the German BDA and BDI set up office in 1991 (Interview: 21)
Chambers o f Commerce: another cross-sectoral group of policy participants are the 
national Chambers of Commerce and their European federation, Eurochambres. 
Chambers exist in all Member States within the European Union although there are 
differences in the relationship between national governments and each national chamber 
association. For example, in Germany, membership of a Chamber of Commerce is 
compulsory for firms. Funding is generated by tax levy and compulsory subscriptions, 
whereas in the UK, membership is voluntary and Chambers are funded by voluntary 
fees and subscriptions (Bennett, Krebs & Zimmermann, 1993). Eurochambres states
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that in the majority of countries 'Chambers' have public law status and therefore have 
privileged access to national and local government policy formulation and decision­
making processes. Despite these differences however, Chambers uniformly have a 
focus which is predominantly local, and which in theory forms a special route for the 
representation of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) top EU institutions.
National Chambers are represented at a European level by Eurochambres. This is a 
federation of the national Chambers of Commerce in 31 countries (some outside the 
EU). Eurochambres was formed in 1958 and has 4-5 executive staff based in 
Brussels. It represents the views of its member companies, now 14 million in total. It 
estimates that over 95% of these fall into the SME category, and the organisation is 
now officially recognised by the Commission as the representative of SME interests. 
Like UNICE therefore, it is automatically consulted on all legislative proposals. 
Eurochambres has particular links with DGXXIII and in the communication of the 
views of this cross-section of business interests on economic and social issues. Again, 
like UNICE, though it recognised as the consultation partner for Chambers across 
Europe, most Member State chamber organisations have also located offices in 
Brussels. The Netherlands and the UK are the exceptions to this (interview: 25). Cost 
implications are the inhibitor in the case of the UK (interview: 24).
Special Focus Groups: these include such organisations as the European Round Table 
of Industrialists, the Association of American Chambers of Commerce (AMCHAM). 
They may represent various industry groupings which cross national or sectoral 
boundaries. Of these, both AMCHAM and the European Round Table deserve special 
mention because they represent particularly influential groups.
The European Round Table of Industrialists was founded in the early 1980s on the 
initiative of Peter Gyllenhammar, the Chief Executive of Volvo. It consists of the Chief 
Executives of major European industrial corporations such as Philips, Fiat, Siemens, 
Gevaert etc. Membership is by invitation only, and it currently has around 43 member 
companies. Given the economic power of the firms represented, it is one of the most 
influential private interest groups within the European Union. It is concerned with 
political and economic issues at the highest level as can be seen from its involvement 
with the Single Market initiative. In 1985 Wisse Dekker, head of Philips, presented the 
Round Table's proposal on what was to become the '1992' programme. Whether or not 
this was the 'conceptual blueprint fo r Lord Cockfield’s White Paper’, which formally 
launched the 1992 programme five months later' as stated by Gardner (1991, p.47), 
Lord Cockfield certainly comments on the 'tireless' campaigning of Wisse Dekker 
about the programme and in particular the proposed date for completion of the Single
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Market (Cockfield, 1994, p.33). This group represents a powerful lobby, with access to 
the highest levels of national and European government.
The EC Committee of the American Chambers of Commerce is another influential 
group with a particular membership and focus. Its objective is both to defend the 
interest of its American member companies and to influence the direction of decision­
makers thinking by representing information from the standpoint of American business 
organisations to those same decision-makers. Its work is highly regarded for its 
professionalism by EU institutions and by its member companies (Andersen, 1992, 
p.98). As formal channels of consultation are by implication closed to this group (for 
example membership of ECOSOC and other standing committees) its work is 
conducted on an informal basis through individual contacts. Companies such as Ford, 
IBM and Rank Xerox are members. It does however have the advantage of having an 
elite membership of companies, which represent some of the biggest multinational 
corporations and major employers within Europe. Gardner estimates there are were 80 
member companies in 1989, who in addition to sheer size, have the advantage of being 
pan-European in operations and outlook and therefore a source of information about 
the barriers and difficulties which needed to be addressed in the creation of a Single 
Market (Gardner, 1991, p.42). As an important source of information for decision­
makers therefore, it is very well placed to exploit this advantage to its maximum. 
Companies such as Rank Xerox, despite investing in their own in-house lobbyists, still 
use this organisation as a major route for exercising influence (interview: 21).
4. 4 Company Response to Influencing Opportunities
The EU provides opportunities for influence both through the growing scope of its 
policy remit, and the complexity of its institutions. The response to this has been an 
increase in business lobbying activity, and the growth of direct representation to EU 
decision-makers (Mazey & Richardson, 1993a, p.6; Andersen & Eliassen,1992, pp 38- 
41). The characteristics of the political framework in terms of its uncertainty, 
complexity, and the information asymmetries these generate, support the preconditions 
for influence activity. As Gardner notes ' the law-ranking Eurocrat working on a 
technical proposal frequently suffers from a "European information deficit" all o f his 
own. He may be the only government official assigned to develop a proposal in a 
highly technical area. His counterparts in the national ministries o f EC countries may 
be reluctant to share technical information with him because they are fearful o f 
adverse economic consequences for "national champion" firms or because they resent 
the growing displacement o f national regulatory authority by the Commission. Having 
a reasonably objective source o f technical information and advice can thus be vitally
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important to a frantically busy Eurocrat attempting to harmonise the divergent 
regulatory schemes o f 12 sovereign states.' (Gardner, 1991, pp 66-67). In response to 
these opportunities, the 'Brussels' lobbying arena can be seen to be populated by a 
variety of interests which service the requirements of firms for influence (see figure 7). 
These may be European, national, or represent special focus groups which focus on 
particular issues. The presence of European level interests in Brussels, for example 
European federations of national trade associations, does not preclude the presence of 
those national trade associations, or individual firms which they may represent. The 
picture is one of a complex network of organisations which not only interact with 
government agencies, but also co-ordinate information flow and influence activities 
between themselves. It also indicates there is something about direct contact with 
decision-makers which is highly prized. As the following sectoral studies show, this 
'need' for contact does not necessarily suggest a lack of professionalism on the part of 
collective representatives or their lack of credibility with EU decision-makers. It 
indicates more fundamental reasons about the nature of the relationship between 
business and government, and the continuing tolerance to that contact by decision­
makers.
The lobbying arena in Brussels presents a multiplicity of ways in which companies may 
choose to influence decision-making, both from the point of view of national and EU 
governmental institutions and the tolerance of both direct company approach to 
decision-makers and indirect methods through various interest groupings. The response 
of individual companies to the opportunities presented by this new political framework 
varies, as the later investigation into contrasting industry sectors will show. However, 
some broad preferences in terms of company lobbying emerge from existing sectoral 
and company studies.
Active Strategies: at one end of the scale, the most active approach involves 
establishing on-going relationships with decision-makers, being involved in the very 
earliest stages of policy formation, membership of consultative committees. It means 
establishing a position where it is possible to influence the directional thinking of 
decision-makers, not just respond to and influence individual issues (R. Hull, 1993, 
p.83). Its hallmark is the development and continuous husbandry of relationships with 
members of government, both bureaucrats and politicians, directly with the company. 
This approach is also characterised by intervention early in the political decision­
making process, rather than at the later stages in reaction to proposed legislation, when 
this may be in the final stages of ratification, and where debates are within a national 
context. It is also concerned not just with the management of risks, but the 
development of business opportunities. The description of the activities of express
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courier companies in the case of European Postal monopolies shows this (Campbell, 
1994, p. 123). It is concerned with attempts to change the external political and 
economic environment. This approach also goes hand-in-hand with the use of in-house 
or professional lobbying resource where direct contact is made by the organisation with 
governmental decision-makers. Another characteristic of this approach is a focus not 
just on 'vertical' or sectoral issues, but a concern to become consultation partners for 
more 'horizontal' issues, such as social and environment policy (interviews: 1,2,3). At 
an individual level, companies may have their own public affairs personnel who act as 
lobbyists on their behalf, or they may use the services of an external agency such as a 
law firm, or professional lobbyists.
Some firms will use the both internal resource and outside advisers as part of their 
approach. If for example detailed legal knowledge is required in order to present a 
case, then they may use outside expertise to provide this. Similarly, companies involved 
in lobbying for the first time may use political consultants in order to identify, approach 
and establish key contacts. Interestingly, companies take different views of the skills 
they require from public affairs specialists. These are sometimes outside appointments, 
ex-diplomats for example, brought in for political know-how. Other companies appoint 
individuals from within the organisation, considering that it is knowledge of the 
company, its objectives and operations that is key. Where companies are prepared to 
expend resource in funding a public affairs specialist, it appears to be viewed as a 
strategic role. Companies may also however engage in influencing activity through 
collective interest groups such as trade or industry organisations, or special focus 
groups. These groups may exist at an international, European or national level, 
sometimes within sectoral boundaries (the International Road Haulage Union for 
example) and sometimes determined by cross sectoral issues (the European Round 
Table). For some companies national government could almost be designated one of 
the collective interest groups which populate the lobbying arena, albeit one with special 
powers in the context of the EU .
Passive Strategies: at the other end of the scale, companies may simply choose to 
review information about proposed legislation. They take very little individual action 
and chiefly use interest groups to represent their views, rather than having direct 
contact with decision-makers. They use a collective approach to exert influence and 
this is basically an approach focused on adaptation and compliance. The direct contact 
with decision-makers is usually left to interest group representatives, of which trade 
associations appear to be particularly important within the context of the UK. 
Relationships with interest groups may however be active or passive. Interest groups 
are themselves 'lobbied' in order to take up, or to heighten activity in response to
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particular issues, but this study indicates that it is the companies with an active 
lobbying approach that provide the impetus for action within interests groups. For 
example, multinational firms were responsible for encouraging the active involvement 
of the Freight Transport Association in the Single Market Initiative (interview: code 
18). The concerns of firms adopting a passive approach, on the other hand are more 
likely to concentrate on vertical or sectoral issues and not the broader economic, social 
and environmental ones.
In summary, individual company behaviour cannot be interpreted solely in terms of a 
choice between individual or collective action. Companies with an active approach to 
the influencing opportunities presented by EU institutions and policy development, use 
both the direct approach to decision-makers, and work through interest groups. In 
other words they use multiple influencing routes. These companies also seem to be 
active shapers of the influencing strategies of the various interest groups to which they 
belong. Representation within a recognised group is clearly important as various 
sectoral studies of lobbying indicate. The network of interest groups also offers an 
important channel of influence, even for the largest companies. The selection of 
individual and collective influence strategies are not, therefore, mutually exclusive. 
There are good reasons for collective action, a key consideration being that it is seen as 
politically legitimate (Cawson, 1992, p 117). One insider's comment on the importance 
of collective action was that in order to be successful in lobbying, firms need to ensure 
that they could 'collectivise' the issues under debate, for just this reason. It also has 
other advantages, possibly indicating that interest groups may act as a cover for the 
capture of company-specific benefits (Cawson, 1992). Depending on the size of the 
group and the particular characteristics of the industry it can also have benefits in terms 
of the degree of self-regulation that is permitted by government. This is the idea of 
'private-interest government' (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985), but it is dependent upon 
strong, cohesive collective approach and actions, characteristics have been identified 
by Greenwood and Ronit, both at national and at European level in the pharmaceutical 
industry (Greenwood, & Ronit, 1992), despite the apparent 'pluralist' features of the 
lobbying arena in Brussels.
If collective action is so important however, the issue to examine is why firms act as 
individual lobbyists at all. Also, why the EU governmental machinery tolerates this 
activity. If we assume that both parties behave in a rational, self interested way, then 
the answer must be that there is some benefit in this behaviour, over and above that 
gained in collective action. In other words, there must be the potential for both 
individual firm benefit, and benefit from the point of view of EU political institutions.
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The starting point for this study was the proposition put forward in chapter 2 that the 
political framework, its institutions and policies both create the opportunity for, and 
contribute to the level of, influence activity. Those opportunities relate to the degree of 
information asymmetry between decision-makers and interest groups, and its 
relationship to the degree of complexity and uncertainty in the decision-making 
environment. Chapter 3 shows that the EU presents a highly complex decision-making 
environment of political institutions which have gradually extended areas of policy 
competence vis-a-vis national governments. This chapter shows that, viewed at a 
general level, the response of business interests has been to increase influencing 
activity, the symptoms of which are a visible and well-documented rise in the number 
of lobbyists and lobbying organisations based in Brussels.
4.5 Sector Response to Influencing Opportunities in the EU
The picture which emerges at the sectoral level, is that industry and trade associations 
can be represented at both national as well as European level within Brussels. For 
example the CBI, as well as UNICE, also has an office in Brussels. Companies may 
also be present as well as their industry and sectoral representatives at national and 
European level. They may employ the services of various professional organisations, 
lobbying firms or law and accountancy firms, to act on their behalf. Companies may 
also be part of special focus groups which seek to influence on particular issues, i.e. 
where it is the issue rather than product or markets or national/ regional boundaries 
which define the 'interest1. There are therefore a variety of influencing strategies that 
individual firms may adopt.
National interest groups can also pursue independently what Greenwood calls the 
'Brussels strategy'. That is, go direct to EU decision-makers and may even go as far as 
investing in a permanent lobbying presence in Brussels. Considering the key 
characteristics of the industry is important. For concentrated, transnational sectors, 
national lobbying resource may not be so important compared to more fragmented, 
nationally focused sectors. The question is whether this is sufficient in itself to result in 
the 'Brussels strategy', given that sector influence can be exerted through national 
channels (national civil service and national government representation at the Council 
of Ministers). This raises therefore not an issue of co-ordination, as above, but an issue 
of purpose. What benefits do national collective interests achieve through their 
presence in Brussels, which could not otherwise be achieved, and how does this relate 
to members interests? The sectoral study of road freight suggests that adoption of the 
Brussels' strategy, and in its extreme form the location of representatives in Brussels, is
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linked to the needs of particular firms within the membership which combine with the 
strategic interests of the interest group itself.
What the sectoral studies in Chapter 6 & 7 will examine is how firms respond both as 
individuals and collectively to opportunities for influence. This relates to firm and 
industry characteristics which are important factors in the organisation of influence, 
and how that influence is exerted within the context of EU institutions and policy­
making. They will show that collective action in sectors which are characterised by 
concentration, large firms, and transnational interest are likely to have fewer co­
ordination problems at the European level, due to the smaller number of firms 
involved, and the greater similarity of issues they face. Sectors which are characterised 
by fragmentation, including that which is caused by national differences, are at the 
other end of the spectrum, and they will experience greater difficulties of co-ordination.
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Chapter 5
Sectoral Analysis, Approach & Methodology
5.1 Introduction
The rationale for companies' attempts to influence their political and economic 
environment outlined in chapter 2 highlighted the importance of the powers, and 
characteristics of political institutions in providing the impetus for influence activities. 
This proposed that both the political framework itself and the policies pursued by 
political agencies contribute to the level of influence activity as a result of the 
information asymmetries which arise between decision-making authorities and the 
interests affected by those decisions.
Chapter 2 also highlighted the importance of industry structure and the competitive 
environment in shaping business response to opportunities for influence. It proposed 
that while the political framework determines the extent of opportunity for influence 
and the rules of the lobbying 'game', firm characteristics and the industry structure 
within which firms operate provide the rationale for how that influence is organised. 
To examine the impact of these factors, a second, more detailed level of analysis is 
required, which must be set within the context of the markets in which industries 
operate, i.e. the sector.
The rest of this thesis examines individual strategies and the pattern of lobbying at a 
sectoral level. It focuses on how two contrasting sectors respond to the EU political 
framework in order (1) to draw out comparisons between their industry structure and 
competitive environments and (2) to link these to the influence strategies of firms and 
the organisation of influence within each sector.
5.2 Approach
5.2.1 Comparative Approach: the influence strategies of firms, and the organisation 
of influence in two sectors have been examined within the context of the key industry 
characteristics. The approach to the second part of the thesis is therefore comparative. 
It is essentially concerned with differences and similarities in the influence strategies 
and lobbying behaviour of individual firms, their relevant interest groups, and the 
pattern of interaction between these and EU institutions in different sectors. This 
comparison is an important aspect of the thesis because its purpose is to explore the 
links between industry environment and the behaviour of individual firms within their
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competitive environment. It looks at the process for exerting influence and compares 
these within two distinct business structures and competitive environments. The 
proposal, based on the rationale noted in chapter 2, is that contrasting industry 
structure, will result in different patterns of interaction with EU decision-makers, and 
that these are linked to certain key industry characteristics. While recognising that a 
comparative exercise across two sectors will not produce absolute conclusions about 
causal factors, it provides a more formal framework for analysis than exists in current 
literature, where single sector studies predominate. This framework focuses on 
examining the following aspects:
* Industry structure and competitive environment
* EU policy development and policy initiatives
* Company and sector response in terms of influencing
Firm characteristics and industry structure are identified from existing literature on 
each sector, and from trade association publications. EU policy development and policy 
initiatives are analysed from EU documentation and trade association information. 
Company and sector influencing strategies are established primarily through interviews 
with companies, interest groups, and governmental representatives in the case of road 
freight, and from existing literature, supplemented by additional interviews for the 
pharmaceutical sector study.
5.2.2 Stages of the Research: the research involved two stages. The first stage 
encompassed preliminary interviews across a range of sectors additional to the two to 
be examined in detail. These were selected in order to reflect relative degrees of 
concentration or fragmentation within different sectors, and to include both 
manufacturing as well as services. The interviews targeted a range of companies and 
sectors. Preliminary interviews took place with senior members of management within 
companies, some of which were public affairs professionals, employed within the IT, 
Electronics, Pharmaceuticals, Road Freight, and Retail Sectors. The purpose was to 
explore both company and sectoral behaviour, and to identify developments in the 
approach adopted to influencing the EU. The interviews confirmed a wide variety of 
approaches to influencing the EU, and in particular internal company factors 
influencing the choice of individual action (through in-house or professional lobbyists) 
or collective action (through trade associations). Although all the interviews were 
unstructured, interviewees comments were recorded. All interviews are detailed in 
appendix 1.
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The preliminary interviews confirmed the importance of information gathering by 
interview. Due to the sensitivity of lobbying issues for companies, and the nature of 
some of the questions asked, it was unlikely that postal survey techniques would prove 
effective. Hence a decision was made that all subsequent research in the thesis had to 
use interviewing techniques.
The second stage involved interviews with representatives from the two sectors under 
consideration, and was based on both structured and semi-structured interviews 
incorporating findings from both existing lobbying literature and the results of the 
preliminary interviews. The sample was more closely defined taking into account the 
segmentation of the two sectors chosen for analysis, and focusing on two particular 
areas (public haulage for road freight and ethical pharmaceuticals for the 
pharmaceutical industry).
5.3 The Sector as the 'Explanatory Unit'
The choice of the 'sector' as the focus of the research was made because it represents 
not only a policy community within its own right but also a competitive community. 
Firms do not operate in a vacuum either in terms of the government policies to which 
they are subject, or with respect to their markets. While therefore the concept of 'the 
sector' is not without difficulties and care needs to be taken about its definition for 
research purposes, its position as the main focus of analysis in lobbying literature is 
justified.
Studies of lobbying activity are by their nature about relationships between individuals 
or organisations, or groups of organisations. Understanding the individual organisation 
is important in terms of data gathering (e.g. the company), and represents one level of 
analysis. The explanation of the data gathered is dependent on another level of analysis, 
which recognises these relationships within a wider context (e.g. the sector). This 
distinction is noted by Ragin, as part of his treatment of comparative methodologies 
within the social sciences. He highlights the need for clarification of the term unit of 
analysis and proposes that this covers two elements; observational units and 
explanatory units. 'Observational unit refers to the unit used in data collection and 
data analysis; explanatory unit refers to the unit that is used to account fo r the 
pattern o f results obtained.' (Ragin, 1987, p. 9)
This study reflects this distinction in that it examines the way in which companies exert 
influence on EU institutions. It does so through examining their strategies both as 
individuals and collectively through interest groups and whether or not they engage in
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lobbying as part of their strategy. The findings are interpreted within the wider context 
of the sector both the in terms of industry structure and competitive environment.
5.4 Choice of Sectors
The choice of sectors for investigation is based on the key characteristics identified in 
chapter 2. From existing literature these are factors which are implicated in the 
emergence of particular influence strategies for firms, and the organisation of influence 
within sectors. These factors are summarised in the table below:
Key Characteristics of Industry Structure
Group 1 Group 2
Strategic Nature Non-Strategic Nature
Operations - Transnational Operations - National
Structure - Complex Structure - Simple
Products - High Technology Products - Low Technology
Capital Intensity & Profit Margins - High Capital Intensity & Profit Margins - Low
Concentration - Few Competitors Fragmentation - Many Competitors
Firm Size - Predominantly Large Firm Size - Predominantly Small/Medium
Table I Basis for Sectoral Comparison o f Industries & Influence Strategies
Companies within the first group have a high level of interaction with national 
government for reasons of size, strategic economic importance, and sometimes 
relatively high levels of government regulation. There are existing studies of influence 
strategies and lobbying activity for this group. Companies within the second group, are 
less well represented in existing literature. This presents a rather one-sided view of 
business lobbying in the EU, given Eurochambres estimates that 95% of businesses 
within the EU are in the SME category (Eurochambres, 1994). It also makes a 
comparative exercise difficult. For this reason, new research has been undertaken into 
an industry sector which falls into the second group, while existing findings for the first 
group have been developed using additional research in order to strengthen the 
comparison.
For the new research, the UK road freight sector was selected. This met the criteria for 
sectors within Group 2 (table 1). Existing research on the Ethical Pharmaceutical 
industry, as well as the preliminary interviews, suggested this was an appropriate sector 
for comparing an industry which displays the characteristics of Group 1 (table 1).
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5.5 Road Freight Sector: Definition & Research Methodology
5.5.1 Definition: the Road Freight sector can be subdivided into a number of specialist 
areas. The main division that exists, is between the 'own account' operators, and public 
haulage companies. Own account operators are companies whose main business is not 
road freight, for example they may be retailers or pharmaceuticals manufacturers, but 
which run their own fleet of vehicles. Public haulage companies, as their name implies 
offer a range of services on the open market. These do not necessarily just supply 
vehicles and drivers. There has been a move within the UK for larger companies to 
offer a range of 'logistics' services, including complex warehousing and distribution 
facilities as well as the organisation of multi-modal transport needs for customers. The 
research focuses on public haulage companies i.e. those for whom freight is a major 
focus of their activity, and road freight a significant part of this.
5.5.2 Methodology: existing research into the transport sector, consultancy reports, 
European and national trade association data were used to build a picture of the sector. 
EU documentation (the Official Journals) provided information on EU policy 
development and issues, as well as the FTA's archives. The latter provides a valuable 
source of information on the industry response to initiatives. The methodology for 
gathering data on company and sector response in terms of influencing strategies 
involved the following research sequence:
^company interviews structured
^interest group interviews structured
^policy-maker interviews semi-structured
Company interviews: these were organised into three main sections. First, to obtain 
basic information about the company, its structure, and services. Second, to explore 
how the company receives information about EU policy developments, and how it 
responds to this in terms of influence strategy. Third, the effect of policy initiatives 
linked to the Single European Act were explored in terms of their impact and the 
reaction of the company to these developments. This specific response tested out the 
more general statements made about preferences for exerting influence, and also 
allowed exploration of some more subjective statements about the company response 
to 'legislative interventions'.
Interviewees were identified and selected through discussion with the UK trade 
associations, which assisted in the identification of appropriate companies and key
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government representatives. Criteria for the selection of the companies, were based on 
turnover, and an element of European freight operation.
The interview questionnaire was piloted with one company (BOC) in order to test out 
the appropriateness of the questions, and suitability of the format. An issue which arose 
from this concerned the cost of monitoring EU legislation, and influencing activities 
resulting from this. The pilot showed this was difficult for companies to gauge, given 
that the impact was slight, and dispersed across a number of areas within the firm. This 
contrasted with the response of trade associations, where costs could be identified, at 
least in terms of FTE. It was decided to leave this question in place, although the 
anticipation was that few companies would be able to respond with quantitative data.
A stratified sample was selected to include a small, medium and large firms within the 
sector. Following the pilot interview, it was expected that the preference for individual 
compared with collective action was only likely within the largest firms. For this reason 
the sample represented the larger organisations within the total freight sector, 
excluding the very smallest operators many of which are one or two vehicle owner 
drivers. The sample represents however, an extremely large variation in firm size and 
includes those which would be classed as SMEs. The sample only needed to be small 
due to the other interviews which took place with government and interest group 
representatives which helped to complete the picture of representation in the sector. 
The expectation from preliminary research was that there would be little variance in 
company strategies. While therefore the possibility of a increased number of company 
interviews was kept open, in the event the data gathering from all sources confirmed 
(at the end of the interview schedule) that further work would not alter the emerging 
picture, and indeed that variance of strategies between companies of the same size was 
small.
Interest Group interviews: these were structured, though not all questions were 
relevant to every interest group representative approached, due to the different role of 
each representative. The questionnaires used for the interviews (see appendix 1) were 
designed to establish the membership of the group (how it related to the companies 
within the sector), the structure and management of the organisation, the groups 
response to the development of EU institutions and policies in terms of resource and 
organisation, the current approach to influencing EU decision-makers, and the 
relationship with other interest groups. Interest group interviews covered industry and 
trade associations at a UK and European level.
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For some organisations, more than one person was interviewed. For example, several 
individuals within the CBI and FTA are involved in monitoring policy development and 
in lobbying activity, and each was interviewed in the course of the research.
Government Representative Interviews: the inclusion of representatives from both 
national government and the EU had two objectives. First, this was essential to test the 
emerging picture about company influencing strategy and sectoral patterns of influence 
(how both companies and interest groups have responded to EU institutional and 
policy development). Second, it enabled the identification of key points of contact 
from the policy-makers viewpoint, and any new, emerging groups that may not have 
been apparent from preliminary interest group and company interviews. Third, it 
enabled a comparison between the consultation methods and avenues for influence 
open within the national government, and those within the EU.
Government Representatives interviewed were from the UK Department of Transport 
and DGVII (Transport) and DGXI (Environment). It also included interviews with UK 
Representation in Brussels. Individuals were either Department Heads, or A/B Grade 
Officials. The MEP interviewed is a member of the Transport and Tourism Committee 
of the European Parliament.
The interviews were semi-structured. They were designed to check both the 
consultation processes and confirm key consultation partners. They also allowed some 
exploration of trends in lobbying activity. That is, who makes the approach, whether 
this has changed over a period of time in terms of who lobbies, and the amount of 
overall contact. It also provided an opportunity to review some of the policy initiatives 
affecting Road Freight, as well as general perceptions about the level of lobbying 
activity.
5.6 Pharmaceutical Sector, Definition and Research Methodology
The new research into the Road Freight sector forms one part of the thesis. This 
provides the analysis of influencing strategies and lobbying activity within a particular 
industry sector that has been little examined in previous research; it is fragmented, 
nationally focused, low technology, low profit margin and dominated by small firms. 
The comparison provided in chapter 7 by the pharmaceutical industry, uses existing 
research chiefly by Greenwood and Ronit (1992), amplified by new interviews.
5.6.1 Definition: the same issues with regard to defining the 'sector', noted for road 
freight, apply to the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceuticals has a number of different
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segments which, taken as a whole, would not have the particular characteristics 
required for comparison with road freight. If, for example, all pharmacists, or 
producers of over-the-counter medicines, or all new biotechnology companies were 
included in this category, there would be a strong argument for designating it 
'fragmented' rather than 'concentrated'. One segment, however, the producers of 
ethical (or prescription only) pharmaceuticals, displays industry characteristics which 
provide the required contrast to road freight. These characteristics are: concentration; 
international markets and operations; advanced technology; and high profit margins 
with differentiation by product rather than price. Although it will be referred to under 
the general title of'pharmaceuticals', it is the ethical medicine sector which is the focus 
of chapter 7. It is also a regulated sector at national level. There is direct government 
intervention in the market through price or profit controls.
5.6.2 Methodology: the methodology for the pharmaceuticals research differs from 
road freight in that it is chiefly based on existing work by Greenwood, and Greenwood 
& Ronit. Findings are therefore preceded by a review of the conclusions from 
Greenwood and Ronit on the organisation of influence within the sector. This 
recognises that the questions which Greenwood and Ronit seek to address as part of 
their research have a different slant to those which appear here, even if their findings 
are highly relevant to the thesis
Following the review of Greenwood and Ronit, the chapter on pharmaceuticals follows 
the same basic structure of analysis as for road freight. That is, industry structure and 
characteristics, the impact of EU policy development, attitude of policy makers 
towards consultation, and company and sectoral response to this. This approach 
supported the need for further development of data on the sector, to explore the 
interaction between companies, interest groups and decision-makers required for a 
comparative exercise with road freight. In order to gather the data required for the 
thesis, information was gathered from company annual reports, EU documentation, 
trade association literature, and other research into the pharmaceuticals industry. 
Selective interviews were also carried out at both company, trade association and 
government level. Interviews provided additional data in particular on company 
behaviour, both from a company, interest group and government perspective.
Interviews for company, interest group, and government representatives followed the 
same basic format as for road freight, tailored to the pharmaceuticals environment. 
Interviews for the first two were therefore structured, while government contact 
interviews used a semi-structured format.
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5.7 Conclusion
In the initial chapters, theoretical contributions from a variety of sources provided both 
an insight into influencing activity in terms of both the opportunity for influence and the 
costs and benefits associated with this. Chapter 3 contained a first level of analysis and 
looked at the opportunities for influence provided by the EU, and concluded that the 
development of its institutions, decision-making powers and processes provides a high 
degree of opportunity for those seeking to influence decisions, hence the 'lobbying 
explosion'. It focused on the changing characteristics of the political environment in 
which firms operate, and high level view of business response to this.
Chapter 4 explored business response to this political environment in more detail, 
examining the influencing strategies of companies, and how these translate at a sectoral 
level into the organisation of influence. The next two chapters develop a second level 
of analysis which seeks to show that while the political institutions may provide the 
opportunities, the characteristics of firms and the industry structure of each sector are 
key to determining the response, in particular the emergence of direct EU lobbying by 
companies, the location of professional lobbying representatives in Brussels, and its 
link to issues of firm size, industry concentration and transnational operations.
Finally, it is important to be aware of potential weaknesses in the above methodology. These arise 
from the inherent problems of relying on information from interviewees. However, to overcome these 
problems the interview programme was structured to ensure that data could be cross-checked using 
multiple sources. For example, company responses to questions about preferred influence strategies 
were compared with responses from trade of industry associations. Similarly, the picture to emerge I from company and trade association interviews was cross-checked against the responses from
, i government sources (e.g. Commission and UK Civil Service). In addition, the network of pilot
V1.
.interviews with a wider range of companies allowed further cross-checks. An important part of this 
whole strategy was extensive preparation that went into identifying the most appropriate persons to 
interview. It is believed that by identifying the key targets for interview, as accurate a picture as 
possible was achieved. At the same time all interviews were felt to have achieved a frank and open 
response which was possible by combining structured and semi-structured interview format. Most 
interviews lasted for over two hours.
In order for this approach to work key questions used for cross-checking had to be structured into the 
interviews at the three levels indicated above. Principally these related to agencies lobbied by 
companies and who is lobbying government institutions. While the government interviews where less 
structured to allow a freer discussion of issues and industry response company level, they nevertheless 
encompassed some specific questions in order to produce an accurate picture of influence strategies 
and lobbying behaviour.
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Chapter 6
Influencing Strategies in the UK Road Freight Sector
6.1 Industry Structure & Competitive Environment
The Road Freight sector represents an important part of total freight transport in 
Europe. Statistics published by the Commission for 1993 estimate that this mode of 
transport compared to others (rail, air, shipping and inland waterways), varies between 
53% and 90% of the total. Only in Germany and the Netherlands is there a substantial 
amount of freight transported by other means (CEC, Panorama o f EC Industry ,1993).
It is also a sector which has seen a faster growth in international intra-Union freight 
than in national domestic trade. The report of the Committee on Road Freight 
Transport in the Single European Market stated that in 1986 the international market 
represented 25% of the size of the total domestic road haulage but by 1991 this had 
risen to approximately 40% of this total {Committee o f Enquiry on Road Freight, 
1994, p.25).
The growth o f  this sector has been given impetus by the increased demands for 
flexibility in freight forwarding and logistics. The rise of just-in-time strategies, and 
global industry and retailing demands are linked to the emergence of integrated 
transport strategies associated with major firms operating over large geographic areas.
Subsectors: the sector is characterised by a split between 'own account' operators, and 
the public haulage companies or 'hire and reward' firms. Own account operators are 
those companies in other sectors e.g. retailing who own and manage their own fleets. 
Public haulage companies, as the name suggests, are companies which are contracted 
to provide haulage services by others. The split between own account operators and 
public haulage companies is almost equal in the UK. Own account represents 49% and 
public haulage 51%, a significantly altered relationship from 1988. At this time, own 
account operators represented 60% of the total. The existence of these two subsectors 
is reflected by two different trade associations within the UK and in the structure of the 
international federation of trade associations, the IRU.
Linked to the 'own account' subsector is the presence of large companies whose core 
business is not road freight, but which have considerable interests in this industry. For 
this reason, companies such as Esso, Glaxo Wellcome, British Sugar, and Shell UK Oil
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are represented on the Board of one of the national trade associations - the Freight 
Transport Association.
Product: at its simplest level, this industry provides services for the movement of 
goods from A to B. Within this however, there are considerable variations in the level 
of sophistication for the handling of goods, and requirements for the management of 
their handling. Freight may represent anything from textile merchandise, with few 
special requirements for handling, through to the transport of refrigerated foods, or the 
transport of dangerous chemicals, both of which are governed by special requirements 
linked to health and safety. There is also a considerable variation in the type of service 
provided by different firms. This may range from simple ad hoc hire services for the 
transport of goods, to the provision of complex logistics services involving 
warehousing and IT supported distribution systems.
As a service industry, Road Freight occupies an intermediate position within the 
product life-cycle. Its customers are producers, or retailers, which make use of road 
freight services to achieve a flexible means of distribution to outlets/customers. As 
the above Committee report points out however, ■unlike nearly all other products and 
service sectors road freight transport services are not provided in a fixed workplace 
but are continually mobile and permanently in the public domain.’ (iCommittee o f 
Enquiry on Road Freight, 1994, pp 23-24) This creates special conditions for the 
industry, which although considered 'deregulated' means that it is at the centre of many 
health, safety and increasingly, environmental issues.
Number of Firms by Turnover in the Road Freight Sector 1993
£000 Hire & Reward Own Account
0-50 15452 2830
50-99 9251 1073
100-249 5582 692
250-499 2702 269
500-999 1695 172
1000-4999 1350 101
5000+ 212 18
Total 36155 5155
Table 2 Road Freight Sector: Size Distribution o f Firms 
Source: Keynote Market Research 1992
Concentration/Fragmentation: Road Freight is a highly fragmented industry. 
Within the UK, the Freight Transport Association estimates there are around 36,000 
public haulage companies currently in operation (interview: 17). The majority are small
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operators running less than 5 vehicles. There is some evidence of the sector becoming 
more concentrated, through the growth of large haulage companies with sophisticated 
logistics management systems. One estimate cites that 2% of companies operate 
around 36% of the total commercial vehicles, that is, fleets of more than 50 vehicles 
(Keynote Market Research, 1993).
Fragmentation is defined not just in terms of the numbers of firms that operate within 
it, but also in terms of the regional spread of activity. The road freight industry is a 
service industry focused on a wide customer base and widespread geographic 
locations.
Firm Size Emphasis: the sector is dominated by small to medium-sized firms, 
although there are some large companies which have developed sophisticated logistics 
management operations. The size distribution of firms is shown in table 2, emphasising 
the dominance of small to medium-sized operations within the sector. However, even 
at the upper end of this section there is considerable variation in the size of company, 
many of which fall into the category of SME's.
Group & Company Turnover within Sample
Company Group £m Company £m
Large
P&O 5000 700
NFC 2000 2000
Medium
Salveson 558 324
BOC 3000 200
Hays 600 80
Small
Laser - 13
Denby - 7
Barber - 6
Table 3 Road Freight Sector: Size o f Group & Individual Companies 
within the Interview Sample 
Source: Own Research
Companies approached for the purposes of the research had a turnover of between 
£2bn and £6m per annum, which represents a large variation in size. These were 
chosen to represent a range of firms from the largest to small operators, excluding only 
extremely small operators. Only one of the five largest companies in the sample, the 
NFC, is dedicated to logistics activities focused on road freight per se, all the others 
were companies which form part of groups which have diverse interests. Even P&O,
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far larger as a group than NFC, encompasses a range of business activities, though 
these are linked to transport in various modes, both passenger and freight.
This indicates another aspect of diversity amongst operators within the sector. The 
larger companies are often part of a diversified group of firms (e.g. BOC), where road 
freight may not be the main product/service area. By contrast, the smaller the firm, the 
more likely that freight is the sole focus of activity.
Operations and Structure: company operations are predominantly based within the 
UK. Only the larger companies have operational bases on the continent, for example 
P&O, BOC, and NFC. The smaller European haulage companies are still based within 
the UK. Within the sample, the larger operators are all part of groups organised on a 
multidivisional basis. That is, companies which have discrete operating units, or 
divisions, which manage all necessary functions. The corporate or group Board may or 
may not have directors who are responsible for particular divisions. The largest of the 
groups dealing with transport services is P&O although the single largest road freight 
company is the NFC. None of the sample however, have responsibility for marketing 
and corporate affairs as a single function at Board level. These functional 
responsibilities, where they do occur, appear further down the hierarchy, sometimes at 
divisional director level, or sometimes at senior management level within 'companies'. 
The representation of the marketing and corporate affairs role contrasts with the 
sample of multinational companies that were interviewed as part of the preliminary 
investigations for the research. Here, an integral part of the structure is a corporate 
affairs function, within which public affairs may exist as a discrete section. At divisional 
or company level, boards of directors consist of individuals with responsibilities 
encompassing all aspects of the firms operations. These may have marketing managers 
working for them. The smaller companies have a single layer approach, with a small 
board of directors which has responsibility for operations, finance and legal aspects of 
the firm's business. Given the low level of profit generated by the industry such 
structures are logical. Pre-tax profit levels on average for the UK industry have 
remained around 2-3% {Committee o f Enquiry on Road Freight, 1994, p. 52).
Technology: the vehicle and engine design technologies associated with this sector are 
not intrinsic to it, but are provided by other sectors. These are the prerogative of motor 
manufacturers. For some of the larger operators, IT systems designed to support the 
complex logistics management are also important. These are, however, technologies 
which are essentially provided to, rather than provided by, the industry. The sector is 
not the source of technological innovation, but rather firms take advantage of advances 
in relevant technology in order to further competitive advantage within their own
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market place. For example, in the use of complex warehousing and distribution 
systems. For the majority of small firms such a strategy is not possible due to the 
capital outlay required in a market place which is driven by price considerations rather 
than product differentiation. By implication, research and development does not feature 
heavily in value chain associated with these firms, in comparison with the IT or 
pharmaceutical sectors.
National/Transnational Focus: the sector is dominated by operations which take 
place in local markets. Within the UK 60% of all tonnage is moved within a radius of 
50kms (Committee of Enquiry on Road Freight, 1994). For the sample of companies 
interviewed, those with European operations were deliberately selected, to see whether 
this had increased the relevance of European policy-making and legislation to their 
operations, and provoked a change in influence strategy. Issues related to Single 
Market legislation, for example cabotage, customs and border controls and taxation 
issues, could be expected to have a direct impact on international operators rather than 
nationally focused businesses.
The sample shows in all except the case of P&O & Salveson the larger companies are 
still predominantly focused on UK operations. P&O were unable to quote the 
percentage of business for Europe as a discrete figure, but with 50% of its business 
overseas, this company, along with the Salveson (60%) is the most internationally 
focused business interviewed among the larger operators.
Company Operations, % UK v European %
Company UK European
Large
P&O 50 50
NFC 83 17
Medium
Salvesen 40 60
BOC 90 10
Hays 72 21
Small
Laser 5 95
Denby 15 85
Barber 20 80
Table 4 . Road Freight: Company Operations UK v European %
Source: Own Research Interviews
European operations however, do not necessarily account for the majority of this 
international trade, which for the largest companies ranged between 9% and 50% of 
activity based on turnover figures. It should also be noted that the interviewees
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definition of 'Europe' in this case is a fairly loose one. It does not refer just to the 
Member States of the EU, but includes EFT A and countries previously designated as 
Eastem-Bloc. The smaller companies reflect a particular subsector with a specialisation 
in European operations, though their influence strategies do not seem to vary 
significantly between UK focused and European focused operators.
Strategic Importance: the importance of Road Freight lies in its support for industrial 
strategies where the co-ordination of production across wide geographical areas is 
key. The 1994 report on Road Freight in the Single European Market ( p.31) states 
that 'In such industrial strategies where purchasing, production and final despatch 
must be absolutely synchronised, and where material sources, the production process 
and markets can all be spread over a wide geographical area (Globalisation), the role 
o f transport is crucial'. According to the same report however, international trade 
inside the world's 350 multinational companies accounts for almost 40% of the world 
trade in goods. This may help to explain the interests and activities of 'other sector' 
multinational firms within the Freight Transport Association.
The sector is not, therefore, a source of major EU competitive advantage in terms of 
innovative product development, but it is part of the required infrastructure for those 
companies which provide such advantage in an international context. It is not therefore 
strategic in the way that some advanced technology sectors, such as IT or 
pharmaceuticals may claim, but has a broader economic importance associated with the 
infrastructure needed to support these. The key point is that individual firms within this 
sector are not strategically important.
Summary: companies within the UK road freight sector exhibit a wide variation in 
size, structure, and focus of activity. They are predominantly UK focused in terms of 
operation, though there is a subsector of firms which specialise in European haulage. 
The larger companies may be part of conglomerates which operate in more than one 
industry sector, and these have relatively flat structures, which seldom represent 
marketing or corporate affairs at corporate or group level as a single area of Board 
member responsibility, and certainly not at company level. For the smaller companies, 
such functional specialism is not an option. Even the larger operators however, have 
relatively simple structures with senior members of the organisations heavily involved 
in the day-to-day running of the organisation. This may be a reflection of the relative 
lack of complexity of operations, compared to manufacturing sectors. The issues 
involved in chemical manufacture or pharmaceuticals development for example, are by 
their nature more complex, involving commercial decision-making in an advanced 
technology environment. Finally, although the markets of some operators may be
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'European', their operations are in reality UK based, and they are not handling the 
complexities of managing a full product life cycle across European and international 
borders.
6.2 European and National Regulatory Environment
The European Member States have varying approaches to their road freight sector. 
|Degli Abbati notes that the outlying countries of the Union display a greater reliance on 
road transport, while the central states such as Germany and France are more 
concerned with the utilisation of railways (degli Abbati, 1986, p. 19). In either case, 
transport policy is a key area of government intervention and firms in this 'sector' have 
been closely linked to government, '...national transport policies have been dominated 
by supplier interests, fostered by the close links between governments and industries 
in many sectors and countries.’ (McGowan, 1990, p.248)
In the UK, the road freight industry has been de-regulated since 1970. That is, there is 
no real restriction on the quantity of companies operating within the market place, only 
on the standards of operators, controlled through operator licensing. This is a control 
of quality rather than quantity. Other countries such as Germany have recently 
undergone this form of de-regulation.
However, de-regulation does not necessarily imply a low level of interaction with 
national government. There is a well established network of relationships involving 
national government departments, particularly Transport, which is seen as the 'sponsor' 
department, and which works mainly with the UK trade associations, the Freight 
Transport Association and the Road Haulage Association, as representatives of road 
freight interests. These have been seen as 'strong' lobbying groups (Whitelegg, 1988, 
p.63). While lobbying on road freight issues may also include other sectoral groups e.g. 
motor manufacturers, the RHA and FT A still represent key consultation partners in any 
consideration of road transport issues.
EU legislation affecting road freight has chiefly come about as a result of the Single 
Market initiative, but it also sits within the context of the earlier aims for a Common 
Transport Policy (CTP) across the EU. Under the Treaty of Rome, the Member States 
of the European Community were required to agree and implement a common 
transport policy. Progress towards this has been painfully slow because of widely 
differing transport policies of Member States, and the conflicting interests at stake. 
(Mackie, Simon, Whiteing, 1987).
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Between 1959 and 1973, when the Community was enlarged to include Denmark, the 
UK and Ireland, Community institutions attempted to decide on their policy for 
transport. Key to this was the Commission's memorandum on the General Lines of a 
Transport Policy, which set out the basic principles and content of the policy (1961). 
This was followed by the Action Programme on a Common Transport Policy (1962). 
The principles which emerged from this were: equal treatment for transport users and 
transport operators; the financial independence of transport undertakings and their 
freedom of action and competition; free choice for users and co-ordination of 
infrastructure investment. Measures proposed within these principles included the need 
for controlling the supply of transport services, organisation of the market to align 
tariffs between different modes of transport and between different Member States, and 
harmonisation of conditions of competition (covering taxation, social and public 
service obligation issues). Finally, it included the need for fairly allocated costs between 
users of transport services.
The following years were marked by a general lack of political will on the part of the 
Council of Ministers to progress the outlined proposals. During this period, the 
institutional crisis of 1965 occurred, which resulted in the "Luxembourg Compromise". 
This recognised the right of veto by a single Member State, on proposals which were 
considered against the national interest, and it resulted in a general stalemate over a 
variety of issues.
In 1973 however, there was a new departure for the Common Transport Policy (CTP). 
The Commission proposed to extend the scope and content of the CTP in response to 
the outcome of the Paris summit in 1972, and what was considered to be the increasing 
costs to society of the transport sector. The Commission proposed that the market 
would not only be organised but integrated. All modes of transport would together 
form one integrated network. This was an explicit extension of the remit of the then 
CTP, which was subsequently supported by the European Court of Justice ruling in 
1974 that neither maritime or air modes of transport were exempt from the obligations 
of the Community, and that therefore the general rules applied to them. It still, 
however, preserved the basic focus of the policy, which was to uphold the wider 
economic goal of economic integration based on free market-thinking (Whitelegg, 
1988, p. 14).
Leo Tindemann's Report on European Union (1975) again mentioned an aim of the 
European Union as improved transport and communication, and recognised the need 
for the harmonisation of rules which would be required to achieve this. However, no 
positive action ensued and at the beginning of the 1980s very few of the objectives set
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out in the 1973 proposal had been achieved. In May 1979 for example, the discussions 
about the technical standardisation of weights and dimensions of commercial vehicles, 
were stalled by the entry of the new 3 Member States. Enlargement had further 
exacerbated the difficulties in decision-making experienced by the original 6 States. 
The entrenched nature of national views is aptly demonstrated by the fact that the FT A 
was still campaigning in 1994 for the application of the 40 tonne standard 
(subsequently implemented in all but two countries) within the UK. This period of 
stagnation culminated finally in an action brought by the President of the European 
Parliament to the Court of Justice, against the Council of Ministers, for failure to act in 
the field of transport policy. The Court found in its judgement of 22nd May 1985 that 
'The Council has infringed the Treaty by failing to ensure freedom to provide services 
in the sphere o f international transport and to lay down the conditions under which 
non-resident carriers may operate transport services in a member state.' (OJL 6/85)
The judgement coincided with the Commission proposal for the completion of the 
Internal Market, which was subsequently agreed by the European Council at its 
meeting in Milan 1985 and again in December 1985. 'The Community shall adopt 
measures with the aim o f progressively establishing the internal market over a period
expiring on 31st December 1992 The internal market shall comprise an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement o f goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions o f this (the EEC) Treaty.' This 
provided the impetus for a number of measures affecting the freight sector. The major 
aspect of this new commitment was the introduction of cabotage in both air, maritime 
and road transport. The implementation has not been without difficulty. It has also 
given rise to other legislation which is complimentary to the overall aim of the Single 
Market. For Road Freight, important areas were the simplification of customs 
documentation, the move towards mutual recognition of professional qualifications, 
and harmonisation of technical standards, i.e. vehicle weights and dimensions. !'Many o f 
these were on the agenda prior to the Single Market initiative but were fraught with 
difficulties due to the discrepancies in the degree o f liberalisation in transport across 
member states' (Lodge, 1993, p.91). This package of 'liberalising' measures 
progressively introduced changes in border control and customs procedures and the 
gradual removal of restrictions on international transport imposed by the quota system 
of permits. EU legislators have, however, been active in a number of other areas since 
1986. If these do not strictly belong under an 'Single Market' heading, they are closely 
related to this in their intention of removing potential for market distortion resulting 
from national differences. Such areas cover vehicle taxation, drivers' hours and 
operating licenses. With the addition of environmental legislation on vehicle emissions,
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and the transport of hazardous goods, the impact on the freight sector can be seen to 
span technical, financial, social, and latterly, environmental issues.
The focus on environmental issues represents a substantial change of emphasis in the 
development of the CTP. Commenting on the progress of the CTP until 1988, 
Whitelegg concludes, 'In twenty-five years there has been little development o f its 
basic thinking about transport and much repetition and bureaucratic non-activity 
which passes fo r a common policy. Its resilience to popular academic and critical 
transport policy developments is remarkable and it exists in isolation from transport 
priorities, wrapped up in a language o f its own and nurtured by a self-perpetuating 
and somewhat incestuous relationship with wider EEC goals o f economic growth 
regardless o f the consequences' (Whitelegg, 1988, pp 16-17)
In December 1992 however, a proposal 'The Future Development o f the Common 
Transport Policy' was produced which set the scene for a more comprehensive policy 
based on an internal market in which remaining restrictions or distortion should be 
eliminated as quickly as possible. A key feature of the Policy is the integration of 
environmental objectives as laid down in the Treaty of European Union. How far free- 
market objectives can be reconciled with environmental considerations, is yet to be 
tested This is essentially the point that Whitelegg makes in his rather acerbic 
assessment of European policy development. Leaving aside considerations of 
practicality however, the 1992 proposal does at least represent a shift in emphasis, and 
a recognition of the issue.
While many problematic 'internal market' issues still remain to be resolved, this perhaps 
signals the start of a very different EU environment for Road Freight companies, and 
the users of their services. The difference lies in the sensitivity of environmental issues. 
The importance of these issues has already found expression in EU measures on vehicle 
emissions and proposals for a carbon tax. However, the balancing act between 
industrial and environmental objectives is a difficult one. No more so than for 
politicians, who face an electorate that is generally far more aware of environmental 
issues, and possibly less willing to compromise, as well as environmental lobby 
organisations (Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace). Reactions to road-building 
programmes in the UK demonstrate this. The assessment of company and interest 
group influencing strategies therefore takes place at a time when there is a shift of 
emphasis in policy focus, the results of which may not be apparent for some time.
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6.3 European Policy Initiatives
Policy Initiatives Linked to Single Market Implementation: there have been a 
number of key liberalisation and associated harmonisation measures introduced both 
as a result of the Single Market Initiative and the development of the Common 
Transport Policy. These have had significant impact on operators within the UK and 
for that matter, other European countries. They have also been the subject of 
protracted negotiations between Member States, reflecting the wide diversity in 
transport environments across the EU. Four policy initiatives are discussed below. 
These do not represent the only legislation tabled within the period under review, they 
reflect, however, key issues for firms within the sector.
Cabotage
Cabotage is possibly the most contentious area of legislation linked to the Single 
Market initiative. Regulation 4058/89 defines cabotage as the condition under which a 
non-resident carrier may operate services in another Member State. It proposed that 
from July 1990 all haulage companies would be able to operate their services on a 
temporary basis within another (state. For example, a vehicle delivering freight from the 
UK to the south of France, could take on a further freight delivery contract for the 
movement of goods from the south of France to Paris, thus 'running empty' only for a 
proportion of its total return journey. This liberalisation measure would, however, be 
introduced incrementally through a quota of cabotage authorisations, increasing from 
July 1991 until full cabotage was implemented.
Regulation 4058/89 was followed by further provisions amending the authorisation 
quota until Regulation 3118/93 detailed the timetable for the introduction of a 
definitive systems and full cabotage in 1998, a considerably later date for completion 
than originally anticipated. The proposal was part of a package of liberalising measures 
supporting the Single Market initiative, but it was seen as a particular threat to some 
countries with restrictive road transport licensing systems (Mackie, Simon & Whiteing, 
1987). There was opposition to the proposal and pressure on the Commission to allow 
'safeguard measures' in the event of'serious disturbances' within the road freight sector 
as a result of liberalisation. This pressure was successful as can be seen from the 
inclusion of safeguard measures in the subsequent Regulation 3118/93.
Within the UK, there was considerable concern about the proposal in the initial stages, 
and fears that it would undermine the domestic freight business (Freight, Jan 1988
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p.7), through foreign operators taking business from local firms. Some of this concern 
came through the Unions (interview: 19). However, the FTA campaigned in favour of 
the proposal, citing benefits in the form of greater operational efficiency (less empty 
running) and the interchangeability of drivers' vehicles and trailers regardless of their 
country of residence or registration. In the end fears about the adverse effects of 
cabotage proved unfounded, and there is no evidence that it is now seen as a problem 
for UK operators.
Customs and Border Controls
Another key feature of the Single Market proposal related to the removal of customs 
and border controls between Member States (Regulation 4060/89). For international 
hauliers this had a major impact in terms of journey time on cross country operations. 
The export, community transit and import declarations were abolished for the majority 
of freight movements and replaced by the requirement for some statistical data on VAT 
returns for Customs & Excise.
This aspect of the Single Market met with general support from Road Freight 
operators as with other sections of UK industry. The main issue which arose was delay 
over the definition of the final format of cabotage arrangements and because of this, 
failure to agree this in the Council of Ministers 'detracts from the single market 
arrangements which should now be fully in place' (FTA, 1993, p.5).
Vehicle Weights
In addition to these initiatives, a number of other areas have also been targeted by the 
Commission in order to support the Single Market process. These attempt to remove 
possible market distortions caused by differing technical social and fiscal arrangements 
across Member States. Harmonisation measures were seen by the Commission as key 
to successfully achieving cabotage. It also supported the proposals to abolish customs. 
" Without harmonisation it is difficult to police legal requirements i f  there are 12 
different sets o f rules" (interview: 31). Directive 85/3 established the maximum 
specifications for road haulage vehicles on intra-EU journeys for 5 & 6 axle vehicles, 
(89/338 for 2,3, & 4 axle vehicles). This introduced the 40 tonne maximum permitted 
weight, from which the UK government obtained a derogation to allow its upper limit 
of 38 tonnes to remain until 1998. These proposals have once again been the subject of 
conflict between Member States which have widely varying regulations. Undeterred 
however, the Commission presented proposals to harmonise the maximum permitted 
weights for all vehicles circulating in the Community (COM 93/679). The range of
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permitted weights can vary considerably from country to country, between 38 and 50 
tonnes prior to the most recent enlargement, but the Commission eventually settled on 
a 44 tonne limit (to reflect the most common 40 or 44 tonne national limit).
There has been continuing opposition to increases in lorry weight maximum by the UK 
Government. Hence the limit remains at 38 tonnes, despite pressure from the national 
trade associations. The UK has obtained a derogation from the proposed increase to 
44 tonnes on the grounds that it would have to review the likely impact on bridge 
safety and the wear and tear on roads. However, it has subsequently agreed that the 
new 44 tonne maximum could be introduced on any 6 axle vehicles transporting goods 
to or from a railhead, provided that vehicles are fitted with the appropriate suspension 
and do not increase their overall dimensions.
The issue of lorry weights is unfinished business in the UK, but here lobbying activity 
has been directed towards the UK government, in support of the adoption of EU 
legislation, rather than the prevention of legislation. It illustrates possibly more than 
any of the other regulatory issues the close interest of national government in transport 
issues and the highly charged political nature of seemingly 'technical' issues in this 
arena, against a background of increasing public sensitivity to environmental issues.
Social Harmonisation : Drivers Hours and Access to the Profession
Regulation 543/69 first proposed the regulation of drivers hours of work and rest 
breaks, and resulted in the introduction of the tachograph (3820/85 3821/85). The 
regulations themselves did not cause significant concern, but the introduction of the 
tachograph was resisted by trade unions. It was only introduced after the European 
Commission took action against the UK government for failure to implement the 
regulation.
In 1988, a revision of regulation 3820/85 was made to change the definitions of the 
working week and working days and specified permitted driving hours against these 
definitions, and introduced compulsory rest periods. The background was the apparent 
lack of clarity in rules and therefore their interpretation in various countries. However, 
the FTA and employers resisted these changes on the grounds that the proposals 
represented more than a simple clarification of the existing rules, which had in any case 
only been introduced in 1986.
The proposed revisions were not implemented in the end, but the associated 
amendment of 3821/85 introduced the requirement for countries to carry out a check
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of at least one per cent of the total number of tachograph charts used by drivers in any 
one year. This proposal established common standards for enforcing social legislation 
and was actioned through Directive 88/599. More recently other issues have arisen 
relating to the tachograph with the proposal to replace the current mechanical device 
with an electronic tachograph (a move being resisted by the manufacturers of the 
current device).
As early as 1974, a directive (74/561) was published which aimed at eliminating social 
factors which were a source market distortions. This proposed the certain minimum 
criteria for access to the profession. This related to both national and international 
operators. In 1992 however, a new regulation (881/92) subsequently provided for a 
community authorisation system in which holders of a standard international operator 
licence or International Certificate of Professional Competence would automatically be 
issued with a Community Authorisation to operate. This replaced the system of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements between Member States.
Fiscal Harmonisation : Vehicle Taxation and Tolls
The final, and possibly the most difficult area of harmonisation concerns the two main 
taxes levied on freight vehicles, annual vehicle tax and excise duty In 1986 the 
Commission stated that the presence of different levels of taxes and transport tolls were 
distorting competitive conditions (COM 86/750). In 1993, agreement was finally 
reached by the Council of Ministers that a minimum rate of taxation, 454 Ecu, would 
apply to all vehicles over 12 tonnes (Directive 93/98). The minimum rates would only 
come into effect in 1998 however as five countries, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal 
were allowed by the Commission a derogation until this time. It specified they could 
maintain rates 50% below the minimum until this time.
Recent pressure from Germany to introduce a road-usage charge or 'vignette' system 
heightened the debate about disparities created by different systems and levels of 
taxation. This is particularly the case for the UK, as operators currently bear the 
highest levels of taxation on their vehicles of any Member State in the EU. Under this 
proposal they would have to pay additional levies for using the German road system.
In the event, the Commission agreed to either tolls or road-user charges as Member 
States see fit, provided that the schemes meet certain conditions, for example, they 
must not lead to mandatory checks on frontiers or they may not discriminate on the 
grounds of nationality (COM 93/98). This effectively allowed Germany to introduce 
the proposed vignette system. It is likely however that fiscal harmonisation will prove
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one of the most difficult areas to address for the Commission due to the implications 
for national taxation regimes and the constraints that EU-wide regulations will have on 
the independence of national finance ministers. This is still therefore a main focus for 
UK road freight lobbying of the UK Government, although the sector is unlikely to 
have much joy on this score from the Treasury.
Policy Initiatives Linked to Safety and Environmental Issues: the above initiatives 
were part of the Single Market programme or closely linked with it, in that they are 
aimed at the prevention of market distortions. More recently however, the focus of 
policy development has shifted to environmental and safety issues. This relates directly 
to the agenda set out in the Commission's document "The Future Development of the 
Common Transport Policy" (COM 494 1992). This recognises 1992 as a turning point 
in terms of the shift from the Single Market focus to a new set of challenges. It states 
!Among those challenges one o f the most important is the integration o f the 
environmental objectives as now laid down in the Union Treaty' (COM 92 494 p 5). 
It goes on to outline the key areas which will be tackled as part of the Commission's 
proposal for meeting these challenges. These are; transferring the real costs of 
transport (by implication road transport in particular) to users, higher standards for 
vehicle omissions, stricter maintenance of vehicles, action on fuels, and fiscal incentives 
for promoting the desired responses from industry in relation to environment. 
Encouragement of collective modes of transport and the discouragement of private car 
use are specific goals ( COM 494, 1992, pp 165-180). Ironically, the Commission also 
recognises in its report that the completion of the internal market and integration of the 
economies of Member States entails increased transport movements across frontiers. 
By implication this may have increased environmental issues.
Carbon Tax, Vehicle Emissions and Safety
As part of the commitment of governments within the EU to stabilise C02 emissions 
and therefore reduce global warming, the Commission developed a strategy ensuring 
emission levels in the year 2000 were contained at the 1990 level. In March 1992 it 
proposed a tax on fossil fuels based on their carbon and energy contents. These fiscal 
measures were challenged by the FTA on the grounds that price controls were not the 
answer, but that levels of C02 would be dependent on engine efficiencies, and 
distance and quantity of goods transported (Freight, 1992, November, p.21). Instead 
the FTA proposed fuel-efficiency incentives as an alternative to the taxation approach.
Certainly the 'incentives' route seems to have been taken up by the Commission, as 
more recent legislation on vehicle emissions has made provision for this (Directive
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94/12). Legislation on vehicle emissions has however, existed since 1970 when the first 
limits on carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions were proposed. This predates 
by some considerable time the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change which 
highlighted the need to reduce overall levels of C02 emissions. Vehicle emission limits 
have gradually become more stringent, and have been accompanied by ’technological 
advances' in engine design.
The Commission's interest in transport safety issues predates the publication of COM 
494 92, when in 1987, it proposed that the international regulation concerning the 
carriage of hazardous goods (ADR) should be extended to national operations as well. 
In 1989 a directive was agreed which required the harmonisation of training standards 
for drivers of vehicles carrying dangerous goods (OJL 398). Under this directive, 
drivers had to attend approved training courses, and were required to hold a certificate 
of competence. This certificate lasted 5 years. Further developments in this area were 
then proposed in 1992 which both introduced additional regulations aimed at 
improving the training of operatives, and extended the scope of those covered by the 
regulations. That is, not only drivers, but those involved in the loading and storage of 
dangerous goods were encompassed in the new regulations passed in April 1991. 
Continuing on the theme of safety, another set of measures has been introduced to 
limit the speed of goods (and passenger) vehicles Directive 92/6 therefore brought the 
introduction of speed limiters on vehicles over 12 tonnes, and reductions in the 
permissible maximum speeds on various classes of road.
Taking all of the Single Market initiatives and safety and environmental issues into 
consideration, there has been a steady stream of legislation affecting firms in the road 
freight sector, across a wide range of issues, from driver operating hours, to vehicle 
specifications. For the most part these initiatives have not been regarded as a major 
threats to the sector in themselves, even if the implementation has sometimes caused 
problems (e.g. rules governing the calculation of drivers hours and the introduction of 
the tachograph). The prospects of further 'environmental' legislation is seen as a 
potential area of concern, but some of the companies represented in this research also 
see this as a business opportunity. These are the larger firms which believe they may 
gain because they will be able to respond to more stringent regulations, while the 
smaller operators will not. What the next section will show is that neither the 
development of Single Market legislation nor the likelihood of regulation linked to 
environmental issues has caused a major shift in individual firm  approach to 
monitoring EU developments, or influencing strategies.
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6.4 European & National Consultation Processes
Policies affecting road freight business interests can be generated by a variety of 
national government departments and Commission directorates. However, it is the UK 
Department of Transport and DG VII within the Commission which form the main 
focus of consultation, particularly within the context of single market liberalisation and 
harmonisation measures, though the emphasis may change depending on developments 
in transport and environmental issues.
Within the Commission, and specifically within DGVQ, proposals are reviewed 
through two key committees, the Transport Working Group linked to COREPER, and 
through the Transport and Tourism Committee linked to the European Parliament. 
Consultation with business is structured through three channels, UNICE, the IRU 
(International Road Haulage Union), and Eurochambres. DGVQ representatives 
confirm that formal consultation only takes place with international organisations, and 
that national organisations hence the current channels. Of these three organisations, 
the greatest contact is with the IRU, which was reported to b e ' on a day-to-day basis' 
(interview: 31). Interviews confirmed that contact with companies was very limited, 
and that officials did not go out of their way to approach individual firms, or for that 
matter, national trade associations. The emphasis is on consultation with a pan- 
European organisation. The overall picture is therefore of a very structured approach 
to consultation. Also, there appear to have been no significant changes in the approach 
since 1986.
Company contacts with the Commission are limited, although there is some variation in 
the response between senior and junior officials interviewed. Whether this was because 
of different perceptions of different officials, or their particular policy portfolio is 
difficult to determine. There was evidence of contact with lobbying firms, but mostly 
in the form of information gathering rather than influencing activity. "We are 
sometimes approached by individual companies i f  there are problems, and they feel 
they are being discriminated against, but what generally happens i f  we don't give 
them a satisfactory reply is that it comes back through the MEPs asking questions in 
Parliament" (interview: 35).
Within the UK, the consultation between business interests and the Department of 
Transport mirrors that of the Commission in certain key aspects. Main consultation 
partners are the Freight Transport Association (FTA) and Road Haulage Association 
(RHA), the CBI and Chambers of Commerce. Of these, the trade associations, the FTA 
and RHA are seen as the most important. Contact with individual companies was
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limited although the growth of initiatives concerned with the transport of hazardous 
goods has resulted in a change of approach. A committee comprising representatives 
of companies specialising in this area is now established. This supports the proposition 
that policy initiatives in areas where companies have specialist expertise (i.e. an 
information advantage) they may have the opportunity for direct access to decision­
makers. This tendency may apply equally in a national and a European context.
There have been no significant changes to consultation processes within the context of 
Single Market liberalisation and harmonisation measures. Here, the overall direction of 
the EU was seen to be very much in line with the liberalised industry which already 
existed within the UK. However, the shift of focus to environmental and safety issues is 
seen as a potential catalyst for change as the above example of a deviation from normal 
consultation routes suggests. What has changed in the national context is the 
development of contacts and consultation processes between the UK Government 
Departments and the Commission, and latterly contacts with MEPs.
The approach taken by DGVTI highlights that while it is certainly open to contact 
directly by companies, there is a well-established approach to consultation through 
collective interests operating at an international level. It is these collective interests that 
form the main opportunity for influence by individual companies, or for that matter by 
national interest groups representing the sector. Further, there is no indication that the 
shift of policy focus to environmental issues will result in a change of approach on the 
part of this particular directorate.
The pattern of consultation in this context appears to be very similar for both UK and 
EU decision-makers. This is through the trade associations, industry associations, and 
Chambers of Commerce at a European/International Level. There is no evidence of the 
development of separate consultative forums involving individual companies. This 
contrasts with evidence from other, concentrated sectors such as electronics and 
pharmaceuticals where some of the preliminary interviews in the research indicated that 
individual companies were part of separate consultative forums, echoing the point that 
Richardson & Mazey make about the possible formation of 'inner circles' of influence 
(Mazey & Richardson, 1993, p.22). Within the fragmented road freight sector, 
consultation takes place primarily with associations.
In terms of the European Parliament, where there is a particular need to consult, the 
focal point for business interests is once again the trade association. Contact by 
companies is ad hoc, and the main attempt at influence is through the trade 
associations. However, when these contacts are made, they are made direct to the
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MEP rather than through MPs. For the Freight sector, UK MPs do not appear to be a 
significant indirect channel for influencing the European Parliament. Links between 
MEPs and MPs appear weak in this context. One of the reasons given for this is the 
issue of timescales (interview: 35). Often, a particular policy or piece of legislation only 
becomes an issue at national level long after agreement through the EU decision­
making process. The prime means of exerting influence on the European Parliament 
therefore mirrors that of the Commission. It is through the trade associations. At both 
national and EU level these appear to have established a key position with decision­
makers, in this case MEPs.
The RHA and FTA hold regular sessions with the UK MEPs represented on the 
Transport and Tourism Committee, though the RHA has developed a strategy of using 
the CBI British Business Bureau as its representative rather than directly providing a 
lobbyist based in Brussels. The Parliament also appears to be the focus for non­
business groups as important consultation groups are also see as the TGWU, and 
Friends of the Earth and Transport 2000, in addition to the trade associations. Some ad 
hoc contacts are made with haulage firms but as an MEP on the Transport and 
Tourism Committee commented ' the onus is on them (i.e. the firms) except where it is 
a really big issue. On these occasions we will instigate a hearing and it is well 
publicised. Key speakers are invited to put their views ’(interview: 35/ The same 
MEP also confirmed that the focus of business lobbying, in this case predominantly the 
trade associations, was the Commission. ’ My impression is trade associations work 
very closely with the Commission and DGVII particularly is heavily influenced by 
transport interests’ (interview: 35).
In summary, UK business interests within Road Freight appear to have intensified their 
contacts with the European Parliament, but this has been expressed through more 
systematic and regular contact with national and European trade associations.
6.5 Companies Response: Individual Strategies
Monitoring and Sources of Information: companies within the sector use a variety 
of sources of information on EU developments to determine what is going on. Most 
companies in the sample use at least 3 or 4 main sources (see table 6). Only one 
company, the smallest, relied on one source only (the RHA). These results confirm the 
important roles of the trade association as the chief sources: the FTA is used by 87% of 
the sample and the RHA by 75%.
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Sources of Information
P&O BOC NFC Hays Salveson Laser Denby Barber % Using Source
UK Ministries / 12
UK MPs / / 25
CBI / / 25
FTA / / / / / / / 87
RHA / / / / / / 75
Other Trade Assoc's / / 25
Consultancies / / 25
Institute of Logistics / 12
EIU Intelligence Report / 12
Retai 1 ers/Customers / 12
MEPs / / 25
Press / / / 38
Own researcher / 12
Institute of Directors / / 25
EU Commission / 12
No of Sources 5 5 3 4 5 4 7 1
Table 5. Road Freight: Main Company Sources o f Information on EU
Developments 
Source: Own Research Interviews
Influence Strategies: only two firms confirmed that in terms of representing its views 
on EU issues it will go direct to EU institutions. These were: P&O the largest group 
(though not the largest company) within the sample, and a smaller company 
specialising in the transport of hazardous goods (Denby). P&O displayed the nearest 
approach to that found in other multinationals within the concentrated industry sectors 
investigated as part of the preliminary research. That is they have a main Board 
director who is also a professional lobbyist. Even here however, the company 
representative stressed the importance of the FTA as an important influencing route. 
We have lobbied via the FTA, helping their arguments as part o f a group. This is 
discrete lobbying which is via information giving. I  can’t imagine we would appoint a 
lobbyist, given the way we work, though I  said when I  joined that I  though we ought to 
get more involved with the FTA, and we have done this' (interview: 9). This suggests 
that while a large company like P&O can use the direct access route, it is careful to 
support a strong collective strategy. The second exception was a small firm (Denby). 
Here the senior Managing Director will directly approach national government and EU 
decision-makers over particular issues, as well as being active in the trade association. 
This appears to be a personal interest, according to the executive Managing Director, 
so it may be an exception to the rule, relating to personal interest, rather than specific 
commercial objectives. However, it is interesting that the firm is involved in specialist 
distribution of dangerous goods. It may be that this also gives this firm an information 
advantage which will mean that it will always find an ’open ear' in government 
departments, whether national or EU.
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Companies within the UK Road Freight sector predominantly exert influence on EU 
institutions through collective means. The most important of these is the trade 
association, both from the point of view of information gathering and exerting 
influence (see fig 9). The trade associations are themselves part of an interlocking 
structure of interest groups and consultation forums which primarily focus on 'vertical', 
or sectoral issues and which occupy important positions as the providers of technical 
expertise. They are seen as such by both national and EU decision-makers, and by 
national industry organisations. In addition, their position does not appear to be 
seriously challenged by special focus groups representing distinct policy communities 
within the sector (companies with an interest in regulations affecting the transport of 
hazardous good being the possible exception).
Influence Strategy Preferred Strategies
P&O BOC NFC Hays Salveson Laser Denby Barber % of Firm Sample
Direct (Lobbying)
Commission / / 25
Council 0
European Parliament (MEPs) / 12
Ecosoc 0
Committee of the Regions 0
Indirect
National Ministries / 1 / / / 62
National Parliament (MPs) / / 25
CBI London 0
CBI Brussels 0
CBI Business Bureau 0
IRU 0
FTA / 1 / / / 62
RHA / / / 37
Retailer/Customer 1 0
Eurochambres 0
Chambers of Commerce 0
Lobbying Firms/Consultants / 12
Table 6. Road Freight: Company Influence Strategies 
Source: Own Research Interviews
There is no significant evidence of companies departing from this pattern either at a 
national or EU level. Where they deviate from collective action, their efforts seem 
mainly channelled towards UK Government Ministries and MPs. Only the largest 
company within the sample displayed the direct and multiple route EU lobbying 
strategies noted in other multinational organisations and which involves the use of a 
professional, Brussels-based lobbyist. No evidence was found of companies making use 
of external lobbying companies, although some have clearly obtained access to such 
services through Board appointments.
There is evidence from company interviews that environmental legislation may provide 
opportunities as well as threats. Although the interest in EU policy development has 
increased, and environmental issues appear to be a reason, the research suggests that
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increased concern about the potential for legislation in this area will continue to be 
managed predominantly through collective strategies, and that this will be where 
changes in approach, including intensification of contact with EU institutions will 
develop, rather than at company level. It is therefore not solely the opportunity for 
influence created by the EU and its institutions, or for that matter, legislation directly 
affecting the sector, which explains the response of firms, and the way influence is 
exerted at sectoral level. The difference between the RHA and FTA suggests that 
company and industry characteristics play a significant part, with the presence of large, 
transnational firms from concentrated industry sectors providing the membership 
impetus for developing EU lobbying capability in the case of the FTA.
This comment supports the findings from interviews with companies, government 
representatives, trade, and industry associations that the focal point for lobbying 
activity within the sector is the trade association, and that of the two which represent 
road freight in the UK (FTA and RHA), the Freight Transport Association appears to 
have developed a special role in relation to European issues. Only one of the four 
larger companies in the sample did not identify the FTA as an influencing route for 
European policy issues. The reasons for this were attributed to the FTA being focused 
on 'own account operators' not the 'hire and reward' sector, i.e. it represents those 
companies who may not consider freight as their main business but which nevertheless 
operate their own vehicle fleet and physical distribution systems (users as well as 
suppliers).
Reasons for Influence Strategies: of the factors which may influence the company's 
choice of routes, the major reasons identified by interviewees for their current 
approach were: the degree of threat posed by EU legislation; the cost of lobbying; 
organisational structure and the attitude of Board members (table 7). Other factors that 
featured in the replies were the perceived effectiveness of trade association and national 
government representation.
In general, legislation has been favourable to UK operators, particularly the large ones, 
and there has been little to cause concern, i.e. perception of threat has been low. There 
is, however, evidence of a very slight increase in monitoring EU proposals and policies 
and the two largest companies in the sample have stated that going forward 
developments in EU policy-making may cause a re-think of their current strategy (P&O 
and NFC). The reason given for this in both cases was the development of EU 
environmental policy.
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Three companies in the sample considered they were well advanced in thinking about 
environmental issues (P&O, NFC and Christian Salveson). They also indicated that 
there were commercial opportunities for their business contained within more stringent 
and wide-ranging environmental regulation. This illustrates the point that businesses 
may sometimes have a direct commercial interest in supporting, and sometimes even 
encouraging legislation. Lobbying is not always a case of staving off a threat. In this 
context, more stringent environmental regulation on the sector would have the effect 
(assuming reasonable enforcement provision) of reducing the number of operators i.e. 
those who could not respond to new standards. These would inevitably be the smaller
R easons For Current Approach
P&O BOC NFC Hays Salveson Laser Denby Barber % Citing Reason
External
Commercial Threat / / / / 50
Commercial Opportunity / / 25
Familiarity with EU / 25
Lack of Familiarity with EU / / 12
Effective UK Govt. Approach / 25
Ineffective UK Govt Approach 12
Effective Business Associations / / 0
Ineffective Business Associations / 25
12
Internal
External Company Image 0
Board Members Attitudes / / / 37
Organisational Structure / / / 37
Investment Plans / 12
Cost Implications / / / 37
Table 7. Road Freight: Reasons for Companies' Selection o f
Influence Strategy 
Source: Own Research Interviews
operators. It could reasonably be expected that this type of regulation will in fact aid 
the concentration of the industry. However, although the larger companies in the 
sample all identified their environmental standards as a competitive advantage, no 
evidence was forthcoming of an attempt to develop proactive lobbying in Brussels on 
this, or the enforcement issue, thus increasing this advantage. This supports the view 
emerging of company strategies which are predominantly passive, at best, opportunistic 
and mainly geared to assessing the degree of threat.
The companies interviewed as part of the research showed no real development of 
direct lobbying activities within the EU, and this mimics the approach established with 
national government. Contact with decision-makers in general is limited. With few 
exceptions it is managed at Board level. Apart from P&O, there are no 'public affairs 
specialists' within the sample, though the research picked up evidence of one other firm
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outside the sample which like P&O have appointed a lobbyist as a Board Director 
(Non-Executive).
The predominance of collective influence strategies coincides with a focus on sectoral 
or Vertical issues', and goes hand-in-hand with a relatively reactive approach to the 
potential implications of government decisions on the business, at company level. 
Problems are identified once legislation has already been agreed (e.g. drivers hours) 
and issues raised then via sectoral lobbying groups, the trade associations. 'Degree of 
threat', Board members' attitudes, and cost issues are the most frequently stated as the 
reason for the low-key and indirect approach to decision-makers. These characteristics 
were displayed across all companies, regardless of size, structure and operational 
focus. Lack of familiarity with EU institutions and processes was not a particular issue, 
and was only identified as a key external reason for the particular approach in two 
companies. These were NFC and BOC, a large and a medium sized company.
Summary: companies response to Single Market legislation has been low key. Overall, 
there is little evidence that this has caused a major rethink in terms of how these 
businesses monitor the regulatory environment, or that it has generated more proactive 
company influence activity (i.e. direct lobbying of EU institutions in order to change 
impending or current legislation). Most firms have not formally reviewed their 
approach to the processes involved in monitoring and responding to legislation, though 
company representatives confirmed that the amount of information gathering has 
increased, even though they found it hard to quantify by how much.
Each company's approach has usually evolved over a period of time, and mainly 
consists of monitoring by legal or sector experts, with decisions on action required 
referred to the Board of Directors. With one exception (P&O) within the sample of 
companies interviewed as part of this research, no professional lobbyists are employed 
by businesses for monitoring or action. This contrasts with sectors such as 
pharmaceuticals or IT where there is evidence of the development of in-house 
lobbying expertise. Within Road Freight, contacts with governmental agencies remain 
predominantly the preserve of Board members, where it takes place at all, and this 
suggests a type of insurance policy approach to lobbying, i.e. ensuring that the firm 
has the appropriate contacts should the need arise, rather than the proactive, 
continuous contact approach used where public affairs professionals are present.
Nevertheless, the P&O strategy comes quite close to this. The P&O European 
Transport Services division has John Steele as its Non-executive chairman. Previously
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Commissioner for DGVII, the Commission Transport Directorate, he also heads a 
professional lobbying firm based in Brussels.
Although companies may not appoint lobbyists, this does not mean that they do not 
exert influence directly. Companies may influence through contacts at board level as 
noted above, and specifically appoint non-executive directors who have governmental 
affairs experience in order to facilitate such contacts. This type of influencing is 
particularly difficult to assess. However, there is evidence of this approach across a 
number of companies within the sample. Apart from P&O European Transport 
Services which is the only Company board to have an appointee with EU experience, 
the BOC Group board has Sir Christopher Tugendhat, previously an EC 
Commissioner, and Dick Taveme, who is chairman of the consultancy PRIMA Europe 
Ltd, as a non-executive director. The NFC have appointed Sir Norman Fowler, ex- 
Cabinet minister, and chairman of the Conservative Party, as a non-executive director. 
These appointments reflect an emphasis on both EU and UK links.
Board members may also have contact with EU institutions. Only two of the sample 
companies could cite examples of this, but the accuracy of replies may reflect individual 
knowledge, or lack of it, rather than fact. Probably the best known example of contact, 
and where there was some fairly intense and protracted lobbying activity concerns the 
issue of shipping conferences. Though only of indirect concern to road freight 
operators, it is useful to discuss briefly in order to serves to illustrate the point about 
contact with EU institutions at the highest levels in companies. In this case, a group of 
11 shipping lines, including P&O, attempted to conclude an agreement, which would 
fix rates and conditions of carriage and members carrying capacity (the Transatlantic 
Agreement). This gave this group of companies, which account for around 83% of the 
transatlantic market, a power to limit freight carrying capacity, and therefore create 
opportunities for price increases. Following objections raised by trade associations on 
behalf of companies who use shipping services, the Commission ruled that this 
arrangement was an infringement of competition rules. Members of the Council of 
Ministers were then lobbied directly by senior company Board members in order to 
force a decision to overturn the Commission's ruling. They succeeded in forcing a vote 
within the Council, but this narrowly went against them {Freight, 1992, March). Hence 
in this case the Board proved an important route for access within the EU at the 
highest level, even if it proved unsuccessful in the event.
The response of the two largest companies in the sample does, however, put a marker 
in the ground that the pattern may change in the future. There are also other 
developments in the sector which suggest that a more proactive stance may be
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developing, but this is linked to changes in influence strategy at the collective level 
rather than by individual companies.
6.6 Sector Response: Collective Strategies
The previous discussion demonstrated that the chief route for influencing the EU 
sought by the companies is through collective action rather than individual direct 
lobbying strategies. Though a distinction here needs to be made between Group 
structures, and Company structures, this research indicates that individual road freight 
firms rarely attempt to influence EU institutions directly . Hence, they rarely 'lobby' in 
the strict sense of the term applied here. This does not mean, however, they do not 
exert influence on EU decision-makers. The preference is for collective action through 
a variety of interest groups. In the case of UK Road Freight, key interest groups 
representing firms within the sector are:
• The Freight Transport Association (FTA)
• The Road Haulage Association (RHA)
• The Union Internationale des Transports (IRU)
• The Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
• Union of Industry and Employers Confederation (UNICE)
These are well-established groups and operate in different, but overlapping domains 
which form a network of interest representation, and are all long established. The 
industry is therefore primarily represented through trade and industry associations at a 
national and European level.
Trade Associations: discussions with officials in the European Commission 
(interviews: 31, 32, 33), and the Department of Transport (interview: 27) indicate the 
particular importance of the trade associations as consultation partners: the Freight 
Transport Association (FTA); the Road Haulage Association (RHA); and at an 
international level, the Union Internationale des Routiers (IRU). The RHA and FTA 
have European and international counterparts, though they do not always have quite 
the same remit. This may be due to a number of characteristics of the national 
environment. For example within the UK the strength of a more concentrated retailing 
sector compared with the rest of the EU creates particular demands for fast, flexible 
transportation, and logistics management systems. An FTA representative confirmed 
that the European association which came closest to their profile of cross-sectoral 
membership was the Dutch association, the EVO. This parallel is explained by a similar 
history in each country of 'own account' operation. By contrast the Road Haulage
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Association represents the ’hire and reward' sector, and this association has more 
equivalent organisations throughout the EU and internationally (for example the BDF 
in Germany).
National Trade Associations: the FTA and RHA are the two national sector 
representatives of the industry. The FTA has around 12,000 members, and the RHA 
slightly less at approximately 10,000. The major difference is the type of company 
represented. About 2000 of the FTA's members are road haulage specific, but there 
are many large companies from other sectors represented in its membership. Although 
historically its focus has been on vehicle operation, it is also concerned with wider 
transport issues and rail, air and shipping operations. The British Shippers Council has 
its headquarters at the FTA's Head Office in Tunbridge Wells. The Road Haulage 
Association, as its name suggests, concentrates on road haulage operators only.
Both associations have regional offices in addition to their main headquarters, and both 
have a high proportion of small to medium-sized enterprises as members. In the RHA 
for example 55% of member organisations run between 1 and 4 vehicles 
(interview: 19). Both associations generate income by subscription and commercial 
activities such as training and vehicle inspection. However, in the case of the FTA the 
latter represents a substantial level of activity accounting for around two-thirds of the 
annual income. Flow charts for the RHA and FTA influence strategies are shown in 
figures 8 & 9. These charts involved considerable research based on detailed interviews 
within each association. They show that both associations lobby EU institutions 
directly. The significant difference lies in how they go about this, and the FTA's 
appointment of a Brussels based lobbyist.
Membership fees for the FTA are based on a combination of factors, of which turnover 
is key. Fees for 1996 range between £200 per annum and £20,000 per annum 
(interview: 17). The RHA represents a similar range, £160 per annum through to 
£22,000. This is based, however, on the number of vehicles owned by each member 
(interview: 19).
In terms of lobbying activity, the FTA appointed a lobbyist to represent its views to EU 
institutions in 1993. This was a senior appointment at Regional Director level. This 
does not imply that there was no contact with the Commission, Council and Parliament 
before this time. Neither does it imply that the RHA does not have contacts with EU 
institutions (see figure 8). It is, however, a very visible statement of changing priorities 
if an organisation is prepared to bear the costs involved in creating a new senior level 
appointment and in setting up a Brussels office. The reason given for the increased
123
investment was a perception of the growing importance of EU legislation and 
increasing areas of EU competence (the issue of representation to Brussels was first 
discussed 15 years ago), a recognition of the need to be in at the ideas stage in order to 
influence legislation, and pressure from the membership. 'The office costs £100,000 a 
year to run and this goes straight on to the bottom line. The decision to set up the 
office was however, membership driven, and as a result membership fees have risen. 
The Association made it clear to members that i f  they wanted this facility they would 
have to pay' (interview: 18). In January 1997 the Association is due to increase its 
Brussels team yet again.
The RHA has contacts with EU institutions on an ad hoc basis, largely driven by 
particular issues. EU developments are tracked at the association's headquarters in 
Weybridge through information gathered from a number of sources: the IRU, the 
Official Journal publications, press and magazine articles. Council of Ministers' 
meetings are also monitored and contact is made with the Department of Transport for 
an update following one of these sessions. The priority routes for both information 
gathering and representing views to the EU are through national government routes, 
through the IRU with specific contact with the Commission| when required. The 
reason given for this approach is that ’the cost o f representation in Brussels outweighs 
the potential benefits given that the membership is predominantly nationally focused’ 
(interview: 19). By contrast, the appointment of a Brussels based representative of the 
FTA has given this association the opportunity to increase its contacts with various EU 
institutions, although this appointment doesn't mean no lobbying has previously taken 
place. Contacts have been made with the Commission, prior to this. 'We've been active 
in Europe many years. For the past 4 or 5 years there has been an annual pilgrimage 
to Brussels where Chief Executives and one or two others have gone on a blitzkrieg 
visit to a number o f the directorates' (interview: 17).
Their representative in Brussels has however increased contact with the Commission, 
the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, ECOSOC and the newly formed 
Committee of the Regions. Of these, work with the Commission is the main focus, with 
daily contact with various directorates. DGVII (Transport) is the key contact, but 
contacts with DGIV (Competition), DGV (Social Policy), DGXI (Environment) and 
DGXXI (Customs and Direct Taxation) are also primary contacts. Other directorates 
may feature from time to time. Agriculture is an example, where there have been 
negotiations about the carriage of live animals, and the handling of dangerous 
agricultural substances. Overall the scope and frequency of contact has increased, 
facilitated by the establishment of the Brussels office, and the appointment of someone 
in the organisation with this brief.
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Officials approached by the FT A within each directorate can vary. In DG VH 
(Transport) discussions may be with the Director General, while in DGIV 
(Competition) it may be Director level. Contact at all levels is, however, frequent 
particularly with more junior levels of the Commission, where policies are being 
considered or developed. Cabinet contacts are also important however, and each 
Cabinet will have one member with responsibility for the transport portfolio. This is 
also a useful means of learning what is happening within each Member State.
The third major institution that the FTA seeks to influence is the European Parliament. 
Though discussions with MEPs take place less frequently than with officials within the 
Directorates of the Commission, there is evidence of the growing importance of the 
Parliament in FTA networking activities. This was confirmed not only by the FTA but 
also one of the MEPs represented on the Transport and Tourism committee.
The FTA representative tries to attend the European Parliament's plenary session each 
month and has developed a range of contacts there. 'When I  came to Brussels it 
became apparent that we needed more contacts [with MEPs], that the Parliament was 
important. They have now got the power to chuck legislation out. This imposes a 
discipline on the Commission, who in this case would have to go through the much 
lengthier procedure. They will now accept amendments to proposals in order to 
lessen procedure time, particularly i f  they want to get something though in a hurry ’ 
(interview: 18).
An example of this was the amendment of bill which would effectively have banned the 
carriage of all radio-active isotopes on board passenger planes. The amendment was 
introduced by a member of the Green Party on the European Parliament Environmental 
Committee. As most radio-active isotope is carried on passenger planes, it would have 
caused a major problem for businesses which produce isotopes. In the end, the 
amendment was not pursued as a result of informal discussions with the chairman of 
the Committee. The compromise was the agreement to improve the controls on the 
carriage of radio-active isotopes. The point worth noting about this example is that the 
proposed legislation (i.e. amendment in this case) had already reached the second stage 
of discussion in the European Parliament before there was any involvement by firms or 
business interest groups.
The implications of the power to amend proposals by the European Parliament may not 
be fully understood by UK business both within road freight and other business sectors. 
Views about the European Parliament can still reflect the scope of powers pre- 
Maastricht and even pre-SEA. The reasons for this continuing perception are beyond
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the scope of this paper. However, it is not a view shared by those company, trade 
association and industry representatives working directly with EU institutions.
Despite the FTA's increasing efforts within Brussels, and latterly some shift in approach 
by the RHA, there is no sudden 'switch' of activities to the European level. There 
continues to be a need for these associations to represent sector views to national 
government and local authorities regarding transport issues. Although this is a 'de­
regulated' sector, operators are affected by legislation covering many different areas, 
from vehicle taxation to access to town centres, there is still a large role for the 
association in relation to national issues. Both the FTA and the RHA have well 
established links with national and local government machinery and these continue to 
function much as before. The UK Department of Transport (Interview: 27) considers 
these two organisations as the key points of contact for seeking business sector views.
However, the FTA's presence in Brussels has brought a new dimension to relations 
with national government. This has been in terms of the acquisition o f information, and 
the speed of that acquisition. It is not necessarily always EU developments that can be 
accessed more quickly however. The network of contacts also gives the organisation 
an insight into issues emerging from other Member States. An example of this was that 
the FTA obtained information about the operation of the proposed 'vignettes' system 
in certain EU countries, in advance of the Department of Transport. These are the 
States which do not currently have a road toll system. The document detailing the 
methodology for operating the system was only available in German. As it was not 
strictly a Commission matter, it did not surface through normal channels, but through 
other interest group contacts. This measure was prompted by financial and 
environmental concerns, primarily on the part of Germany, that operators from various 
nations were taking advantage of the free motorway system, funded nationally, while 
their own operators from countries were having to pay tolls elsewhere for the use of 
road infrastructure.
These proposals are of major importance to UK road freight operators as the 
implications of a further tax being levied on operators whose vehicles are already taxed 
at the highest rate within the EU has consequences in terms of overall competitiveness. 
The high rate of vehicle taxation within the UK is a constant bone of contention 
between vehicle operators and the UK Treasury. Logically, the chances of obtaining 
such advance warning is increased with the presence of a representative based in 
Brussels, and the network of contacts it is possible to build in situ. This is an advantage 
which is unlikely to be enjoyed by the RHA, despite its more recently developed links 
through the CBI's British Business Bureau.
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For the FTA, the informal network is reinforced by the presence of the association's 
representative on various committees. The FTA representative takes the CBI seat at 
the UNICE transport working group, attends the IRU Own Account Operators 
committee, and has been invited to serve on the ECOSOC transport committee (as a 
technical expert). David Green, President of the FTA, is also currently President of the 
IRU. Although informal networking is considered most important, these contacts and 
membership of certain committees highlights relationships between lobbying 
organisations, notably the CBI, UNICE and the IRU, and the position of the FTA as 
an important player in each. The FTA has developed a sophisticated lobbying strategy 
which is similar to those found in the multinationals interviewed in the preliminary 
stages of the research, or that is reported in other research (McLaughlin, 1994; 
Cawson, 1992). The predominant characteristic of this approach is the development of 
complex networks of contacts, not only with EU institutions, but also with other 
Member State associations, and other lobbying organisations (see figure 9). This 
enables a proactive style of influence, that is, influencing decision-makers at the early 
stages of policy formation, and developing a network capable of early warning on 
issues that may arise. Having said this, the FTA recognises the limits of its influence on 
EU policy-making. It recognises that the 'rules of the game' are determined by the 
political institutions themselves and these 'rules' specify that formal consultation is 
through pan-European interest groups. This is one of the reasons why it has 
deliberately strengthened its involvement in UNICE and the IRU. Contact with the 
CBI Brussels office (the office of the FTA is located in the same building in Brussels, 
though they have subsequently moved), and with the IRU have increased since the 
appointment of a Brussels representative, but this has also allowed the association to 
extend its network to other organisations such as the UIRR, UITP, CER, CEN, 
CEFIC, NFU, ETUC and Transport and Environment. In the context of environmental 
issues Transport & Environment is carving a position for itself as a key representative 
of environmental interests. Its membership consists of organisations like Friends of the 
Earth and Transport 2000, and it is viewed by both the DG XI and the FTA as a 
sensible negotiation participant (interview: 34)
In summary, the results of this research suggest that as far as EU policy making is 
concerned the RHA influences the EU mainly through national government. More 
recently it appears to have extended its use of the CBI British Business Bureau to 
represent its views to EU institutions. Although clearly it has adapted its strategy, it is 
still principally concerned with national consultation routes. By contrast the FTA has 
adopted the highly proactive strategy of locating an office in Brussels. The association 
may still respond reactively to proposals, but its strategy is to network directly with EU 
institutions, and to be represented directly on EU fora in order to influence the very
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earliest stages of thinking about potential legislation. The impetus for both types of 
approach was identified by the RHA and FTA as 'membership requirements'. On one 
level this simply recognises the pressure, or lack of it, for more involvement with the 
EU and by implication the perceived commercial importance of its decision-making to 
member companies. On another level the profile of companies, their size, scope of 
activities, involvement with EU institutions in other sectoral issues, can be seen to link 
to the influence strategies visible within the sector. In particular, the approach of 
multinational companies to influence activities, and the confirmation of multiple- 
strategies, i.e. individual lobbying capabilities as well as support for collective interests, 
chiefly the sector or trade association, as the distinctive hallmark of this particular 
group of firms.
There may, however, be a further factor which has influence on the varying approach 
of these two organisations. This is that the FTA may see commercial opportunity in 
terms of developing its profile with existing and potential members through the 'added 
value' its expertise in European issues may give. Trade associations have their own 
customers, markets and, in this case competitors. They will therefore generate their 
own strategies and policies, and this may include seeking opportunities for 
differentiation from competitor organisations, or developing the career profile of their 
senior staff.
This discussion shows that there are parallels between the two trade associations 
representing the road freight sector. They have both developed a direct approach to 
lobbying Brussels, rather than solely relying on national government, or for that matter, 
their European federation. The FTA has very visibly increased its focus on EU 
institutions, by increasing the resources allocated to representational activity in 
Brussels. Both associations however, recognise that the sponsoring directorate within 
the Commission prefers a pan-European consultation partner. Hence in addition to the 
activities of a few companies, and the national trade associations a further layer is 
added by the presence of the IRU and the status this organisation is accorded as a 
consultation partner to the Commission.
European Trade Association: the European association representing the industry is 
the IRU. This organisation consists of 154 member associations in 60 countries and 
has an international as well as European remit. In the EU Member States, there are 
approximately 45 organisations represented. These are categorised into three main 
areas of focus: professional haulage, own account operators and coach operators. 
Three committees represent these areas and contain representatives from national trade 
associations and industry associations. Road Freight segments, reflecting distinct
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competitive and policy communities, are therefore visible within the structure of the 
organisation as can be seen from the membership details, and this arrangement enables 
it to continue to manage diverse sets of interests. The RHA is represented on the 
Professional Haulage Committee and the FTA representative attends the Own Account 
Committee.
The IRU was formed just after the second world war. It was originally linked to the 
UN initiative which set up the TIR system, a system of insurance for hauliers and users 
of their services. The IRU was formed in order to negotiate with insurers to provide 
the scheme and then to administer this. There was therefore a specific raison d ’etre for 
the organisation, which still derives income from the overall management of the system 
at its headquarters in Geneva - it did not come into existence specifically as an 
international lobbying organisation. In 1973 however, a decision was taken to set up a 
Brussels office and to maintain a permanent representation to the European 
Commission. The reason was the gradual realisation of the implications of the growing 
legislative powers of Community institutions. This was a realisation on the part of the 
IRU itself and does not appear to have been generated by the national organisations 
which form its members. These were reportedly reluctant to relinquish direct contacts 
with the Commission in the early days. Starting with one appointee, the IRU office has 
expanded from 4.5 FTE to 6 FTE clerical and managerial staff in 1995. By Brussels 
standards this is quite a large office. In 1995 the CBI was staffed at 5 FTE, including 
the British Business Bureau. The work of IRU representatives focuses on the 
Commission, and to a lesser extent the Parliament, though this has increased over the 
last 5 years (interview: 24). There are contacts with national ministries but Council 
contacts are for the most part left to Member State organisations.
Contacts with the Commission are wide-ranging and cover not only DGVTI Transport, 
but DGV, Social Affairs, DGXXI Customs & Indirect Taxation, DGXXm Consumer 
and SMEs, DGID Industrial Affairs, DGXIII Information Technology and DGXI 
Environment. Contact with DGXI Environment is only just beginning, and the contact 
procedure is 'not well developed at the moment’ (interview: 24) in comparison to some 
of the others. The main focus of contacts is DGVII Transport and DGV Social Affairs, 
and the IRU is represented on the Committee for Road Transport and the Committee 
for Social Affairs, amongst others.
The IRU is one of the two main interfaces with business interests in this sector within 
the Commission, excluding ETUC. The other formal link is with UNICE. The IRU 
therefore forms the main interface for European Road Freight sectoral, and has 
frequent formal and informal contact with DGVII. The diverse demands of the various
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national industries, and the segmentation of the industry into different groups (i.e. own 
account, public haulage and passenger) gives this organisation inherent problems in 
terms of representation - those caused by the heterogeneity of member interests which 
it must encompass. To date it appears to have overcome these and established a strong 
position as consultation partner to the Commission. There has, however, been some 
discussion within the FTA about whether a separate European (rather than 
international) federation should be formed, which would align more closely with the 
cross-sectoral membership of the FTA and other national trade associations (interview: 
18)
The role of the IRU reflects the international scope of the road freight sector, as it 
represents both EU and non-EU countries. It has a strong position as the key sectoral 
consultation partner with the Commission for whom such transnational interest 
representation important. Despite this however, national interests such as the RHA and 
FTA, also engage in their own direct contact with EU institutions. They will not 'leave 
it to the IRU. Unlike some concentrated sectors however, the IRU does not appear to 
face parallel lobbying by firms, at least this is the case within the UK.
National & European Industry Associations and Chambers of Commerce: within 
the UK context, the CBI has the role of representing national business interests across 
all sectors. It currently has around 250,000 direct and affiliated members. It does not 
seek to represent specific sector or specific company views however. Its role is to 
address broad industry and economic issues and to communicate the views on national 
issues both to the UK government and EU institutions. In the case of the EU 
institutions however, the formal channel of communication is through the European 
federation of industry associations, UNICE.
The CBI has maintained an office in Brussels since 1971, and like the IRU its lobbying 
activities have increased. The number of people directly employed in this area have 
risen since that time to the current level of 5 FTE. This includes a relatively new part 
of the Brussels operation, the CBI British Business Bureau. Located in the same offices 
in Brussels, this new area was set up in 1990, initially with 6 clients, now with 20. It 
provides special information and introductory services for members who pay a fee (in 
addition to their CBI subscription) for these services. It is self-financing, and therefore 
has enabled the CBI to increase its presence in Brussels without, presumably, incurring 
additional costs to London. The RHA and FTA are members of the Bureau.
The CBI's increased lobbying capability is not solely reflected in changes within 
Brussels. In London, increased activity can also be noted within the European
132
Community Affairs Group. This acts as the link between the Brussels operation and 
the various divisions and committees of the CBI in London. It has the specific task of 
liaison with the European Parliament, a role which has grown since the SEA. The 
current head of the European Community Affairs Group spent 6 months in the Brussels 
office before taking over responsibility for the area in London. Broadly speaking 
therefore the Brussels office concentrates on the Commission and Council (via 
UKREP, and the British Embassy) while the main focus of contact with MEPs is 
through the European Community Affairs Group. This does not imply that the CBI 
Brussels office has no contact with MEPS (a dialogue with 5 or 6 MEPs is maintained) 
just that there are two distinct areas of focus across the two offices.
Within the CBI in London, a European Committee reviews EU legislation. The 
Committee is provided information on EU developments through the Brussels Office 
via the European Affairs Group. The Committee consists of representatives from a 
variety of different companies and businesses, including Unilever, Grand Met, ICL, 
consultancy firms and trade associations, though neither the FTA or RHA are 
represented here. The Committee reviews legislation and effectively identifies issues 
which may then generate lobbying activity either to the UK government or the EU. 
Influence strategies include going direct to EU decision-makers or UNICE depending 
on the issue.
The FTA and RHA are, however, represented on the CBI's Transport Policy 
Committee which has representatives from both users and providers of transport 
infrastructure, for example, British Rail, BAA, Boots, Powergen, and the Society of 
Motor Manufacturers and Traders. Of the two freight associations, a CBI interviewee 
commented ' We have close relations with the FTA, and we leave European matters to 
their European representative based in Brussels. We don't deal with operations 
issues, such as drivers hours, we leave that to the FTA ’ (interview: 21)
There are no direct links between the European Committee and the Transport Policy 
Committee, though there are the administrative means (meetings etc) through which 
areas of common interest are flagged across the various policy areas of the CBI. The 
Transport Policy area will make direct representations to the Commission, or go 
through UNICE depending on the issue. The chairman of the Transport Policy 
Committee has been involved in a presentation to the European Parliament's Transport 
and Tourism Committee within the last twelve months.
As a route for companies to influence the EU, particularly road freight companies, the 
role of the CBI is far more limited than that of the trade associations. The CBI's work
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within the transport area is still 95% focused on national government, and concentrates 
on transport infrastructure issues (interview: 22). It does exert some influence and this 
is achieved both directly with the EU, in particular the Commission, and increasingly 
through the European Parliament, and indirectly through national government 
departments and UNICE, the European industry federation. There are indicators 
however that road freight transport specific European lobbying is centred round the 
activities of the FTA, whose dealings with the CBI, particularly the Brussels office, 
have increased. By contrast, the CBI Brussels representative confirmed that there is no 
regular contact with either the RHA or for that matter the IRU.
The main Commission contacts for the CBI handled through its Brussels office are 
centred on DGIII, Industry, DGXV Internal Market, and DGXXIII, Consumer and 
SMEs, this confirms that transport issues and attempts at influence in this policy area 
are being channelled through other sectoral routes.
The same picture cannot however, be applied to UNICE, which is one of the three 
main business interfaces with DGVII, Transport. Founded in 1958, by the industry 
associations of the six founder states of the Community, it now represents 32 national 
federations, some of which represent non-EU countries. The structure of UNICE is 
based on policy areas, represented by committees, one of which is the transport 
working group. The CBI's seats at the UNICE Transport Policy Committee are taken 
by FTA representatives. This organisation focuses on broad social and economic issues 
and has a particular interest in the development of the Common Transport policy and 
the broad implication of transport policy for industry competitiveness. It is part of the 
influence strategy for the FTA, which occupies the UK seat on the transport 
committee, an access which is logical given the association's broad transport interests 
in shipping and air freight as well as road. For the RHA however, narrower interests 
focused on road freight indicate that this organisation does not form a significant part 
of their strategy.
Another active consultation partner for the Commission is Eurochambres. 
Representing small to medium-sized firms in particular, the high numbers of small and 
medium-sized companies within road freight suggests this might be a prime route for 
lobbying. There is no evidence however, that the UK Chambers of Commerce are used 
to gather information about EU policy development or to channel views to the 
Commission or other institutions. There may be a different situation in other Member 
States, as differences between Chambers of Commerce and their relationships with 
national government vary. However, it is fairly clear from interviews in the sample 
companies and the response of EU policy-makers that the sector associations are the
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main influence routes, with CBI and other industry organisations as the chief 
secondary routes.
Summary: the research shows the dominant role of the IRU and the national sector 
associations as the main routes for exerting influence. Of the two trade associations 
within the UK sector, one of these, the FTA, has evolved a more direct style of 
influence and engages in the direct lobbying of EU institutions, which involves funding 
a lobbying representative in Brussels. The RHA is trying to increase direct influence 
capacity through the CBI Business Bureau, suggesting that the cost of own direct 
representation through establishing a base in Brussels is still considered prohibitive by 
the company membership of this organisation. It also confirms however, the 
importance of the location. The RHA's response seems to be to try to mitigate the 
costs of a Brussels location while gaining the benefits of access to information and 
influence through the presence of the British Business Bureau.
This lobbying is targeted mainly at the Commission. DGVII Transport has three main 
interfaces with business, which are UNICE, the IRU and Eurochambres. Of these, the 
IRU was identified as being particularly important Secondary level contacts maintained 
with national government, UKREP, and MEPs. There is increasing interest being 
shown by the FTA in the European Parliament. Ultimately however, the main sectoral 
consultation partner as far as the Commission is concerned is the IRU. While the FTA 
and RHA may have informal contacts, the Commission is clearly favouring an interest 
group which can represent pan-European views. For the Road Freight sector therefore, 
the focus on using the national government routes to the EU has now been 
supplemented by the more direct approach to EU decision-makers. However, the 
proactive style of lobbying which involves locating professional services in Brussels is 
only evident in the FTA's approach.
There is evidence of increasing focus on EU developments, with increased resources 
devoted to tracking policy development and developing influence capability. Of the key 
players identified, the FTA, RHA, CBI, and UNICE, the most significant recent 
changes appear to have taken place within the FTA, which has invested in sending a 
representative to Brussels. A question is therefore why the approach of the FTA differs 
from that of the RHA. The RHA clearly recognises the importance of EU policies for 
its members. The FTA's own explanation points to the requirements of its multinational 
company membership, whose representatives hold influential positions within the 
organisation. This is in marked contrast to the RHA membership.
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Until now, the major issue for the sector has been the completion of the Internal 
Market, the fundamental principles of which are very much in line with the UK 
deregulated road freight environment noted earlier. EU legislation has been largely in 
harmony with the established UK approach. Commenting on the pre-1992 Common 
Transport Policy, and the FTA's reaction to this, Whitelegg notes that the association 
has levelled criticisms at the rate of progress towards liberalisation and harmonisation, 
but that the driving force behind the policy, i.e. the establishment of a free market
economy, is in line with FTA thinking. 'The FTA sees the CTP as a major force
for pushing home the competitive dominance o f the lorry in European freight 
movement. The CTP policies are in any case, already skewed in this direction ,and the 
FTA's endorsement o f many aspects o f recent CTP initiatives is a clear indication o f 
this' (Whitelegg, 1988, p. 77). The shift of focus to environmental and social issues 
contained within the Treaty on European Union is likely to carry with it far more 
contentious and politically sensitive issues, and transport concerns may find the need 
for a more proactive attitude to policy-making and the handling of transport and 
environmental issues. An example of the problems faced by the road freight industry 
was demonstrated when the House of Lords Select Committee recently published a 
report recommending the Government accept the proposed 44 tonne limit for domestic 
freight vehicles. This was in line with EU proposal published in 1993, one of a number 
of measures aimed at harmonisation of operating conditions across the EU. It 
provoked hostile response from the public however, due to concerns about road safety 
and in general about damage to the environment. What is not evident however, is how 
this new pressure would significantly alter the preference for collective strategies by 
individual firms within this sector. This suggests that the strategy may be linked to the 
industry structure rather than the policies in question.
6.7 Conclusion: Opportunities for Influence & the Costs and Benefits of 
Information
The rationale for lobbying proposed at the outset of the paper maintained that 
opportunities for influence occurred through the existence of information asymmetries 
between decision-makers and those interested in the outcome of decisions. The ability 
to capitalise on these opportunities could also be enhanced in certain circumstances by 
certain characteristics of the decision-making institutions, for example, the openness of 
decision-makers to contact by interest groups. The development of the EU has 
gradually resulted in the enhancement of its institutions and decision-making powers, 
and it has considerable powers of resource distribution.
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Commentators on the development of the EU are consistent in their observations 
about the open attitude of the Commission in particular to contact from outside 
(Mazey & Richardson 1993a,1993b,1993c; Andersen & Eliassen 1993). This is 
supported by the Commission's own re-statement of the principles of 'an open and 
structured dialogue’ between itself and interest groups. The conditions for the 
existence of influencing activities are clearly evident in the EU context. They exist not 
just at a general level, but within the more specific context of Road Freight.
However, these two factors alone are not enough to account for the particular 
organisation of influencing within the sector. They do not provide an explanation of 
why companies may choose to influence through collective strategies, or invest in 
individual lobbying activity as part of their overall strategy, or for that matter, why 
decision-makers should encourage direct contact by individual firms more in some 
areas than others. In Road Freight there is little evidence of individual company 
lobbying, though some companies have clearly positioned themselves to do this should 
the need arise. The preference is for collective representation through the trade 
associations (see figure 10).
The details of the Road Freight sector show this industry to be dominated by very 
different national regulatory regimes, but whose basic structure in terms of the 
predominance of small operators is the same. The structure of these companies is 
simple. They may form part of a multidivisional business, for example P&O or BOC, 
but usually they are individual firms, sometimes with subsidiaries abroad. There is a 
mainly national focus to the industry, reflecting the different industry customer profile 
of each national environment, for example the sophistication of the retailing sector 
within the UK. The technology of the industry is simple, by comparison with 
pharmaceuticals or chemicals. The barriers to entry are low for most would-be 
entrants. Exceptions are the more complex logistics operations associated with 
retailing, or the transport of dangerous goods.
In contrast to the pharmaceutical or chemical sectors, road freight could not claim to 
be a centre of technical innovation, it is not a 'strategic' industry sector, either from a 
national or EU viewpoint, though it may provide strategic services for multinational 
firms. It does not therefore represent potential for direct competitive advantage for the 
EU in the international economy. Key areas of technical innovation are likely to go 
hand in hand with complex technical knowledge. Where individual firms are the 
holders of this knowledge, it may create a balance of information in its favour, and 
create an opportunity to use this to advantage in negotiations with decision-makers. 
Acquisition of such information ensures that decision-makers are likely to be far more
Economic & Social 
Committee
A
UNICE
International
Road
Haulage
Union
Road
Haulage
Association
Freight Transport 
AssociationUK Government 
Principally Dept 
Transport
European
Parliament
Commission
UKREP
nr
Road Freight Companies
Council o f  
Ministers o f  
Transport
Confederation 
o f British 
Industry
Council o f 
Ministers
Committee 
o f the Regions
^ u ro chambr e s^
Association o f  
British Chambers 
o f Commerce
O
O
Government
Agencies
based in Brussels
Government 
Agencies withi n the 
UK
Sector Interests with a 
base
in Brussels
Sector Interests which 
are
UK-Based
Figure 10 Lobbying Participants & Primary Lobbying Routes in the UK Road Freight Sector
137
138
receptive to consultation with individual companies who can provide this. This is 
clearly not the case with the majority of road freight companies, both within the UK 
and outside. The only current example of a deviation from normal consultation 
methods through interest groups identified as part of the research, is on the subject of 
the transport of dangerous goods, a more 'technical' area.
Road Freight has however, been the subject of some major policy initiatives which 
have proved very contentious at a national level, even if for the UK proposals so far 
have tended to line up with the 'liberal market' principles broadly accepted within the 
UK. Despite this, there is little evidence to suggest that for the majority of firms the 
focus of attention has shifted to the EU. There are examples of the appointment of 
directors or non-executive directors with EU links, but these are the larger companies, 
and with one exception do not appear to be active lobbyists. The exception, 
significantly, is the only multinational company within the sample.
This pattern of response does not however, repeat itself at a sectoral level. The 
organisation of interest within the sector is predominantly through the trade 
associations. The two focal points for lobbying activity have taken a different stance to 
European issues. The RHA has a wide-ranging dialogue with the Commission in 
particular, and also other EU institutions when necessary. It has no representative 
based in Brussels however, choosing to use a service provided by another organisation, 
the CBI British Business Bureau. Therefore while it recognises the importance of the 
development of the EU, the costs of establishing a presence there are too high, hence 
use of the CBI Brussels Bureau and IRU as both information sources and influencing 
routes. The FTA by contrast has appointed a representative in Brussels, and its network 
of contacts reflects this. The major reason identified by the FTA for this approach was 
linked to the acquisition of information. The costs of this approach have been offset in 
the ability to acquire information faster, and to use this in direct lobbying activities 
where necessary. The benefits can be construed both as benefits to the FTA as a 
commercial organisation in its own right. However, it is also clear from the research 
that the decision to appoint a 'Brussels representative' was driven by the pressure of 
multinational member companies. These companies may not be road freight specialists, 
but their operations mean that they have a substantial interest in this sector. They are 
major contributors to the FTA whose membership fees are based on the turnover of 
individual companies. The evidence suggests that these companies, many of whom 
have in-house lobbyists based in Brussels, have been instrumental in encouraging the 
FTA to adopt a highly proactive, direct lobbying approach. Whether the FTA would 
have adopted this approach without such pressure is debatable. What is clear however, 
is that where they have some direct interests in road freight issues multinational
139
organisations have influenced the pattern of representation for companies outside 
their own sector.
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Chapter 7
Influencing Strategies in the UK Pharmaceutical Sector
7.1 Greenwood & Ronit's Analysis of Interest Representation in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector
This chapter describes how firms seek to influence the EU, both at an individual level 
and collectively within the UK Pharmaceutical sector. The purpose is to contrast the 
pattern of EU influencing with the previous study of road freight, setting this within 
the context industry structure and competitive environment. This contrast is used to 
highlight the important aspects of firm size, industry concentration, transnational 
marketing and operations, which provide key factors underlying the company influence 
strategies and the organisation of influence within the EU.
The UK Pharmaceuticals industry provides the focus of this chapter in order to 
maintain an appropriate basis for comparison with UK Road Freight. As the analysis of 
the industry structure and competitive environment will show, however, this sector is 
characterised by a high degree of internationalisation, and is more properly regarded in 
a global context rather than national one..........................................................................
Before commencing with the analysis of industry structure, the next section reviews the 
existing work on the sector by Greenwood & Ronit, both to highlight some of the 
findings from their work and identify how the approach used here both uses, and 
develops this further.
The focus of investigation by Greenwood & Ronit concerns the development of 
interest group representation within the EU (Greenwood & Ronit 1991; Greenwood & 
Ronit, 1992; Greenwood, 1994 pp 183-197). The case studies presented on both 
pharmaceuticals, and the closely related new biotechnology industries, explore and 
challenge the notion that all Euro-interest groups are 'weak'. They argue that such an 
idea is based on inappropriate generalisations about the relationships between interests 
and the institutions of the EU, and that this is not supported when reviewed against the 
evidence from empirical studies into sectoral arrangements. General labels such as 
'pluralist' or 'corporatist' are unsustainable, and to progress a useful understanding of 
how interest groups interact with EU decision-makers, empirical investigation at the 
sector level is the most appropriate approach. Greenwood & Ronit's research into the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors demonstrates that not only have these 
sectors achieved strong representation at the European association level (though not
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without some difficulties in the case of the evolving biotechnologies industry), but the 
form of this representation, i.e. the dominant influence strategies differs (Greenwood, 
1994, pp 183-198). For pharmaceuticals, the federated format where national sector 
associations are part of a European federation has achieved a strong, cohesive 
collective voice for the industry at European level. For the developing biotechnologies 
industry a different format has emerged, with a direct company membership European 
group (SAGB) emerging to take a key representation role for the industry at European 
level. In both cases, Greenwood & Ronit show these European interest organisations 
have achieved an influential position as negotiators for their industries.
The interest from the point of view of this thesis, is that conclusions about the rationale 
for such representation patterns are linked to a number of factors by Greenwood & 
Ronit; the common (regulatory) issues faced by the industries across national 
boundaries, and the experience that firms within these sectors have in operating across 
national boundaries. Greenwood & Ronit point to the particular significance of 
internationalisation within the sector, arguing that the similarity of problems faced by 
companies supports more cohesive action at a European level. In the case of the 
European trade federation, EFPIA, a further factor identified is this organisation's 
approach to handling large and small firm membership issues. Basically, it ensures that 
it is careful to position itself to accommodate the views of its larger members................
Greenwood & Ronit's work is chiefly targeted at the collective representation of 
interests, and reasons why this sector appears to have been able to develop strong 
collective representation. The 'unit of analysis', or to borrow Ragin's terminology, the 
'observational unit', appears to be the interest group rather than interests (including 
companies) in the wider sense. While data from the studies by Greenwood et al 
therefore provide important evidence on how representation works within the sector, 
this has been developed in relation to industry structure.
The importance of industry structure in determining influence strategies and directly 
lobbying ' Brussels' as part of this, was outlined in chapter 2, and certain key 
characteristics implicated in the behaviour of firms and sectors. This has provided the 
framework for analysing both road freight and pharmaceutical sectors, and assesses the 
influence of industry structure on patterns of representation visible within each. The 
thesis confirms Greenwood's point about the importance of particular industry 
characteristics, but seeks to examine more explicitly the characteristics which define 
'industry structure', and therefore provide a basis for comparison with Road Freight.
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7.2 Industry Structure and Competitive Environment
The pharmaceuticals industry is a relatively recent arrival in business terms. From very 
small scale beginnings its growth accelerated after the Second World War with the 
discovery of penicillin. This gave impetus to the search for new drugs. In recent years 
a whole new area of research in the biotechnologies field has developed. Within the 
UK, the success of companies such as Glaxo and Wellcome (now merged) have 
established this industry as a leading sector. As the UK trade association ABPI noted in 
its 1992/3 annual report, 'British pharmaceutical companies have discovered more o f 
today's top selling medicines than any other country, apart from the United States. 
Five o f the world's 20 most prescribed medicines are British’ In 1992 ABPI 
estimated that the UK industry alone employed 76,900 people, of which 26% were 
dedicated to research and development activities.
Subsectors: the pharmaceutical industry is not homogeneous and there are a variety of 
different markets which segment the industry. Taggart (1993, p.3) identifies the key 
market subsectors as follows:
• Medicinal Chemical Manufacturers
• Biological Products
• Ethical Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
• Proprietary Products Manufacturers
• Brand Manufacturers (Generics)
These subsectors can have very different characteristics in terms of the size of firms 
which populate them, concentration, production and distribution characteristics, and 
barriers to entry. For the purpose of this study the focus is on Ethical Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturing. This was selected because it provides an example of a higher degree of 
concentration, within which the presence of large firms is significant. This is also a 
segment of the industry which is focused on the initial stages of the product life cycle, 
research and development, and production.
Product: companies within this segment of the industry are characterised by the 
development and production of drugs in dosage quantities. These are usually made 
available to the end-customer through health-care professionals, such as GPs, 
Consultants and Pharmacists. Ethical Pharmaceutical production involves significant 
investment in research and development. The industry's focus is on product innovation 
as means to survive and develop within its competitive environment, although recently 
the producers of ethical medicines have acquired an interest in over-the-counter (OTC)
W O R LD W ID E PHARM ACEUTICAL SALES BY M ARKET SHARE
199-1 1995
Ranked by Com pany M arket Share % Ranked Com pany M arket Share %
sales by sales
1 Glaxo 3.6 1 Glaxo Wellcome 4.7
2 Merck 3.4 2= Merck 3.5
3 Bristol-Meyers Squibb 3.2 2= Hoechst Marion Roussel 3.5
4 Roche 2.8 4 Bristol-Myers Squibb 3.1
3= Johnson and Johnson 2.7 5 American Home Products 3.0
5= Pfizer 2.7 6= Pfizer 2.9
7= Smilhkline Beecham 2.5 6= Johnson and Johnson 2.9
7= Ciba 2.5 8 Roche 2.6
9= Hoeschst 2.3 9= SmilhKline Beecham 2.5
9= American Home Products 2.3 9= Ciba* 2.5
Top 10 28.0 31.2
II Bayer 2.2 11 Rhdne-Poulenc 2.2
12 Eli Lilly 2.1 12 Bayer 2.1
13 Sandoz 1.9 13 Eli Lilly 2.0
14= Rhfine-Poulenc 1.8 14= Sandoz * 1.9
14= Schering-Plough 1.8 14= Schering-Plough 1.9
16 Abbott 1.7 16= Astra 1.8
17 Astra 1.6 16= Abbott 1.8
18= Takeda 1.5 18 Pharmacia & Upjohn 1.7
18= Sankyo 1.5 19= Sankyo 1.6
20 Boehringer Ingelheim 1.4 19= Takeda 1.6
Top 20 45.5 49.8
* Ciba and Sandox to merge with market share o f about 4.5%
W orldwide sales o f  prescription drugs $185bn $205bn
Table 8 Market Share, Major Pharmaceutical Companies 
Source: Financial Times 25.03.96
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medicines, possibly as a result of developments stemming from national government 
attempts to control drug bills as part of health spending. For example, SmithKline 
Beecham acquired Sterling Winthrop, which has some major OTC brands such as 
Panadol. However, new drugs continue to represent major commercial opportunities. 
In 1993 Glaxo recorded the development of 6 new products within its annual report, 
and SmithKline Beecham similarly announced progress on medicines ranging across a 
number of therapeutic categories. In terms of product life-cycle, this industry 
encompasses development, manufacture, marketing and distribution of goods.
Concentration/Fragmentation: the Pharmaceutical sector is dominated by large 
international companies, which have significant market share. The top 20 companies 
represent a market share of 45.5% of world pharmaceutical sales and UK companies 
such as GlaxoWellcome, ICI, and SmithKline Beecham are recognised as highly 
successful competitors in this field (see table 8). Over the past 2-3 years there has been 
a large scale restructuring of the world industry. This 'wave o f consolidation' 
{Financial Times 23.3.96) has resulted in a further concentration of the industry.
The degree of concentration is not as great, however, as in some other industries. In 
the motor manufacturing sector, a few firms capture around 90% of the market 
(Taggart, 1993, pp 30-31). However, the details of UK companies for 1995 shows 
that by comparison with the Road Freight industry, the UK industry is populated by far 
fewer firms (Table 9), which suggests this sector can justifiably be described as 
oligopolistic (Hancher, 1989, p. 161).
Large/Small Firm Emphasis: j the sector is distinguished by the presence of some 
very large companies which have substantial market share. Despite the growth of 
smaller biotechnology firms over recent years, the emphasis in this sector is on large 
firms (table 9). In 1993 the annual report for Glaxo noted approximately 40,000 
employees worldwide of which 7,500 were employed in research and development 
activities. SmithKline Beecham reported a total of 52,000 employees worldwide 
within its 1994 annual report.
In 1993 sales for Glaxo totalled £4,930m, with profit after tax amounting to £1,207m, 
while SmithKline Beecham recorded sales of £563 lm and profits of £842m for the 
same year.
Operations and Structure: the pharmaceutical industry is characterised by complex 
operations covering a wide variety of functions, from research and development, to 
production, storage and distribution. Its marketing activities are regulated, and have to
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be targeted not at the end-user but health care professionals, at least in the case of 
prescription medicines.
UK Phamaceutical Companies 1995
Turnover (£000,000) No of Firms
1-36 47
37-49 21
50-99 34
100-249 74
250-499 58
500-999 37
1,000-4,999 86
5000+ 457
Total 814
Table 10 Size Distribution UK Pharmaceutical Companies 
Source : Keynote Market Research 1995
Another layer of complexity is added to this by virtue of its international operations 
and market. Glaxo reported sales by geographic area in 1993 in North America, 
Europe, the UK, Southern Asia and the Far East, Latin America, Africa and the Middle 
East, and Australasia. North America represented the largest market (43%), with 
Continental Europe and the UK representing just under 40% of sales. The international 
nature of the market in pharmaceuticals is mirrored by the scope of its operations. 
These are also international, involving the management of complex operations. The 
1993 annual report for Glaxo illustrates this with comments about the approach to 
dealing with this. 'The complexity and scale o f our global manufacturing capability 
underlines the importance o f strategic planning and co-ordination. Further progress 
was made in creating an integrated network o f production sites. Major new projects 
were initiated or completed in the UK, France, Canada, Australia, Indonesia, Saudi 
Arabia, Argentina and Turkey. '
These characteristics make the industry particularly information intensive, a 
characteristic which has also been related to lower levels of rivalry. Information 
intensity is complexity of information flow and management needed to co-ordinate the 
company's operation. Although pharmaceutical firms and industry representatives often 
cite 'fierce competition', between firms, an analysis of rivalry by Porter (1990), 
suggests that this industry has characteristics which militate against competitiveness 
(Taggart, 1993, p. 146). The observation about information intensity is an important 
one given earlier arguments about the role of information in the creation and capture of 
opportunities for influence.
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The degree of rivalry within a competitive environment is noted as an important factor 
in explaining the ability of firms to co-operate, as Bowman's study of the US 
bituminous coal producers demonstrates (Bowman, 1988). But it needs to be set within 
the context of other industry characteristics, which may determine the form that this 
rivalry takes. Within ethical pharmaceuticals, energies are channelled into the discovery 
of new drugs, rather than positioning the price of goods within the market. This does 
not mean that pricing is unimportant, it simply reflects the differentiated nature of the 
industry's products. A similar analysis of Road Freight highlights the contrast in terms 
of lower growth levels and a tendency for over-supply in the industry, the 
fragmentation of the industry, the emphasis on price cutting rather than product/service 
differentiation, and the relatively simple structures and operations which generate 
relatively low levels of information requirement.
Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham, as the two leading UK companies within 
the sector, have corporate structures to support these operations. GlaxoWellcome has 
a main Board with a director specifically responsible for legal and corporate affairs. 
The focal point for corporate affairs is not obvious within the SmithKline Beecham 
structure as this firm divides main board responsibilities by geographical area instead. 
Both, however, have public affairs representatives based in Brussels.
Technology: the companies within this sector are characterised by their high 
expenditure on research and development. Firms expenditure in this area has continued 
to increase steadily since the 1950s. Between 1953 and 1992 Research & Development 
expenditure has risen from 2% of output to 17% (ABPI, 1993, p.4), The UK is the 
fourth largest investor in pharmaceutical research and is also characterised by a strong 
export-led focus. It is a UK success story in terms of world class companies. In 1992 
the Sunday Times noted that 4 of the world's leading drug companies were British 
(Glaxo, SmithKline Beecham, ICI and Wellcome). In 1995 the merger of Wellcome 
and Glaxo produced the world's largest pharmaceutical company with an estimated 7% 
of world market share (Financial Times 25.3.96).
The production of new drugs is a high risk business. In 1993 ABPI estimated that out 
of 5000 or so compounds discovered and investigated, on average only one reaches the 
prescription market. The success or failure of firms is dependent on the ability to 
innovate, and this maintains the support for increasing research and development 
expenditure. ■Companies which discover new drugs can look forward to a prolonged 
period o f growth in sales and profits. Companies with a less successful innovative 
record either have to diversify, license new products from other firms, or he acquired 
(Taggart, 1993, p.40).
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The principal way in which new discoveries are protected, in order to allow the return 
on the high research and development costs, is through the patent system. These 
licenses, once obtained, provide a monopoly on the production of a particular product. 
Licences were originally for 16 years, and then extended to 20 years by the 1977 
patents act. More recently EU legislation introduced the supplementary protection 
certificate (SPC) to bolster patent by adding up to a further 5 years to the existing 20. 
This was an important development for the industry given the reliance on innovation 
and rising R&D costs. The EFPIA noted in 1993 - 'The SPC derives its rationale from  
the steady growth in the length o f pharmaceutical R&D, both because o f stricter 
regulatory requirements, and due to the nature o f pharmaceutical research itself - 
pitched as it is on the very frontiers o f science. In consequence, the duration o f 
effective patent protection fo r pharmaceuticals has been declining; it is now about 8- 
10 years, versus the nominal 20. The SPC, the first o f which were granted early this 
year, is an attempt to redress this disadvantage' (EFPIA Annual Report 1995, p. 43).
The focus on R&D and the advanced technology that this implies, is also a reason why 
the barriers to entry within this industry are high. Technical specialism, facilities 
required to research and produce drugs, the length of time that it takes to bring a 
product to market, and the safety issues associated with production and consumption 
means entry to this market is difficult and few new players can afford the required 
substantial advance investment in R&D. Leaving aside the recent wave of mergers, 
within the last 50 years there have been few changes within the top 50 firms (Taggart, 
1993, p. 126).
What has been a new departure for the industry is, however, the growth of a new 
subsector, the biotechnology industry. In the broadest definition, the use of 
’biotechnology', for example the use of biological organisms like penicillin, or the cross­
breeding of plants or animals, is not new. Within this definition the discovery and 
development of many drugs could be classed as 'biotechnology'. However, the term 
'biotechnology' is now more often used with reference to the use of genetically 
modified organisms in the production of new products. The application of these 
products may cross many industry sectors, including the production of new medicines. 
This relatively new segment, stemming from the application of gene-splicing 
technology, R&D into new biotechnologies has resulted in the emergence of many 
small firms. Major pharmaceutical companies have made their own investment in this 
area of research, but they have also acquired some of the smaller companies as well as 
developing a strategy of alliances. The latter approach, according to one report has 
gathered pace within the last five years. The benefits of such alliances 'are that they 
give the pharmaceutical industry the opportunity to keep a watching brief on
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emerging technologies, without risking a significant commitment' (Financial Times 
25.3.96). The same article points out that Sandoz, Ciba and Roche have forged deals 
with over 100 companies, mainly in the US'.
National/Transnational Focus:the pharmaceutical industry is highly internationalised, 
not just across EU borders, but globally. High R&D costs have been viewed as one of 
the main drivers of the internationalisation of the industry. Firms seek to amortise the 
costs of research and development, and also to maximise revenues from already 
patented products through international marketing (Taggart, 1993, p.40). Although US 
firms have decreased dependency on international markets, the European based firms 
have increased their international focus. This internationalisation is not just in terms of 
markets. The operations of the larger firms are also international. In 1990 Glaxo had 
operations in 50 countries, and Wellcome had 40 subsidiaries throughout the world 
(Taggart 1993, pp 241 & 293). Hence the industry leaders are international both in 
terms of their operations and their product markets.
The market for drugs however, is a special market. The market for prescribed, or 
'ethical' medicines is one where companies do not sell primarily to the user of the 
commodity. They sell to health professionals, and within the UK, to the National 
Health Service within which the majority of health professionals operate. It is the 
agency which therefore pays for the drug. As the cost of health care through the NHS 
is a direct cost to government it is not only interested in the pharmaceuticals market as 
part of its own healthcare policies, but looks at it from the point of view of controlling 
expenditure. In 1992, ABPI, the UK industry's trade association, estimated that sales to 
the NHS amounted to £3.5bn, corresponding to 9.7% of the total NHS expenditure 
(ABPI, 1992, p.7).
As noted earlier, the patents on drugs, granted to ensure high risk R&D costs may be 
offset, create a monopoly situation. In 1957, the Department of Health introduced a 
pricing system called the PPRS (Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme). This 
scheme regulates the profits earned by companies on drugs sold to the NHS. While 
there is no direct control of price, in effect product prices are set in the context of the 
allowable profit. The Department of Health negotiates with the UK industry a 
maximum rate of return on the capital employed on company sales to the NHS. The 
industry is set an overall range against which individual companies operate. Companies 
are free to set prices themselves, but must remain within the overall return on capital 
employed for NHS business. Once set however, prices cannot be raised without 
permission.
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Within the UK, and other EU Member States, the last few years have seen increasing 
pressure on health costs, and continued government pressure to reduce health service 
bills as a result. This has resulted in the target range being reduced to 14 -18%. 
Another assault on costs has emerged through the introduction of the 'limited list' 
within the UK. This specifies drugs which may be prescribed through the NHS, and 
those which may not. This was first introduced in 1985 and covered a number of areas 
like analgesics and tonics, but has been extended more recently. The response of the 
industry, has been predictably hostile. ABPI noted in its 1992/3 report 'The 
Association's case against the Limited List extension is based on the premise that it 
will restrict the choice o f medicines available to NHS patients; it will act as a 
deterrent to the discovery and development o f new medicines; and it will damage the 
industry's ability to compete with its major international competitors' (ABPI, 1992-3, 
PS).
The pharmaceutical industry is an important contrast to Road Freight therefore, in the 
internationalisation of its production and product markets, but also has distinct and 
important national regulatory and procurement aspects.
Strategic Importance: as the previous section shows, the strategic importance of this 
industry is based on observations about the changing relationship between firms and 
national governments in the context of increasing competition. 'Faced with the 
difficulties o f adjusting their economies to global competitive demands, governments 
have become increasingly concerned with the competitiveness o f their economies 
under conditions o f high international interdependence when their industries face
strong adjustment needs........Government officials fear that faster industry life cycles
call fo r early identification and targeting o f emerging industries, and believe that co­
operative state-private sector institutional arrangements can perform these tasks more 
effectively than private firms acting alone’ (Doz, 1986, p.228). Although the 
comment is made in relation to national governments, it is also valid within the context 
of the EU. This can be seen in policy relating to advanced technologies, which is given 
a legal base within the Single European Act. 'The Community’s aim shall be to 
strengthen the scientific and technological base o f European industry and to 
encourage it to become more competitive at an international level' (SEA, Title VI 
Article 130f).
This objective has found expression in a series of collaborative programmes of which 
the first was ESPRIT, but which was followed by others, including some focused on 
biotechnologies (Greenwood & Ronit, 1992, p. 92). These were based on the growing
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awareness that firms needed to be able compete on a global basis if they were to meet 
the challenge from the United States and Japan.
Against this background, Europe has produced some of the most successful European 
international pharmaceutical firms. These are also firms which are strengthening 
alliances with, or acquiring biotechnology companies, as the economic potential of this 
technology appears to grow. In the context of the Single Market therefore, the 
pharmaceutical sector may justifiably be considered 'strategic' from the point of view of 
the competitiveness of European industry, a conclusion supported by the existence of a 
specific EU industrial policy for the sector. Moreover, individual firms within the 
industry are strategic by virtue of their size and global market share.
Summary: the ethical pharmaceutical industry has some discrete characteristics as a 
segment of the total pharmaceutical sector. It is high risk, requiring substantial 
investment in research and development, and it is reliant on innovation to ensure 
appropriate returns against this investment. It is dominated by large companies, which 
are international in both their markets and operations, and there is evidence that the 
already high degree of concentration in the industry is increasing as a result of a wave 
of mergers and acquisitions over the past two to three years. It has also, however, 
seen the growth of a range of smaller companies specialising in the research and 
development of genetically modified organisms. Industry response has involved the 
growth of alliances with large multinational organisations and these smaller firms.
While therefore the sector cannot claim to be as concentrated as some, for example, 
motor manufacture, it is clearly at the other end of the spectrum from road freight, with 
its predominance of small nationally focused firms. The contrast is also marked in terms 
of regulation by national government. For ethical pharmaceutical manufacturers the 
government is in effect its major customer, through its direct control of the majority of 
health services offered to the end customer. It is 'regulated' through the PPRS scheme. 
This sets the target for return on capital which is negotiated with the industry. This is 
in complete contrast to road freight where government regulation extends to 
operational and safety issues, but prices and profitability remain the prerogative of 
companies.
The key focus within the pharmaceutical industry is on innovation. Its purpose is the 
discovery and development of new drugs, which represent major long-term profits for 
a company which is successful in this field. The product of this research and 
development is by its very nature 'differentiated', and successes are protected through 
the patent system, in order to offset R&D costs. Road Freight by contrast, is a service
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rather than a development and production industry. There is little differentiation in 
service with the exception a few companies specialising in complex warehousing and 
distribution systems. The key differentiation, for the majority of operators in this 
industry, is price.
7.3 European Policies and Legislation Governing the Sector
The above description of the industry shows that it is closely regulated by government 
within the UK. While national systems differ across the EU, the creation of a Single 
European Market posed a number of issues stemming from the political and economic 
implications of the Single Market within which firms operate. These were technical 
barriers associated with the different national schemes for the certification and 
registration of new drugs, and the need for country-by-country marketing 
authorisation. Closely linked to this was the issue of the erosion of patent life, due to 
the time period required to obtain certification and authorisation for drugs. Finally, 
barriers which result from different pricing and reimbursement schemes contained 
within national healthcare arrangements.
The legislation contained within the White Paper on the Single European Market, and 
all subsequent legislation is based on an initial directive (65/65/EEC). This was issued 
after the Thalidomide case. It states that the primary purpose of regulations governing 
the production and distribution of pharmaceutical products is to safeguard public 
health. This overall objective must, however, be achieved without damaging the 
development of the industry or its trade in products. The directive also stipulated that 
each Member State must have its own regulatory body which should be responsible for 
deciding whether to issue authorisations to market products within their own country.
Harmonisation of Registration & Marketing Authorisation
Despite moves towards harmonisation, Member States still reach different decisions 
about the registration of products. Directive 75/319/EEC established the Committee on 
Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) as part of a focus on harmonisation. This 
committee provided the means by which Member States could exchange information 
on aspects of product licensing including experiences with new or existing products. It 
was drawn from the pharmaceutical inspectorates of Member States, each one having a 
delegate. The Committee enabled a company which has obtained authorisation in one 
Member State to achieve similar authorisations in other States more quickly. Its 
purpose was to facilitate the authorisation process through what was known as the 
'multistate procedure'. Unfortunately however, delays in the assessment of submissions
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through the procedure did not reduce time, and ABPI, the UK trade association, 
reported that it took on average over 11 months from the opinion issued by the CPMP 
before decisions were forwarded to companies (Charlesworth, 1992, p.38). In response 
to this Greenwood notes the influence of the industry's European federation (EFPIA) 
on the revision of the procedure to deal with the problem (Greenwood & Ronit, 1992, 
p.82). This included direct company representation on the CPMP, and the 
implementation of an accelerated process for high technology products.
Attempts to improve the multistate procedure were limited, however, and EFPIA 
proposed that there was an underlying requirement for a centralised, independent 
system of registration and marketing authorisation, which would make these processes 
consistent across the European Union. In 1990 the Commission proposed the 
establishment of a centralised system of medicines evaluation and regulation (COM 
(90) 283). This required the establishment of the European Agency for the Evaluation 
of Medicinal Products. The outcome was the provision for both a centralised an 
decentralised system, depending on the nature of the product. It was proposed that 
those derived from biotechnology and other innovative products use the centralised 
system, and products were efficacy and safety are already established use a system of 
mutual recognition across Member States.
Intellectual Property Rights
Patent protection issues are closely related to registration and marketing authorisation. 
The reasons for the industry's concern with this is clear from the focus on innovation 
and the high costs of R&D incurred before drugs can be marketed. Intellectual 
property rights are a key issue for the industry.
Two important areas have been the focus for pressure by the industry in recent years. 
The first is the erosion of the actual patent life of products, caused in the industry's 
view by stricter regulatory requirements. EFPIA estimated that the nominal 20 year 
patent protection was in reality 8-10 years, taking into account the first date of 
registration. The industry achieved a significant goal when patent life was ostensibly 
extended through the introduction of the Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) 
adding up to 5 years life on patents.
A further advance has been made with regard to biotechnology products, which were 
seen as poorly protected due to the differences between Member States in 
implementing pharmaceutical directives and the particular sensitivity of high risk 
biotechnology ventures. The special requirements for the registration of high-
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technology products (87/22/EEC), the 'concertation procedure' have been supported 
by a new provision. Any application to the CPMP which is successful automatically 
receives patent protection for a period of 10 years starting from the date of issue of the 
first marketing authorisation within the European Union.
Protection of intellectual property rights is pursued vigorously by the industry, and 
EFPIA has been active in both the above issues as well as others, such as local working 
requirements (where patent holders in the EU are obliged to undertake their 
manufacture on national territory), trademarks, and international agreements on 
property rights.
Classification, Information and Advertising
The industry has been subject to regulations concerning the classification of medicines, 
the labelling and information provided on medicines, and rules regarding the 
advertisement of these products. How medicines should be classified is set out in 
Directive 92/26. Key to this is the classification of drugs into two groups. Those 
which are subject to prescription and those which are not. A further Directive issued in 
the same year (92/27) specified information which must be provided on pack labels and 
stipulated that all information provided in leaflets must be consistent with the summary 
of product characteristics described within marketing authorisations. Directive 92/28 
stated that advertising must be consistent with these product characteristics and 
confirmed that prescription only drugs should to be advertised to the general public. It 
further specified that Member States must have some means of control over 
advertising, even if this is through self-regulation.
Transparency and Pricing
Pricing issues have been the focus of some of the most persistent regulatory problems 
for the industry. They arise from the different social security systems and health 
provision within this that has been set up in different countries since the second world 
war. In most European countries only prescribed medicines are reimbursed, but 
reimbursement arrangements differ widely from country to country. In fact not all 
medicines are reimbursed, and few are reimbursed in full. Some countries limit 
reimbursement to a proportion o f the prices o f the prescribed medicine, others to a 
flat-rate amount according to packaging or prescription. Most countries operate a 
co-payment systems which requires patients to meet part o f the cost o f their own 
prescribed medication' (EFPIA, 1992-3, p.31). The problem with these different
154
systems lies not just in the operational complexity this causes a pharmaceutical 
company, but also the opportunity it presents for discrimination against particular 
products on a national basis, particularly when governments are trying to reduce the 
cost of health care spending.
Directive 89/105 was issued in order to make some inroads into this issue. This 
obliged Member States to publish the criteria on which they based their price controls 
and any restrictions on the use of products covered by their national health insurance 
systems. The so-called 'transparency directive' aimed to make visible the criteria on 
which prices and profits were determined, rather than the earlier proposals for the 
harmonisation of pricing schemes across Member States, which was greeted with alarm 
by some firms (Greenwood, 1992, p.79). EFPIA played a key role in handling this 
potential regulatory threat, through the alternative scheme which the association 
proposed. This formed the basis for the transparency directive. EFPIA managed to 
persuade the Commission to take the governments of Italy and Belgium to the Court of 
Justice over discriminatory pricing schemes.
The European association's close working relationship with the Commission is noted in 
its Annual report of 1992/3,where reference to the (then) outline proposals on 
industrial policy for the sector note ’The Communication draft hears testimony to the 
seasoned relationship between the Commission and EFPIA. The Commission, which 
has appeared receptive to the fu ll range o f EFPIA’s arguments, has also recognised 
an issue often underscored by EFPIA: that though the European pharmaceutical 
industry continues to achieve satisfactory results, recent trends indicate a weakening 
o f its competitive position vis-a-vis its principal competitors' (EFPIA Annual Report 
1993, p.34).
Manufacture, Good Practice and Technical Standards
In 1988 a Commission proposal was passed (COM87/697), which supported the 
introduction of a code of good manufacturing practice. This led to Commission 
Directive 91/356 which stipulated certain standards with regard to quality assurance, 
the use of appropriately qualified personnel and premises and equipment amongst 
other things. Of a similar nature, Directive 87/320 specified requirements for good 
laboratory practice, and similar best practice has also been identified for clinical 
practice.
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The Single European Act and Other Policy Issues
The above sections describe some of the major regulatory issues to which the industry 
has been subject since the mid-eighties. They are not the only issues however, and 
regulation governing the European \ vaccine industry, liability for environmental 
damage, waste and packaging are just some of the many additional areas of activity 
affecting the industry.
The key issues noted have origins which predate the Single European Act. They do not 
necessarily stem from the main focus of its provision for the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and people throughout the Member States. The first directive applied 
to the pharmaceutical industry emerged from particular health issues, and was a 
Community response to these. The SEA certainly generated legislation, such as the 
proposal for protection of patent, measures regarding advertising, distribution and the 
legal status of medicines, and the requirement for a centralised, and faster system of 
registration and marketing authorisation. However, it could be argued that regardless 
of the SEA these represented major issues for the industry, which were tackled within 
the overall context of the industrial policy for the sector.
A significant difference between this sector and road freight is that the pharmaceutical 
industry is seen as a strategic sector, i.e. one which is a source of competitive 
advantage in a global context. The importance of creating or retaining technological 
pre-eminence is the basis of this advantage. It is also the basis of a changing 
relationship between government and an industry characterised by technical innovation 
(Porter, 1990). As economic actors in their own right, governments clearly have an 
interest in nurturing the source of such potential competitive advantage, as part of 
their own goals.
The Pharmaceutical industry is already the source of such advantage, both in a UK and 
European context, as the earlier details of innovation and export performance 
demonstrate. The aim of the Commission is to maintain and develop this position. 'In 
his keynote address to the Federation's General Assembly-Conference at Salzburg in 
May, Commission Vice-President Martin Bangermann publicly warned European 
governments that ill considered cost-containment measures would affect the ability o f 
the pharmaceutical industry to develop new medicines. Later at a meeting with 
pharmaceutical industry CEOs, Dr Bangermann confirmed that the Commission's 
goal was to create an environment which would strengthen the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry in Europe' (EFPIA Annual Report, 1993, p.34). ................
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This highlights the potential conflict between Member States action to reduce the cost 
of healthcare, through reducing drug bills amongst others, and a suitably favourable 
environment for the industry as outlined by Commissioner Bangermann. It also points 
to the importance of the EU as a focus for influencing policy, industrial as well as 
health care. While national government remains important in terms of health care 
systems, ' the regulatory environment is now primarily an issue for the Community 
rather than national government, although national governments retain the power to 
influence, delay or for that matter destroy EC initiatives ’(Sharp, 1991, p.229).
7.4 European and National Consultation Procedures
Although many key issues are viewed within a European or even an international 
context, the power of national government is a substantial one. Due to the close link 
with health care systems, which vary from Member State to Member State, the 
national dimension remains important for pharmaceutical industry. National 
government is the main purchaser of its products, and attempts at policy-making in this 
area by the Commission are inevitably highly sensitive. Consultation with the industry 
covers three main areas of focus. First the regulation of product, second the regulation 
of price/profit, and third competitiveness within the market. The regulation of product 
is the prime concern of the UK Medicines Control Agency. Within the Department of 
Health itself, the focus is on drug-pricing management, and competitiveness within the 
market place. A recently formed industry sponsorship unit exists in order to ensure 
that an industry conscious approach is pursued to policy-making, whilst maintaining 
public confidence in the industry, its regulation and its products. In addition, the 
International Industry Division monitors EU developments in terms of the strategic 
direction of EU initiatives.
The key consultation partner for the Department of Health is the ABPI. Another 
smaller organisation, the PAGB is also consulted, and contact may take place with 
various other groups, for example the British Pharma Group, but the key partner is 
ABPI. Consultation forums for specific issues may involve individual company 
representation, but the Department will usually ask ABPI to facilitate this. An industry 
strategy group forms the focal point for regular consultation (Pharmaceutical Industry 
Strategy Group). This meets quarterly and consists of senior representatives from the 
Department of Trade and Industry, the Treasury and the Department of Health as well 
as key ABPI representatives. However, the majority of contact is ad hoc and frequent 
(interview: 20). There is little evidence of the presence of lobbying firms. Approaches 
are rare, and seem to concentrate on information gathering. Department 
representatives take the lead negotiating role in the Pharmaceutical Working Group
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meetings. Dealings are chiefly with DG III, DG V and DG XIV, although some 
contact also takes place with DG XII and XHI.
At a European level, EFPIA plays a key role as consultation partner with the 
Commission, though large firms clearly have a presence in Brussels. The strength of the 
federation's position is indicated by Greenwood, and Greenwood & Ronit's treatment 
of the organisation of interests in this sector, but is also indicated through the strategy 
adopted by the UK national association. While it certainly maintains contact with EU 
institutions, its own stated policy is to focus on the UK.
7.5 Company and Sector Influence Strategies
7.5.1 Companies Response: Individual Strategies: the segment of the 
pharmaceutical industry which concerns itself with the discovery and production of 
ethical pharmaceuticals is relatively 'concentrated', and is dominated by a number of 
large multinational organisations with considerable resources at their disposal. These 
resources are easily sufficient to support individual EU lobbying capabilities, and large 
UK firms such as Glaxo Wellcome, and SmithKline Beecham have their own 
representatives based in Brussels, (interview: 1). These are a relatively new breed of 
professional 'public affairs' specialists employed directly by, and servicing the interests 
of individual companies. Although there is a higher incidence of direct lobbying by 
firms, and the appointment of Brussels-based lobbying representatives, this is still the 
preserve of multinational corporations, and appears to come under the umbrella of the 
public relations function within the organisation (interviews: 7, 16). There are however 
variations in approach which stem largely from the attitude of Board members to the 
function. Glaxo Wellcome has maintained a presence in Brussels, while Sterling 
Winthrop for example, while it still invests in a lobbying representative has now re­
located its lobbying representative to the UK.
Another significant difference in this sector is that the UK companies also have to 
contend with the presence of major US international pharmaceutical companies such as 
Merck and Eli Lilley. Both of these have representatives in Brussels (interview: 2). 
They have a separate organisation representing their views in addition to AMCHAM. 
This is the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) which forms an 
important avenue for influence for these companies or their UK subsidiaries. Given 
earlier arguments about the competitive nature, or not, of the industry, the Sterling 
Winthrop representative's comment on the co-operation across member companies is 
telling 'In most cases there was little divergence in interests. . It was not a case o f 
competitive advantage as such. We were a co-operative and like-minded group and we
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were establishing ourselves as the infantry on the ground' (Interview: code 7). This 
interviewee also noted that particular care had to be taken not to overload the 
Commission with information and contacts, which could be seen as 'intrusive*, and by 
implication have an adverse effect. This could suggest that associations may play a 
part in self-regulation of lobbying in a sector where a relatively high level of individual 
firm lobbying is characteristic of the sector. Glaxo Wellcome employ government 
affairs representatives to deal with both national and EU issues, and have a UK full­
time appointee in this role, as well as a representative in Brussels. In other countries, 
this may not be a full time appointment, unlike the UK, but may be subsumed under the 
broad umbrella of corporate affairs work. The Sterling Winthrop representative was 
also part of the corporate affairs function within the firm.
The focus of work within the EU is the Commission, and within the UK the 
Department of Health. However, there is also considerable contact with the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and occasionally other departments such as 
Environment and Treasury. Glaxo's representative confirmed that there was regular 
contact with 20-30 UK civil servants. This particular company also delegates 
responsibility for contact with MEPs to the national government affairs representatives. 
Interestingly, little contact was reported with other pressure groups of representing 
non-business interests, and also little interaction with competitors except through work 
with associations, at least at the level of government affairs specialists (Interview: 16). 
Sterling Winthrop however, reported some contacts with BEUC and emphasised the 
importance of combined action - 'the only way I  could make an impact was with 
working with others' (Interview: 17). Their lobbying representative also confirmed use 
of external lobbying agencies, even if these were to assist primarily with information 
gathering, rather than the representation work itself. The main consultation partner for 
the Commission appears to be EFPIA, which has established a significant role for itself 
according to both Greenwood & Ronit and the company and governmental sources 
interviewed within this sector.
7.5.2 Sector Response: Collective Strategies: Influence within the sector is exerted 
through both the activities of individual companies, trade associations and cross- 
sectoral groups. However, the key interest groups representing the industry at 
European and UK level are:
• The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries Association
• The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
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EFPIA, as the trade federation for the European industry has been very proactive in 
working with the Commission, and ensuring that industrial competitiveness is always 
an active consideration. As Greenwood & Ronit note 'Although EFPIA has not had its 
own way in every instance, it has clearly had a considerable impact upon the 
regulatory flavour o f EC action in the sector, to the extent that its major demands 
have been incorporated' ( Greenwood & Ronit, 1992, p.82). To date the industry has 
been rather successful in influencing policy initiatives, and in using the strategic 
position of the industry as the main thrust of its argument in preventing or adapting 
what it sees as potentially harmful regulation.
The UK pharmaceuticals sector is represented by a UK national trade association, the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), though there is also another 
organisation representing the smaller producers and manufacturers of over-the-counter 
drugs and generics (PAGB).
Pre-dating the existence of EFPIA, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industry Associations was created in the 1970's, in response to the regulatory threats 
posed by the World Health Organisation (WHO). There also exist various groups 
which represent the interests of the new biotechnology industries. These are identified 
by Greenwood as:
• Bio Industry Association (BIA)
• European Secretariat of National Biotechnology Associations (ESNBA)
• European Federation of Biotechnology (EFB)
• Forum for European Bioindustry Co-ordination(FEBC)
• Senior Advisory Group Biotechnology (SAGB)
Greenwood singles out the Senior Advisory Group Biotechnology (SAGB), as the 
most influential of these (Greenwood, 1994, p. 193). In addition however, he notes the 
interest of other sector associations such as CEFIC, and EFPIA in this field, various 
national forums for biotechnology which are non-associational, specialised 
biotechnology interests such as the 'Yeast Industry Platform', and the activity of 
individual firms, and networks of firms. This new area is marked by the proliferation of 
different forms of collective action.
For the purposes of this analysis the main focus is on the influence strategy of ethical 
pharmaceuticals companies, rather than biotechnology firms. As noted earlier however, 
there are significant linkages between the two, witnessed by the . growth of alliances
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between biotechnology concerns and the pharmaceutical multinationals. For this 
reason, some mention of biotechnologies cannot be avoided in the following details.
National Trade Associations: ABPI represents the focal point for the industry in the 
UK. In 1994, the Association had 110 members of whom 75 were subsidiaries of one 
sort or another. There were 6 large British owned companies and 30 subsidiaries of 
French, German, and Swiss companies. Figures for 1995 show a slight reduction in 
overall numbers but reflects again the presence of international as well as UK based 
companies. In 1994, the organisation had 12 executive directors and a secretariat of 50 
employees in total (interview: 20) This has now increased to around 60. ABPI has 
regional groupings of members but these groups focus on local activities and building 
links with the community, and there are no ABPI regional offices to support them.
ABPI has a Board of Management which consists of senior managers from company 
members. Both UK and non-UK companies are included. The Board is supported by a 
series of permanent committees and a strategy development group.
Within the association there is a focal point for European activities, totalling 4 staff. 
The association does not have a Brussels office but works through its European 
federation, EFPIA. However, as a representative for the association commented We 
will sometimes make direct representation to the Commission. We feel that EFPIA as 
a federation o f association is always having to compromise. I f  you have a special 
point you go direct’ (interview: 20). A recent strategy review within the association 
resulted in a decision to focus on UK issues, with European and International contacts 
occupying a secondary, albeit important role (ABPI, 1995, p.25) While therefore the 
association clearly has an involvement in European affairs, and considers itself 
influential in European policy-making its declared focus is the UK.
The Association's approach to influencing the EU, follows the familiar pattern noted in 
earlier chapters. The focus of interaction is on the Commission, in order to influence at 
the early stages of developing ideas. UK Representation is lobbied if influence is 
required at the later stages of the decision-making process. There is no indication 
however, that any serious change in attitude towards MEPs had occurred. These were 
not seen as wielding real power, but the Association clearly recognised the their 
increased powers as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, and going forward see this as 
changing their approach to the European Parliament. ABPI maintains some contact 
with ECOSOC, but again this is seen as low priority, and the Committee of the 
Regions is, in their view, ’still very much in its infancy[ (interview: 20). ABPI works, 
with the CBI on various issues, particularly with broader commercial issues as opposed
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to technical ones, but rarely has any contact with UNICE (interview: 20). There are 
links with the Chemical Industries Association and its European counterpart, CEFIC. 
For example the association has fairly recently been involved in work with CEFIC, 
EFPLA, and the Commission on producing Good Manufacturing Practice guidelines for 
the inspection of bulk chemicals. Twice a year the association holds a Science and 
Technology Forum at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, which are attended by 
around 25-30 MEPs as well as Parliamentary and Commission staff. It also has contact 
with trade associations in other Member States and in America, for example the 
Japanese Pharmaceutical Industries Association.
Consultation processes with members tends to be issue driven. For example, on the 
question of advertising, the Association formed a committee of certain member 
companies to carry out a review of proposals, and to recommend the position the 
association will adopt in any negotiations with the EU (principally the Commission). 
The level of European lobbying activity, and the structures supporting this has not 
changed significantly from 1991-1994. In the Association's view, legislation specifically 
on pharmaceuticals is expected to decrease as nearly all the internal market provisions 
had been passed, even if they were still in various stages of enactment at national level. 
However, an increase in environmental legislation has been noted, and a significant 
development is the creation of a new bi-annual meeting of Health Ministers across the 
EU.
Work at a national level continues to remain important to the industry. This is not only 
because national government has power over the implementation of EU policy. It is 
because of the link to healthcare policy and services noted earlier. Within ABPI there is 
a separate department that works solely on UK government legislation. For example, a 
key area of concern for the industry has been the introduction and extension of the idea 
of a 'limited list' of drugs which ABPI has campaigned against vociferously. While the 
limited list is still in existence, in 1992/3 ABPI had some success in positioning the 
industry to influence decisions on the list. It achieved this through persuading the 
government to appoint a former chairman of a member company (Boehringer 
Ingelheim UK) to the committee which advised on which products should be available 
through the NHS. ABPI also see their lobbying on the location of the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) in London as a success story. Here they 
campaigned with the UK government in a bid for the location of the agency in London, 
and this proved successful.
ABPI subscription fees for members are at present calculated against company 
turnover for branded products. Currently, subscriptions range from £14,000 to an
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upper limit of £180,000, when the contribution is capped. The subscriptions for 1997 
onwards are presently under review, both in terms of the level, and the method of 
calculation for individual members. The level of subscription fees reflects the size of 
firm within this sector and is in marked contrast to those noted for the members of the 
Freight Transport Association and Road Haulage Association. From 1997 onwards the 
ABPI membership will be expanded to introduce a category termed 'affiliates' with two 
classes, research affiliates, and general affiliates. Research affiliates will include 
companies engaged in R&D but with no sales. General affiliates will include companies 
such as advertising agencies, PR companies, financial analyst houses, law firms etc. 
The subscription for affiliates will be fixed at £5000 pa but the benefits available to 
such members will be less that those available to members per se.
European Trade Association: the European federation to which ABPI belongs is 
EFPIA, The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations. Founded in 
1978, it consisted of an office in Brussels with a staff of 2. Initially, the three main 
areas of focus for the federation were set out as intellectual property rights, regulatory 
affairs and economic questions. By 1994 it had a secretariat consisting of 20 qualified 
staff, and has established itself as a key consultation partner to the EU on industry 
matters - 'EFPIA is the industry's spokesman at European supranational bodies; 
European Union institutions, the Council o f Europe, WIPO etc. It represents the 
European pharmaceutical industry in areas which involve it with associations from  
other sectors and consumer groups. It represents the interests o f the European 
Pharmaceutical Industry at several international organisations ' (EFPIA 1993, p. 13). 
In 1993, the federation membership consisted of 16 national organisations.
Its structure comprises a General Assembly consisting of representatives from each of 
the member organisations, an Executive Committee, consisting of a number of 
permanent members represented by the main producer nations, and a number of 
'rotating' member participants. There is also a standing advisory committee consisting 
of representatives from the major international pharmaceutical companies. Greenwood 
notes that it was formed specifically in response to the threats and opportunities posed 
to its interests by the European Community and points to substantial influence on 
regulatory issues. He comments that 'Although E1FPIA has not had it own way in every 
instance, it has clearly had considerable impact upon the regulatory flavour o f EC 
action in the sector, to the extent that its major demands have been incorporated 
(Greenwood, 1992, p. 75) Greenwood shows that the strong performance of EFPIA 
challenges the idea that all Euro-groups are weak, and explores the reasons for this 
apparent strength, in terms of the characteristics of the. industry, in particular, 
internationalisation, and therefore the similarity of issues facing companies across
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national boundaries (Greenwood & Ronit, 1994, p. 3 7). The point is that this 
organisation has achieved a pre-eminent position as consultation partner to the 
Commission.
In terms of the focus of lobbying activity, a familiar pattern emerges of concentration 
on the Commission. EFPIA appears to have been extremely successful in developing 
relationships here, particularly with DGHI. Greenwood & Ronit note 'this relationship 
has developed into an effective mechanism o f sectoral governance' (Greenwood & 
Ronit, 1994, p. 190). It is also clear however that EFPIA sees the European Parliament 
as an important target as part of its influence strategy. It both monitors developments 
carefully in terms of individual initiatives by MEPs, the work of Parliamentary 
Intergroups, and makes its presence felt in the system of public hearings that are 
instituted by the Parliament as part of its consultation processes. An example of this is 
its influence on the European Parliament is the STOA programme (Scientific and 
Technological Options Assessment), where the Federation was 'accorded official 
recognition as the expert representing the entire European pharmaceutical industry' 
(EFPIA, 1993, p.52).
The position of EFPIA as the main interface with EU decision-makers is supported by 
ABPI’s recent stated focus on UK issues. This does not mean that national associations 
do not seek contact. However, EFPIA seems to have established a role for itself as the 
collective voice of the industry at European level, and national associations (at least in 
the UK) are unlikely to by-pass this organisation in any attempt to exert influence. 
Unlike the Road Freight sector however, this industry has within it some extremely 
large, multinational organisations with both the resources and capability to represent 
their own interests, as noted earlier. As well as acting as individual ’policy participants’, 
these can establish direct company forums to address particular issues, an example of 
which is given below.
Direct Membership Groups: the shift of attention from Single Market initiatives to 
broader health care issues has caused a new sectoral group to emerge. This consists of 
representatives from major firms within the sector and called itself the ’Pharmaceutical 
Partners for Better Health Care’. At the time of writing, EFPIA and ABPI were not 
involved in this association, which consists of senior company management, and which 
commissioned the National Economic Research Association to look at health care 
issues in ’13 or 14 countries', largely in response to the shift in both national 
government and Commission focus issues affecting the industry. As Glaxo's 
representative commented European Member States are largely facing the same 
pressures on their health care systems and a number are now talking to each other.
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There is now a regular EU health ministers meeting which has had the issue o f drug 
pricing on its agenda fro  the last three or four times' (interview: 16).
The Senior Advisory Group Biotechnology, also falls into this particular category of 
collective interest representation. It was originally an initiative of CEFIC, and consisted 
of an invited membership of seven large chemical firms, although it now has affiliated 
membership of 30 firms, and membership is open to application. The membership is 
dominated by large firm interests which 'provides an extremely important and 
influential example o f large firm  co-operation at the European level (Greenwood & 
Ronit, 1994, p.94). Its success is attributed to a number of factors such as the small 
number of members, the homogeneity of interests that can be preserved through this, 
and the presence of large firms with both the resources and the experience of operating 
within the different national environments of the EU. Here Greenwood points to the 
importance of such experience to the Commission. This indicates the benefits to 
decision-makers of access to information, which is simply not available through smaller 
firms, or even perhaps through a strong European federation. An example of the 
successful lobbying that this organisation has carried out, is its influence in persuading 
the Commission to create a high level co-ordination group for Biotechnology even if its 
approach has sometimes been seen as rather too forceful (Greenwood, 1994, p 194).
7.6 Conclusion: Opportunities for Influence Strategies and the Costs & Benefits 
of Information
7.6.1 The Strategic Importance of the Industry and Individual Firms: the
opportunities created for influencing both national and European government decision­
makers are greater for the pharmaceutical industry than road freight. This is due to 
the leading edge technology it employs and the high profits that can result from 
successful research, production and marketing of drugs. It is seen as a key industry, by 
the Commission, i.e. one that is internationally competitive, and as such is viewed as 
strategically important in terms of EU industrial policy. Because of the advanced 
technology it employs, the presence of large firms with considerable resources at their 
disposal, and the international nature of their operations, this puts firms within the 
sector at a considerable information advantage, both with reference to national and 
European government. The contrast here with road freight is marked. Relatively low 
technology, therefore less strategic importance, and the predominance of small, 
nationally focused firms with low profit margins, mean that these are unlikely to have 
the information at their disposal which can offer opportunity for influence.
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The link between healthcare systems, and the cost of prescription medicines means 
that government involvement in the pharmaceuticals industry is relatively high. The 
European industry has faced a threat to harmonise pricing systems (which was 
successfully diverted by the industry acting through EFPIA), and legislation on the 
standards of clinical trial, production of medicines, and various other areas. While it is 
perhaps inappropriate to talk in absolute terms about whether sectors are regulated or 
deregulated, the close interest in price and profit that national governments show in the 
industry, and the subsequent need for the industry to monitor potential developments in 
this area contrasts markedly with road freight.
7.6.2 Individual Firms and Collective Action: individual firm strategies aimed at 
influencing EU institutions, reflect the use of such informational advantage, despite the 
presence of strong European collective representation in the form of EFPIA. This is a 
highly influential organisation that has succeeded in establishing a key role for itself in 
decision-making, and which is well resourced with qualified staff.
Despite this strength however, the large firms in this sector still invest in individual 
lobbying. This is not simply the insurance policy approach of having a non-executive 
director who is an ex-commission official, or lobbyist. These firms appoint public 
affairs specialists to represent them, and some of these are based in Brussels. Their 
representatives engage in proactive lobbying which seeks to establish relationships with 
decision-makers and both gain access to, and influence policy formulation at an early 
stage in its development. This is not a new development relevant only to European 
government. It is the way relationships with UK national government are also handled.
The EU has grown in importance to the sector, not just as a result of the Single Market 
initiative, but as a result of earlier interest in health issues, stemming from the ’first 
directive'. It is clear however that while national government continues to be an 
important target for influence in its own right, the preference for direct contact with 
EU decision-makers, and direct influence both at individual company level and 
collectively is well-established. Firms follow a multiple route to decision-makers in 
Brussels as part of their influence strategy, regardless of the relatively cohesive 
collective representation they have achieved at both a national and European level (see 
figure 11).
7.6.3 Industry Structure and Influence Strategies: Both EFPIA and ABPI represent 
a relatively stable, strong collective voice to national government and the EU, and 
although the responsibilities for representation to each seem to be clearly divided, 
ABPI will seek some direct contact with EU decision-makers. This is in contrast to the
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more fragmented approach visible in road freight. In this respect, the influence 
strategies of firms towards the EU mirrors in some respects the industry characteristics 
themselves in terms of fragmentation or concentration. Fragmentation lends itself to 
more competitive behaviour, and weaker collective representation, while concentration 
aligns with a more cohesive collective approach to influence. The assertion by drug 
companies that they are in a fiercely competitive environment, is questionable. 
Certainly in terms of influence strategy they have been able to achieve a highly cohesive 
approach which does not sit easily with their claim of fierce competitiveness. Given 
the arguments in chapter 2, it is doubtful if this could have been achieved in a highly 
competitive context. This behaviour, mirrored in their influence strategies, is logical 
given the high risk nature of the substantial investment in R&D each firm has to make 
in order to stay in the market. A highly competitive environment would not support 
such risks, and would inevitably be self-destructive. The concentration of the sector 
enables firms to avoid a self-destructive path. This is why individual firm lobbying 
activities exist concurrently with strong collective representation, and do not appear, as 
yet, to have caused a problem within this sector. While there is some evidence of 
tension between individual firm views and those of the associations, there can be little 
doubt that at a European level, EFPIA plays a lead role for the industry in both 
monitoring and responding to developments within the EU. The relatively low 
competitiveness of the environment in which firms operate, is also mirrored in the 
format and particularly the cohesiveness of its representation both at national and EU 
level.
In the case of Road Freight, the size of firms, structure of the industry and the 
membership profile appear to support the continued division of national representation 
across two trade associations, the RHA and FT A, despite some earlier efforts by the 
FT A to pursue the possibility of an amalgamation. This contrasts with the more 
cohesive representation noted by Greenwood & Ronit in the UK pharmaceutical 
industry at national level through ABPI. At the European level, however, both sectors 
have developed official consultation partners with the relevant Commission directorate. 
The IRU in the case of Road Freight and EFPIA for pharmaceuticals. There are 
therefore some similarities in both sector strategies. The key difference, however, lies 
in the company influence strategies which underlie this pattern. For the pharmaceutical 
industry, the presence of large firms with transnational interests, and the advanced 
technology nature of their business coincides with an influence strategy where 
individual firm action is allied with support for a collective Voice'. This multiple 
influence strategy means that individual firm lobbying representatives from some of the 
largest organisations are present in Brussels alongside the offices of EFPIA. . The final. 
chapter develops these themes and compares the differences and similarities in
168
influence strategies across the two sectors in order to conclude the findings from the 
thesis.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion
8.1 Political Institutions and Economic Actors
The treatment of influence strategies and 'lobbying' has been examined on two levels 
within this thesis. The first level concerns the role of political institutions themselves on 
influence activities. The second level examines firm and sector characteristics, and 
links these to the patterns of interaction between firms, sectors, and the political 
institutions of the EU. The final chapter attempts to draw together the findings from 
the two levels of analysis and presents conclusions based on the findings from the 
comparison of Road Freight and Pharmaceutical industries.
The thesis is based on the notion that firm and sector influence strategies cannot be 
understood without recourse to both the political environment, and the economic 
environment in which they operate. Following North (1990) and Lindberg, Campbell 
and Hollingsworth (1991), the analysis is based on notion that these two domains 
overlap, with political institutions and economic actors engaged in reciprocal influence 
activities. This includes political institutions acting in pursuit of economic aims, as well 
as economic actors seeking to affect both the policies, and at times the political 
environment in which they operate. The visible manifestation of this interaction is 
lobbying activity, whether this is carried out by individual firms, or their collective 
representatives.
The thesis is not primarily concerned with arguments about whether EU political 
institutions represent a more pluralist or corporatist environment. The contribution of 
Streeck and Schmitter (1991) for example, while providing some key insights into the 
development of the EU political arena, is less relevant here perhaps than the 
contributions on lobbying and the organisation of influence from others (Greenwood 
& Ronit 1991,1994a, 1994b; Cawson, 1992; McLaughlin, 1994), where influence 
strategies are set within the context of the 'sector', implicitly recognising the 
importance of industry factors on patterns of interaction between EU institutions and 
firms. It is not just a case of differences in policies as they apply to each sector, 
important though these are. The thesis proposes that it is firm size, transnational 
operations, and the concentration of sectors which are key determinants of how 
influence is exerted. First, however, there has to be the opportunity for influence.
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8.2 Opportunities for Influence in the EU
Chapters 3 & 4 looked at the development of the EU and its political institutions. 
Milgrom and Roberts argue that the size of a central authority, whether it is within the 
context of a firm, or within the public sector, will affect the level of influence activity. 
The larger the central authority, the greater the level of influence activity this will 
generate. They reason that within any organisation, decision-making is dependent on 
having sufficient good information in order to ensure desirable outcomes (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992). In order to make 'good' decisions, decision-makers will often be 
dependent on others to provide this information, and this creates a dilemma 
(Miller, 1992). The dilemma is that information can be tailored to suit the requirements 
of the information giver, allowing the potential for influencing the outcome of 
decisions. Moreover, within the decision-making environment, the greater the 
uncertainty and more complex the factors involved in the decision, the greater the need 
for information (North, 1990).
Chapter three examines the development of the EU and its institutions against this 
logic. It shows that the development of EU political institutions, the enhancement of 
their power through various treaty provisions, and the growing body of European law 
has indeed created a new focus for influence activities. Prior to the formation of the 
ECSC, national government was the focus of centralised authority and decision-making 
powers (along with the Courts). It was therefore the focus of attempts at influence by 
interest groups. This has changed as development of the EU has created a new set of 
opportunities for influence as both the Road Freight and Pharmaceuticals studies show. 
This is regardless of differences in industry structure. National government still remains 
a key focus, but in many areas, it is no longer the final decision-making point. Instead 
national government may play the role of one of 15 different sets of national interests, 
all seeking to ensure favourable outcomes to EU decision-making. National 
government may still be lobbied, but it can also act as an 'interest group' in the broadest 
sense of the term within the context of the EU. It is no longer sufficient, therefore, for 
business interests to seek information from, and influence national government in order 
to manage the outcome of political decisions on the economic environment. They also 
need to seek information about, and influence, decisions being made by EU institutions.
Chapter three shows that the process of policy formulation and decision-making within 
the EU is complex. Policies are formulated by the Commission, and then go through 
many formal and sometimes informal consultation processes before they can be ratified. 
These processes involve other EU institutions, the Council of. Ministers, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC), UNICE, Eurochambres
171
and more recently, the Committee of the Regions. They also involve negotiations with 
various interest groups, some of which may be handled through ECOSOC.
Policy formulation, and the decision-making process is served by a relatively small 
bureaucracy, despite popular misconceptions, and this is still in the early stages of 
evolution compared with national bureaucracies. This creates a high dependency on 
outside sources for information for EU decision-makers, particularly the Commission. 
Openness to contact from outside is therefore important, and is confirmed by the 
Commission's own statement of the policy on contact with outside interests 'The 
Commission has always been an institution open to outside input. The Commission 
believes this process to be fundamental to the development o f its policies. This 
dialogue has proved invaluable to both the Commission and to interested outside 
parties. Commission officials acknowledge the need fo r such outside input and 
welcome it: (CEC (92) 2272).
The implication of this new political environment is that opportunities for influence are 
many. There are multiple points of access to decision-makers, and the scope of policy­
making has been extended considerably since 1957. The preconditions for influence 
activity in the form of a central authority, complexity and uncertainty, are present in the 
characteristics of the EU and its political institutions.
Business response to the development of the EU confirms this logic. Chapter 4 shows 
that since the ratification of the Single European Act, there has been a considerable 
increase in lobbying activity (Mazey & Richardson, 1991,1993a, 1993b, 1993c; Andersen 
& Eliassen,1993). This marked a watershed in terms of lobbying activity directed 
towards the EU, and this response supports the logic outlined above.
The Single European Act generated nearly 300 pieces of legislation affecting Member 
States. These were aimed at the creation of a Single Market within the European 
Communities and were therefore of direct and obvious relevance to business interests. 
This major initiative amounted to a relaunch of the Community after many years of 
apparent stagnation, some of the symptoms of which are evident in the history of the 
Commmon Transport Policy. There was, however, another aspect to the Single 
European Act. The time taken to ratify each of the items of legislation was reduced. 
This was achieved by a key change to the decision-making process within the (then) 
EEC. The change involved the introduction of majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers on all Single Market issues. It removed the right of any one Member State to 
hold up proceeding by. using a veto.. It therefore increased the uncertainty of outcomes 
for individual national governments, and heightened the importance of the
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intergovernmental bargaining process. For those business interests seeking to influence 
outcomes, solely relying on the support of national government, important though it is, 
would no longer guarantee an acceptable result.
Subsequently, a dense network of business interest groups has formed consisting of 
individual companies, national and European trade associations, national and European 
industry associations, and special interest groups. In addition, non-business interests 
have alsomoved to Brussels. There has been increasing activity by local authorities, 
environmental and social issues groups, which are sometimes rivals, and sometimes 
partners of business associations. Industry and trade associations at national and 
European level, special focus groups, companies, and professional lobbying firms have 
chosen to locate representatives in Brussels. As both the Road Freight and 
Pharmaceutical sector studies show however, the network of organisations which 
surrounds EU governmental agencies represent both complimentary and overlapping 
domains of interest. For example, national trade associations are present even where 
they have a European federation as representative, and all the Member States industry 
associations are present despite the presence of UNICE, with its status as an official 
consultation partner of the Commission.
The main target of lobbying, whether by individual companies, or collectively through 
the action of trade and industry associations is the Commission. This is irrespective of 
whether those interests are European or national associations, companies, or cross- 
sectoral groups like the European Round Table of Industrialists and AMCHAM. 
However, interviews from the Road Freight and Pharmaceutical sectors show that the 
European Parliament is becoming more important, and Road Freight at least shows 
how ECOSOC may also provide the potential for influence. Whether the 'interest' is an 
individual company, or represents a business group, the focus of lobbying and the way 
it is carried out is the same. As North points out, this is because political institutions 
define the 'rules of the game' for negotiation with interests (North, 1990; Lindberg, 
Campbell & Hollingsworth, 1991). An example of this is how responsibilities for policy 
formation seem to dictate the importance of cultivating contacts at more junior levels 
within the Commission bureaucracy (Gardner, 1991; Andersen, 1992).
8.3 Companies and the Costs and Benefits of Influence
Individual companies form part of the complex network of interests in Brussels, and 
can be direct participants in the policy-making process. The term 'interest' is not, 
therefore, synonymous with an association. Sector studies suggest that companies 
adopting the 'Brussels strategy', and in particular locating representatives in Brussels, 
are large, transnational firms with substantial resources at their disposal (McLaughlin,
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1994; Greenwood & Ronit, 1992; Cawson, 1992). Within the Road Freight sector, 
which is dominated by small firms, the notable exception in terms of influence strategy 
is one of the largest, and arguably the only company with substantial transnational 
interests (P&O). This echoes the strategies of the large pharmaceutical companies. The 
complexities of these firms' operations suggest that issues may not align well with the 
interest boundaries of industry and trade associations. They are concerned with 
'horizontal' issues which go beyond the narrow definition of their sector, to broader 
economic and social issues. The active interest of a wide range of large, transnational 
companies in road freight issues is an example of this (e.g. ICI, BP, GlaxoWellcome 
and Shell). Information about the political environment becomes more important to 
firms with transnational operations (Porter 1986; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1992), therefore 
individual representation may provide a key individual benefit to this group. This is 
particularly the case in Pharmaceuticals where industry concentration may also fuel 
greater information requirements (Taggart, 1993). The presence of individual company 
lobbyists may also indicate the potential for other, firm specific, benefits from this 
activity. The concentration of the industry suggests there may be higher potential for 
rent-capture, and the high technology nature of the product for this sector may also 
present certain business opportunities, for example, research funding.
If the development of EU institutions, and their particular characteristics provide the 
preconditions for influence activity, the response of business interests provides 
evidence to support the proposition that the size, complexity of institutions, and 
uncertainty of decision-making processes generates influence activity. The 'lobbying 
explosion' accompanying the SEA represents an entirely logical response by business. 
However, a closer look at individual firms and sectors suggests these are not the only 
factors which will determine the shape of that response. The second part of the thesis 
proposes that the influence strategies of firms and the organisation of influence at 
sector level are shaped not only by political factors, but by firm and industry 
characteristics. Firm and industry characteristics are important because they determine 
the potential benefits of various strategies. For example, strategies which involve 
collective representation through associations, or those which involve individual 
representation through the appointment of public affairs specialists, or both (a multiple 
strategy). It is the potential benefit against which the cost of different strategies are 
weighed.
Companies within the fragmented Road Freight sector showed little evidence of 
individual lobbying activity. There is the potential for lobbying through the 
appointment of lobbyists or ex-bureaucrats to the Board of Directors, but there is little 
evidence of the appointment of public affairs specialists within the companies. This 
does not mean that companies never lobby decision-makers directly. There may well
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be contacts with EU decision-makers by Board members from time to time. However, 
the sustained relationship-building afforded by a professional public affairs function, 
particularly if based in Brussels, is not a characteristic of this sector, and occurs in only 
one company, the largest, and arguably the only multinational firm within the sector. 
This is a significant exception as it is one of the larger organisations within the sample, 
therefore suggesting that firm size and transnational operations may override sector 
characteristics such as fragmentation.
The absence of lobbying activity does not mean however that companies within the 
sector do not exert influence on EU decision-makers, just that they do so through 
different means. For this sector the dominant strategy involves representation through 
trade associations, with national trade associations providing both the main source of 
information on EU policy development, in addition to providing representation. Cost 
is quoted as the main reason for this strategy. Membership fees for the trade 
associations in the Road Freight sector, are determined by a combination of turnover, 
number of vehicles, and local registration requirements for the Freight Transport 
Association, and a straightforward correlation with the number of vehicles for the Road 
Haulage Association. The fees range between £160 per annum to £22,000 per annum 
across the two organisations, with minimal difference between the two. This represents 
a cost-effective option compared with a minimum estimate of £100,000 per annum to 
locate a full time representative in Brussels (interview: 17). The membership figures for 
ABPI however, ranging between £14,000 and £180,000 offer a different equation at 
the higher end of the spectrum.
Despite the increasing power of EU institutions and the scope of legislative 
competence, road freight companies show little sign of re-thinking their influence 
strategy. So, despite the changing political environment, their approach to dealing with 
changes instigated by its decision-makers is still a predominantly passive one. They 
choose to review impending legislation, through information mostly supplied by the 
trade association and are chiefly concerned with adaptation or compliance using the 
sector association's advice. They leave policy monitoring and influencing to their trade 
association, and the research suggests most are not highly active in the affairs of their 
association. The exceptions are the firms with transnational interests, such as P&O.
It is not implied here that firms solely join trade associations in order to gain 
representation. However, given the potential benefits which may be gained from direct 
contact with decision-makers for the small, nationally focused firms, their response is 
logical. For the small firm, the benefits are likely to encompass: market stabilisation, 
enhancement or protection of the. trading environment. There. is therefore little 
incentive to bear the costs of direct lobbying if the potential benefits are collective,
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when other may 'free-ride'. This is particularly the case in a competitive environment 
characterised by low profit margins and fierce competition. For these companies there 
is also very little information to trade with decision-makers. Operations are simple, the 
strategic significance of the individual firm is low. Therefore the bargaining strength of 
companies is low, and they are unlikely to be able to capitalise on this to influence 
decision-makers. The sector is not characterised by any direct company forums, again 
with one notable exception which occurs at national level rather than EU. This is a 
group of companies which acts as consultation partner to the Department of Transport 
on policies (including EU policies) relating to the transport of dangerous goods. This is 
a specialist area subsector of the industry. Here, individual firms may well possess 
informational advantage over trade associations as they have to employ specialist, 
technical skills to handle these operations.
Pharmaceutical companies present a very different picture. Key players such as 
GlaxoWellcome and SmithKline Beecham have public affairs specialists based in 
Brussels. This is despite strong collective representation at national and European level 
through the ABPI and EFPIA. Companies in this concentrated industry sector pursue 
multiple influence strategies, both supporting collective representatives, while ensuring 
they are building and maintaining individual contacts with EU institutions. Unlike road 
freight companies, they have responded to the development of EU institutions and 
policy competence not only with strong collective representation but with active 
strategies for self-representation. This includes a response to the increased threat of 
EU action on healthcare issues with the formulation of a direct company membership 
forum - Pharmaceutical Partners for Better Healthcare'.
Companies within this sector operate within an international market and there is a high 
concentration of large transnational firms with complex operations. Information about 
the political environment is important to such firms, as witnessed by the emergence of 
the government affairs function. The context is competitive advantage. The importance 
of information lies in both the ability to respond quickly to political events, and the 
ability to manage their impact on business operation. In relative terms the cost of direct 
representation in Brussels is comparatively low for these companies. There is also the 
potential for individual firm benefit from lobbying action: rent, and business 
opportunities. The growing concentration of this industry in recent years may also 
suggest that opportunities for rent capture are increasing, although such organisations 
need to ensure they do not fall foul of the EUs competition laws. The fifth Framework 
Programme for R&D which will come into effect at the end of 1998 has 17 
programmes which make available grants for research totalling £10.6bn. Of these, two 
are programmes of direct concern to the pharmaceutical industry, Biotechnology, and 
Biomedicine and Health which total Ecu 946m or £l.lbn (Financial Times, 10.10.96).
176
The relative costs/benefit of individual representation for these firms suggests that 
however strong the collective 'voice' either at national or in this case the European 
context, firms will find it advantageous to go direct to EU decision-makers for a 
number of reasons. They will also find an open door as the possessors of information 
on the highly technical aspects of their products and operations in a key, strategic, 
economic sector.
8.4 Industry Structure & The Organisation of Influence
The organisation of collective interests at European level is varied. Studies of different 
sectors (Greenwood & Ronit, Cawson, McLaughlin) show that the organisation of 
interest has developed in different ways in response to changes in the EU. Although 
there has been a successive re-focusing of interests at European level, supporting 
aspects of neo-functionalist theory (Streeck & Schmitter,1991, p. 134), the formulation 
of those interests is not quite as anticipated. UNICE was formed in 1958, along with 
other bodies such as COP A. Sectoral interests followed later, with a noticeable 
increase in lobbying following the SEA. This pattern of interests is still evolving, for 
example, with the emerging presence of regional interests and environmental groups. 
However studies show a variety of patterns for business interest associations at 
different levels. These indicate that although structured in different ways, European 
associations often exist as part of a federated structure of national organisations. 
Pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, chemicals, motor manufacture, consumer 
electronics are examples. They all have national associations, which are then members 
of a European federation. Greenwood notes the emergence of direct company 
membership European associations in biotechnologies, and he may well be correct to 
infer that emerging high technology sectors could by-pass the more traditional national 
structures, because of their international focus and operations. However, despite the 
presence of large firms with transnational interests, and resources to fimd their own 
lobbying, many sector studies seem to confirm that both associative action, and the 
'federated' format is still important. This format (national associations as part of a 
European federation) may co-exist with other forms of association which involved 
direct company membership, but the national dimension is still important. They also 
confirm the importance of the 'sector' as a key focus for interest promotion 
'Effectiveness through smaller and less inclusive associations is preferred to broad 
compromises and representativeness through peak associations, as many vital issues 
are so unique that they are completely irrelevant and unknown to firm s outside the 
sector itself (Greenwood, 1992, p.244). This echoes not only Olson's arguments about 
the difficulties of achieving collective action where the interests of groups are 
heterogeneous, it also points to the importance of specialised sector knowledge in the
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representational activities of associations. It also suggests a particularly strong position 
for the trade associations, which are likely to possess this knowledge.
Against this background, chapters 6 & 7 look at how company strategies translate into 
a pattern of influence at sector level, and in the process, highlights both similarities and 
differences in associative structures and influence strategies. The industry structure and 
competitive environment of the ethical pharmaceutical sector is marked by a high level 
of concentration, domination by large, multinational organisations with complex 
operations spanning a wide range of the product cycle from research and development 
through to sales and marketing (Taggart, 1993). This is a high technology sector and is 
strategically important in terms of the global competitiveness of EU industry. As a 
recent Council resolution on industrial policy in the sector notes: '...the European 
pharmaceutical industry plays cm essential role in public health, remains a high- 
technology industry with considerable added value, which is particularly successful, 
generates high skilled jobs and makes a significant contribution to the European 
Union's balance o f trade' (136/4, OJL C136, 1996). The competitive environment is 
characterised by product differentiation rather than price differentiation. Profit levels 
are high, even if the investment in research and development costs are also substantial. 
The contrast with road freight could not be more stark, with its relatively low 
technology, domination by small firms with simple operations, and with a largely 
national focus. While road freight provides an important infrastructure service to other 
industries, it is not a source of economic growth through technological innovation. 
Within the UK another difference is the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry, 
against the de-regulated environment of road freight. Although however, the 
pharmaceutical sector is subject to governmental controls on profit, both this, and the 
Road Freight sector are subject to many different areas of EU legislation as shown in 
earlier chapters.
In terms of influence strategies, the main similarity across the two sectors concerns the 
key role of the trade association in representing views to government both at a national 
and EU level. Representation at EU level is through well-established European 
federations linked to national organisations in Member States (see figure 12). Both the 
IRU for the Freight industry and EFPIA for Pharmaceuticals are key consultation 
partners of the Commission. Both these organisations are based in Brussels. Despite 
evidence of some tensions between national trade associations and their European 
counterparts, they form the focal point of organised interests for both sectors.
This mirrors.arrangements at national level. Here the focal point is again the trade, 
association, though in the case of Road Freight there are two national trade
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associations, reflecting the greater fragmentation of the industry. Both within the 
Pharmaceutical sector and Road Freight, influencing national government is still a key 
objective as the industries operate within the differing healthcare or transport policies 
of Member States. For both sectors however, the development of the EU has addedan 
additional aspect to influence strategies at a collective level, rather than replacing the 
national dimension.
Finally, within both sectors it is worth commenting on the apparent absence of a role 
for Chambers of Commerce in terms of sector-level influence. Different industry 
characteristics, including the presence of high numbers of small firms within the Road 
Freight sector, appear to make little difference. Chambers do not feature as an 
important part of the collective strategy within the sector. 'Product' therefore appears 
to be a key shaper of collective strategy by business interests. This does not mean that 
Chambers of Commerce either at a national or EU level are not consulted. Within the 
EU for example Eurochambres is now an official consultation partner of the 
Commission. There is, however, little evidence of companies featuring Chambers 
within their influence strategies, or that Chambers are a strong channel of sector views 
to EU decision-makers.
The above similarities suggest that key aspects of sector influence strategy transcend 
diverse industry structures and competitive environment. First, despite different 
industry characteristics, the trade association is the focal point for influence (and 
information) for both Pharmaceuticals and Road Freight. Industry associations and 
Chambers of Commerce, while they form part of the network of organisations 
representing business interests at sector level, are not the primary source of information 
or influence routes for companies. Second, collective strategies are important, 
regardless of considerable variation in industry structure, and despite the presence of 
large companies which have the financial and information resources available to 
represent themselves. Third, at the European level both sectors are represented by 
well-established. European and International associations which are key consultation 
partners of the European Commission, and whose members are national organisations.
There are, however, a number of important differences in the organisation of influence. 
While the Pharmaceutical sector's European trade association EFPIA is the key 
consultation partner for the Commission, individual representatives of companies are 
also present in Brussels. Major multinational companies in this sector engage in direct 
lobbying of EU institutions in addition to working through EFPIA. This involves the 
appointment of public affairs specialists within the company. Firms within the. sector
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may therefore not only seek to influence through the trade association, but as an 
individual company, pursuing multiple strategies (see fig 13).
A second key difference between the two sectors is that within the UK the national 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) is the key consultation 
partner. Within the Road Freight sector however, key consultation is split across two 
organisations, the Freight Transport Association (FTA) and the Road Haulage 
Association (RHA). Both the FTA and RHA have large numbers of small firms within 
their membership. The FTA is, however, differentiated by the presence of some large 
multinational firms within the membership, whose core activities lie in other sectors, 
but which have substantial interest in road freight issues.
A third area of difference concerns the influence strategy of trade associations. The 
FTA now has a representative in Brussels, despite IRU membership and close formal 
and informal links between itself and the IRU. The RHA is also represented within the 
IRU and yet this association has also chosen to develop its Brussels network, albeit in 
a slightly different way. This is through the CBI's British Business Bureau. In summary, 
therefore, the strong role of the European trade association in Pharmaceuticals is 
supplemented, and potentially challenged, by the presence of company lobbying 
activities in Brussels. Within Road Freight the potential challenge to the European 
Trade Association comes from the presence of national association interests. These 
differences show how issues are framed within a national context for firms within 
Road Freight. By contrast, issues are framed within a transnational industry context 
for the Pharmaceutical sector.
A fourth area of difference occurs in terms of links with industry organisations. The 
predominance of national issues within Road Freight, finds a parallel with the concerns 
of the UK industry association, the CBI. As chapter 5 shows there are close links 
between the FTA, RHA and the CBI. For example, the FTA takes the transport seat 
for the UK within UNICE. Such linkages are not present within the Pharmaceuticals 
sector. The European trade association, EFPIA has an influential negotiating position 
with the Commission. While the IRU also acts as primary consultation partner to the 
Commission in Road Freight however, both the FTA and more recently the RHA are 
becoming more active participants in negotiation through establishing a presence in 
Brussels. This presence of national as well as European interest groups contrasts with 
Pharmaceuticals which is characterised by the presence of individual firms, in addition 
to European collective interests. Any challenge to the negotiating mandate of EFPIA 
comes not from national collective interests but from, companies. Given the potential 
costs and benefits of investment in direct lobbying for large firms within this sector,
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this is not surprising. The question is whether the Freight Transport Association would 
have a Brussels representative if solely concerned with road freight rather than 
encompassing the wider interests of its multinational member companies. The answer is 
that it would probably find it difficult to justify such expenditure to its members, rather 
like the Road Haulage Association.
8.5 Conclusion: Influence Strategies, Lobbying & Information
In conclusion, the earlier chapters of the thesis argued that the opportunities for 
influence were created as a result of the information needs which are linked to 
decision-making processes. Uncertainty and complexity are key factors which 
determine the level of influence activity surrounding that decision-making, as they 
generate the need for information, and increase the importance of its acquisition.
On this basis, the growing decision-making ability of EU institutions and the 
complexity and uncertainty surrounding their decision-making processes provide the 
circumstances for an increase in influence activity. The evidence is that the ratification 
of the Single European Act was the trigger for an substantial increase in lobbying 
activity in ’Brussels'. However, subsequent chapters show that patterns of behaviour at 
firm level are not uniform. Companies do not suddenly invest in lobbying activity. This 
is as true for the EU environment as it is in a national context. There is also some 
evidence from the UK Road Freight and Pharmaceutical sector studies that preference 
for particular strategies in the EU mirror those in the national context.
The first level of analysis therefore provides the rationale for the overall increase in 
influence activity. However, a closer examination of the network of business interests 
that is developing around EU institutions raises a number of issues about how that 
influence is organised. In particular the range of interests groups, or what McLaughlin 
calls 'policy participants' which have emerged in Brussels (McLaughlin, 1993). These 
include individual firms, professional lobbying organisations, national trade and 
industry associations in addition to their European counterparts. A key question is why 
some firms have invested in own lobbying capability even when they benefit from 
strong collective representation at European level.
The analysis of the Pharmaceuticals and Road Freight sectors shows a number of 
similarities and differences at both company and association level. In both cases the 
preference of EU decision-makers is for consultation with European collective 
interests.. For. both sectors there, are . long-established, professionally-run European 
trade associations. Despite this however, within the Pharmaceuticals industry major
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UK firms maintain their own lobbying capability in addition to supporting a strong 
European Trade association. Direct access to decision-makers is important for these 
organisations. This is not the case in Road Freight where firms see little cost benefit in 
this investment. However, one of the national trade associations (the FTA) has chosen 
to establish a base in Brussels. Here, representation via a European trade association is 
not sufficient, despite the clear preference by decision-makers for a pan-European 
consultation partner.
The reason for this investment by the FTA is the access to information this gives the 
association, and the speed of that access. Its strategy is also the result of pressure from 
its membership, in particular pressure from multinational organisations. These do not 
have road freight as a core activity, but have vested interests in this industry as part of 
their complex operations.
In both the case of the individual firm, or association, access to information is a key 
benefit of direct contact with EU decision-makers. This is not necessarily formal 
information in terms of 'policy proposals', but information which becomes available as 
a result of sustained contact with decision-makers, and other groups which form the 
network of organisations surrounding EU institutions. Information is key to successful 
influencing. This is important for road freight at a national level, but more particularly 
for individual companies within the pharmaceutical sector whose interests include, but 
also transcend national boundaries.
As chapter 2 identified, this information comes at a cost. Interviews with a sample of 
multinational companies in the early stages of this research show that despite the 
undoubted ability to fund individual lobbying, even the largest firms deliberate over 
expenditure on such activities. For firms within the Pharmaceuticals sector this 
expenditure not only provides access to information, when it is a benefit in its own 
right for firms with complex, capital intensive operations, and where competitive 
advantage can result from both innovation in product and fine-tuning of the operations 
necessary for production. It also provides the means for the capture of other possible 
benefits, such as business opportunities, or rent. These are not relevant to smaller 
firms in non-strategic sectors. For firms within the Road Freight sector, the benefits 
are likely to be collective: protection or enhancement of the trading environment or 
market stabilisation. These benefits are aligned with national interests due to the 
integral part road freight plays as part of national transport infrastructure.
The influence strategies of firms , within each , sector reflect the balance between the 
costs of the influence strategy and the available benefits which can be captured. For
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pharmaceuticals, potential benefits are both individual and collective. The sector is 
characterised by the presence of firms for which multiple routes using both direct 
company access to EU decision-makers, as well as support for strong collective action 
through the European Trade Association provide the opportunity for individual and 
collective benefits. Within Road Freight, firm and sector characteristics dictate that 
benefits are likely to be collective and therefore firm influence strategies are focused on 
collective action.
Finally, whichever strategy is employed by firms or their collective representatives, the 
rules of the lobbying game are the same: the need for a presence in Brussels to establish 
informal networks of contacts; the importance of working with various levels of 
official; the Commission as the main target of activity; the increasing importance of the 
European Parliament. The 'rules of the game' are determined by the political institutions 
themselves. Within the EU, a key feature is the openness to contact by officials, 
despite increasing pressures on their time as a result of expanding workloads. Whether 
this will continue is uncertain. Some commentators have suggested that increasing 
scope of activities will result in changes where for example certain 'inner circles' of 
key contacts are forming which will exclude later arrivals on the lobbying circuit.
Practical necessity means that it is in the interests of officials to try and stabilise (and 
minimise) consultation processes and contacts. However, while their decision-making 
continues to relate to complex cross-national issues, the information needs associated 
with decision-making are likely to remain high. As such, the arguments presented here 
suggest that those organisations, whether they are individual firms or interest groups, 
which can provide the best information which will assist with that process are always 
likely to find an open door. For a sector like pharmaceuticals, the centre of expertise 
and knowledge is primarily the firm, and secondly the trade association. For Road 
Freight, the available knowledge and expertise resides primarily with the trade 
association (particularly the national associations) and secondly with individual firms, 
where that knowledge and expertise may vary enormously between large and small 
firms. Despite, therefore, clear statements of 'official consultation partners' by the 
Commission, both large firms within the pharmaceuticals sector, and national trade 
associations within Road Freight are likely to continue to capitalise on the 
opportunities for influence to which their knowledge and expertise given them access. 
By implication this means that European sector federations are never likely to have the 
field to themselves. Similarly, UNICE will continue to operate alongside national 
industry associations such as the CBI. Despite formal consultation policies of 
Commission directorates, other interests will continue to exist alongside these Euro- 
groups, representing national sector or cross-sectoral organisations, or individual firms,
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depending on both the information they can trade as a result of information 
asymmetries, and the potential benefits which follow from establishing a presence in 
Brussels.
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Appendix: 1 List of Interviews
CODE ORGANISATION INTERVIEWEE POSITION IN ORGANISATION
Preliminary
1 Glaxo Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd John Code Industry Affairs Manager
2 Rank Xerox International Ltd Howard Papwortb Industry Affairs Manager
3 International Computer* (ICL) Ltd George Hall Corporate Aflhirs Manager
4 British Oxygen Co. (BOC) Ltd Richard Bungey European Development Director
5 Dartford Securities Ltd Ivan Kingston Director
6 Marks A Spencer pic Trevor Evans Corporate Affair* Executive
Road Freight and Pharmaceutical Compaaie*
7 Sterling Winthrop Health Ltd Victor Ripley Corporate Affairs Manager
8 National Freight Corporation Ivy Penman Marketing Manager
9 PAO Rod Burns Marketing Manager
10 Denby Peter Denby Director
11 Laser Nick Charles worth General Manager
12 BOC Richard Bungey European Development Director
13 Hays Specialist Distribution John O'Hagan Managing Director
14 Christian Salvensen Ltd Ken Allison Managing Director
13 Barber Road Services John Barber Director
16 Glaxo Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd John Cook Industry Affairs Manager
lataraat Croup*
17 Freight Transport Association John Gutteridge Public Relation Director
18 . Martin Richards Director FTA Brussel*
19 Road Haulage Association Sydney Balgamie Public Relations Director
20 Association of the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry
Tony Willis European Affairs Advisor
21 Confederation of British Industry Richard Eberlie Director CBI Group Brussels
22 . Michael Roberts Transport Polity Advisor
23 . Karen Phillips Policy Adviser, EC Affairs
24 international Road Haulage Union Winfried Rockmann Director
23 Association of British Chambers of Commerce Richard Brown Assistant Director
26 Eurochambers George Dumbetl Director
Policy-Makm
27 UK Department of Transport James Fells Head of Department
28 UK Department of Health Jonathen Mogford Principal
29 UKREP Francis Morgan Second Secretary
30 UKREP (Brussels) Nick Denton First Secretary
31 EU Commission DGVII Keith Crawford A Grade
32 EU Commission DGVU Dirk Van Vreckcm A Grade
33 EU Commission DGVD Robert Missen B Grade
34 EU Commission DGXI Pat Murphy B Grade
33 . . European Parliament . . . . . Mark Watts MEP
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Appendix 2: Road Freight Company Interviews
I.COMPANY DETAILS
1. What is the Company's (and Group) turnover?
2. How many people are employed by the Company (and Group)?
3. Is the Company:-
Public (pic)
Private (Ltd)
Subsidiary
Holding
4. If a subsidiary or holding company, what are the other companies in the group,
what are their activities and what is their % of overall business within the 
Group?
5. What is the Board structure?
Chairman
Chief Executive 
M.D.
Deputy M.D.
Executive Director 
Non Executive Director 
Other
6. Which Business Functions are Represented at Board Level?
Operations
International Operations
Personnel
Finance
Marketing & PR
Information Technology
Research
Legal
Other
198
7. Board Member Nationality
UK Nationals only 
UK & European Nationals 
UK & International
8. Where is the Group and Company Board located?
9. What are the Company's products or Services?
General Haulage
Agriculture/Farming/Fishing
Construction/Building
Retailing/Warehousing
Manufacturing
Engineering
Scrap Metals
Mining and Quarrying
Vehicle Rental
Local Govt/Public Utilities
Chemicals/Petroleum
Banking/Finance
Parcels and Documents
Other
10. What % of the Company's operations are: UK, European, or International?
11. Does the Company have bases in other Countries? If so, what are they?
11.EU POLICY
12. Which of the following EU policy initiatives linked to the Internal Market 
programme have had significant implications for the company's operation and 
how would you prioritise these in terms of importance to your business?
Cabotage
Customs and Border Controls 
Taxation
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Vehicle Weights 
Drivers Hours 
Other
13. Which of these issues have caused the Company to lobby or represent its views 
to EU institutions, National Government, or to encourage action by 
intermediary organisations?
14. Is the Company's current approach to handling EU issues the result of a 
conscious decision or review process, or has this developed over a period of 
time?
15. Describe how you have arrived at your current approach?
Ill INFORMATION
16. What are your sources of information about EU policy?
EU Publications
Commission Contacts (Directorates)
Parliamentary Contacts (MEPs)
National Government Publications 
National Government Contacts 
National Parliamentary Contacts (MPs)
Regional Government Publications 
Regional Government Contacts 
CBI Brussels 
CBI London 
CBI Regional
Chambers of Commerce National 
Chambers of Commerce Local 
Freight Transport Association 
Road Haulage Association 
International Road Haulage Union 
Other Member State industry confederation 
Other Member State trade association 
Other Member State chambers of commerce 
Other companies same sector 
Other companies different sector
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Professional Law/ Accountancy/Lobbying Firms
Professional Institutions
Universities
Press
Other
17. Are Company personnel represented at any consultative forums on European 
policy issues which link to the following organisations?
European Commission 
European Parliament (MEPs)
Economic & Social Committee 
Committee of the Regions 
National Ministries 
UK Parliament (MPs)
UNICE
CBI
Eurochambres
ABCC
Chambers of Commerce
FTA
RHA
IRU
Cross Sector National Group
Cross Sector European or International Group
Other
18. Who represents the Company at these Forums?
19. Why were these individuals selected?
IY^APPRQACH
20. Who is involved in reviewing and assessing the potential threats or 
opportunities presented by EU policy initiatives on the Company? Who 
provides the first review mechanism and who is involved in a secondary role?
Chairman..................................................................................................................
Board
201
Managing Director 
Specific Other Director 
Senior Manager 
Specialist Legal Advisor 
Specialist Sector Advisor
Public Affairs or Government Affairs Representative 
Other
21. Within the Company, who decides how representation needs to be made to 
Brussels either directly, or indirectly through national government or trade 
associations or other bodies?
Chairman
Board
Managing Director 
Specific Director 
Senior Manager 
Specialist Legal Advisor 
Specialist Sector Advisor
Public Affairs or Governmental Affairs Representative 
Other
22. Have members of the Board had direct contact with EU decision makers over 
particular issues and if so which ones?
None
Cabotage
Customs and Border Controls
Taxation
Vehicle Weights
Drivers Hours
Other (specify)
V. STRATEGIES
23. How does the Company influence EU policies, i.e,which governmental or 
intermediary organisations does it approach?
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Direct to EU Commission 
Direct to EU Council (UKREP)
Direct to EU Parliament (MEPs)
Direct to the Economic and Social Committee 
Direct to the Committee of the Regions 
Through National Government Departments 
Through the UK Parliament (MPs)
Through the Scottish Office 
Through the Welsh Development Agency 
Through the CBI London 
CBI Brussels Office 
CBI Brussels British Business Bureau 
Through the National Association of Chambers of Commerce 
Through a Local Association of Chamber of Commerce 
Through the FT A 
Through the RHA 
Through the IRU
With Other Companies - Same Sector 
With Other Companies - Other Sector 
Through a Professional Lobbying Firm 
Other
24. Which are currently the three most important in order of priority?
VI. REASONS
25. Which of the following factors have influenced your current approach to 
representation?
External Factors 
Degree of Threat
Degree of Commercial Opportunity 
presented by EU policies 
Familiarity with EU institutions 
& decision makers
Lack of familiarity with EU institutions
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& decision makers 
High degree of effectiveness of 
national government representation 
to the EU
Low degree of effectiveness of national 
government representation to the EU 
High degree of effectiveness of 
business lobbying through intermediary 
organisations (Trade & CBI)
Low degree of effectiveness of 
business lobbying organisations 
(Trade & CBI)
Other
Internal Factors
Image the Company seeks to project externally
Image the Company seeks to project internally
Background and attitudes of Board members
Organisation structure
Investment Plans
Cost implications
Other
26. Give examples of how these factors have these influenced your approach on 
particular issues.
Y.CHANGE5
27. Has the frequency of contact with the following increased, decreased, or 
remained the same since 1986?
Government Agencies 
Commission 
Parliament (MEPs)
European Court of Justice 
ECOSOC
Committee of the Regions
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Other UK or European Bodies (Specify)
National Ministries 
UK Parliament (MPs)
Trade & Industry Associations
UNICE
CBI
IRU
FTA
RHA
Eurochambres
UK Association of Chambers of Commerce 
UK Local Chambers of Commerce 
Other European Trade Associations 
Other European Chambers of Commerce 
Other European Industry Associations 
Other
28 Has Company response to EU policy-making changed in respect of the amount 
of resource committed to the following since 1986:
Gathering Information 
Impact Assessment 
Representing Company views 
External Tendering 
Other
29. If the amount of resource has increased, where has this 
increase been primarily focused and by how much?
Chairman
Directors
Senior Managers
Specialist Legal Advisers
Specialist Sector Advisers
Internal Public Affairs Specialists
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External Public Affairs Specialists 
Other
VII SPECIFIC ISSUES
30. Of the individual issues linked to the Internal Market you identified earlier as 
priority issues, taking each one individually:
Cabotage
Customs and Border Controls
Taxation
Vehicle Weights
Drivers Hours
Environment
Other
31. Was the Company involved in any lobbying regarding these issues?
32. What threats or opportunities did this pose for the Company?
33. How did the Company go about representing its views and which governmental 
or other agencies were approached?
34. What implications do you see for the Company in terms of EU environmental 
policy that may impact your business within the next 5 years?
35. Will these necessitate a change in the current approach to representing your 
views to Brussels, or those who represent your views?
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Appendix 3: Pharmaceutical Company Interviews
LCQMPANY DETAILS
1. What is the Company (and Group) turnover?
2. How many people are employed by the Company (and Group)?
3. Is the Company>
Public (pic)
Private (Ltd)
Subsidiary
Holding
4. If a subsidiary or holding company, what are the other companies in the group, 
what are their activities and what is their % of overall business within the 
Group?
5. What are the Company's products or Services?
Ethical
Generic
Biotechnology
Other
6. What % of the Company's operations are: UK, European, or International?
7. Does the Company have bases in other Countries? If so, what are they? 
n.EU POLICY
8. What is the Company's current approach to handling EU issues the result of a 
conscious decision or review process, or has this developed over a period of 
ime?
III. INFORMATION
9. What are your sources of information about EU policy?
EU Publications
Commission Contacts (Directorates)
Parliamentary Contacts (MEPs)
National Government Publications 
National Government Contacts 
National Parliamentary Contacts (MPs)
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Regional Government Publications 
Regional Government Contacts 
CBI Brussels 
CBI London 
CBI Regional
Chambers of Commerce National
Chambers of Commerce Local
ABPI
PAGB
EFPIA
Other
Other Member State industry confederation
Other Member State trade association
Other Member State chambers of commerce
Other companies same sector
Other companies different sector
Professional Law/ Accountancy/Lobbying Firms
Professional Institutions
Universities
Press
Other
10. Are Company personnel represented at any consultative forums on European 
policy issues which link to the following organisations?
European Commission 
European Parliament (MEPs)
Economic & Social Committee 
Committee of the Regions 
National Ministries 
UK Parliament (MPs)
UNICE
CBI
Eurochambres
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ABCC
Chambers of Commerce
EFPIA
ABPI
PAGB
Cross Sector National Group
Cross Sector European or International Group
Other
11. Who represents the Company at these Forums?
IV. APPROACH
12. Who is involved in reviewing and assessing the potential threats or 
opportunities presented by EU policy initiatives on the Company? Who 
provides the first review mechanism and who is involved in a secondary role?
Chairman
Board
Managing Director 
Specific Other Director 
Senior Manager 
Specialist Legal Advisor 
Specialist Sector Advisor
Public Affairs or Government Affairs Representative 
Other
13. Within the Company, who decides how representation needs to be made to 
Brussels either directly, or indirectly through national government or trade 
associations or other bodies?
Chairman
Board
Managing Director 
Specific Director 
Senior Manager 
Specialist Legal Advisor
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Specialist Sector Advisor
Public Affairs or Governmental Affairs Representative 
Other
24. Have members of the Board had direct contact with EU decision makers over 
particular issues and if so which ones?
Patent Protection 
Marketing Authorisation 
Transparency & Pricing 
Packaging & Information 
Environment 
Other
V. STRATEGIES
15. How does the Company influence EU policies, i.e. which governmental or 
. . . intermediary organisations does it approach?.....................................................
Direct to EU Commission 
Direct to EU Council (UKREP)
Direct to EU Parliament (MEPs)
Direct to the Economic and Social Committee 
Direct to the Committee of the Regions 
Through National Government Departments 
Through the UK Parliament (MPs)
Through the CBI London 
CBI Brussels Office 
CBI Brussels British Business Bureau 
Through the National Association of Chambers of Commerce 
Through a Local Association of Chamber of Commerce 
Through EFPIA 
Through ABPI 
Through the PAGB 
With Other Companies - Same Sector 
With Other Companies - Other Sector 
Through a Professional Lobbying Firm
Other
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16. Which are currently the three most important in order of priority?
VI. REASONS
17. Which of the following factors have influenced your current approach to 
representation?
External Factors 
Degree of Threat
Degree of Commercial Opportunity 
presented by EU policies 
Familiarity with EU institutions 
& decision makers
Lack of familiarity with EU institutions 
& decision makers 
High degree of effectiveness of 
national government representation 
to the EU
Low degree of effectiveness of national 
government representation to the EU 
High degree of effectiveness of 
business lobbying through intermediary 
organisations (Trade & CBI)
Low degree of effectiveness of 
business lobbying organisations 
(Trade & CBI)
Other
Internal Factors
Image the Company seeks to project externally 
Image the Company seeks to project internally 
Background and attitudes of Board members 
Organisation structure 
Investment Plans 
Cost implications
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Other
17. Give examples of how these factors have these influenced your approach on 
particular issues.
V.CHANGES
18. Has the frequency of contact with the following increased, decreased, or 
remained the same since 1986?
Government Agencies 
Commission 
Parliament (MEPs)
European Court of Justice 
ECOSOC
Committee of the Regions
Other UK or European Bodies (Specify)
National Ministries 
UK Parliament (MPs)
Trade & Industry Associations
UNICE
CBI
EFPIA
ABPI
PAGB
Eurochambres
UK Association of Chambers of Commerce 
UK Local Chambers of Commerce 
Other European Trade Associations 
Other European Chambers of Commerce 
Other European Industry Associations 
Other
19. Has Company response to EU policy-making changed in respect of the amount 
of resource committed to the following since 1986:
Gathering Information
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Impact Assessment 
Representing Company views 
External Tendering 
Other
20. If the amount of resource has increased, where has this 
increase been primarily focused and by how much?
Chairman 
Directors 
Senior Managers 
Specialist Legal Advisers 
Specialist Sector Advisers 
Internal Public Affairs Specialists 
External Public Affairs Specialists 
Other
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Appendix 4: National Trade Association Interviews 
(FTA, RHA, ABPI)
I. ORGANISATION DETAILS
1. What is the Association's current membership number?
2. What is the size profile of member companies?
3. Which business sectors are represented?
4. What is the Association's management structure?
5. Is there a regional structure? If yes, what is this structure?
6. What is the structure of fees for members?
n. ORGANISATION RESOURCE
6. What is the total amount of paid resource committed to lobbying or 
representing the organisations views on EU matters ?
7. What is the estimated total FTE of your organisation excluding voluntary 
membership and total cost associated with this?
8. Does the organisation have a Brussels based lobbyist?
9. If yes, how and why was this individual selected?
10. Has the total amount of resource committed to this activity 
increased, decreased or remained the same since 1986?
11. If it has increased or decreased by how much ?
12. What restructuring, if any, has occurred within the association to accommodate 
representation of views on EU issues since 1986?
IV. INFLUENCE STRATEGIES & LOBBYING ACTIVITY
13. Which of the following agencies do you target when lobbying about European 
policy issues?
European
Commission
European Parliament (MEPs)
Council of Ministers 
European Court of Justice 
Economic and Social Committee 
Committee of the Regions 
Other European Agencies
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National 
Ministries 
Parliament (MPs)
Other national agencies
14. Which institution or institutions are most frequently targeted? (specify)
15. On any specific lobbying issue do you target more than one 
institution?
16. If you have contact with the national representatives on Council of Ministers, 
who are your main points of contact?
17. How often to you meet with Council representatives i.e. ministers, and 
UKREP?
18. If you have contact with the Commission, which directorates do you have 
contact with?
19. Which are the priority contacts within the Commission?
20. Has the number of directorates you have contact with increased since 1986 and
if so which ones account for the increase?
21. Which level of official do you have contact with within the Commission?
22. Which level is your most frequent contact?
23. What is you reason for targeting particular levels?
24. How frequent is your contact with Commission officials?
25. Which MEPs do you have contact with and why ?
26. How frequent is your contact with MEPs?
27. Do you have contact with any of the following organisations 
as part of your lobbying activity?
CBI London
CBI Brussels Office
CBI British Business Bureau
UK National Assoc. Chambers of Commerce
Eurochambres
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FTA
RHA
IRU
EFPIA
ABPI
PAGB
Other Companies - Freight Sector 
Other Companies - Pharmaceutical Sector 
Other Companies - Other Sector 
Professional Law/ Accountancy/Lobbying Firm 
Other
23. Which committees, either national or European are you a member of, and 
which institutions are these linked to (e.g. Ministries, Parliament or 
Commission)?
24. Who else is represented on these forums?
25. What informal networks exist that you use to monitor EU policy and exert 
influence, for example with other industry sectors that may be affected by EU 
policy-making?
26. What liaison do you have with non-business agencies, for example, BEUC?
27. Do you combine efforts with equivalent Member States associations when 
lobbying the EU?
28. How has your current approach to influencing the EU evolved?
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Appendix 5: European Trade Association Interview (IRU)
I. ORGANISATION DETAILS
1. What is the current membership numbers & country coverage
2. What is the current management structure?
II. ORGANISATION RESOURCE
3. What is the total amount of resource committed to lobbying or representing the 
organisations views on EU matters per year?
4. Has the total amount of resource committed to this activity increased, 
decreased or remained the same since 1986? If so, by how much?
5. What restructuring, if any, has occurred within the association to accommodate
representation of views on EU issues since 1986?
III. INFLUENCE STRATEGIES & LOBBYING ACTIVITIES
6. Which of the following agencies do you target when lobbying about European
policy issues?
Commission
European Parliament (MEPs)
Council of Ministers 
European Court of Justice 
National Ministries 
UK Parliament (MPs)
Economic and Social Committee 
Committee of the Regions 
Other
10. Which institution or institutions are most frequently targeted?
11. On any specific lobbying issue do you target more than one 
institution?
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12. If you have contact with the national representatives on Council of Ministers, 
who are your main points of contact?
13. How often to you meet with Council representatives i.e ministers or UKREP?
14. If you have contact with the Commission, which directorates do you have
contact with?
15. Has the number of directorates you have contact with increased since 1986 and 
if so which ones account for the increase?
16. Which level of official within the Commission is your most frequent level of 
contact?
17. What is the reason for your approach?
18. How frequent is your contact with Commission officials?
19. Which MEPs do you have contact with and why ?
20. How frequent is your contact with MEPs?
21. Which committees, either national or European is the organisation represented 
at?
22. Who else is represented on these forums?
23. What informal networks exist that you use to monitor EU policy and exert 
influence, for example with other industry sectors that may be affected by EU 
policy-making in the transport sector?
24. Do you liaise with any non-business organisations regarding EU issues, for 
example, BEUC?
25. How often do you seek company views directly on policy issues?
26. If you are seeking company views directly, which companies do you contact?
IV. SPECIFIC ISSUES
27. What involvement has the association had in issues relating to the following EU 
policies?
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Cabotage
Customs & Border
Vehicle Weights
Taxation
Drivers Hours
28. What approach did the organisation take to influence activities related to these 
issues?
29. What key issues do environmental concerns raise for the road freight sector?
30. Who are the key actors involved in discussions about transport and 
environmental issues in the EU context?
31. Will your influence strategy for dealing with environmental issues differ from 
those adopted for Single Market issues, and if so, how?
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Appendix 6: Industry Association Interviews
(CBI, ABCC, Eurochambres)
I. ORGANISATION DETAILS
1. What are the association's current membership numbers?
2. What committees or other forums exist within the 
organisation for the review and discussion of EU policy 
issues and their implications ?
a)For Road Freight
b)For Pharmaceuticals
II. ORGANISATION RESOURCE
3. What is the total amount of resource committed to lobbying
or representing the organisations views on EU matters per 
year?
4. Does the organisation have a Brussels based lobbyist or 
lobbying team?
5. How much resource committed to this activity?
a)For Freight Transport
b)For Pharmaceuticals
6. What restructuring, if any, has occurred within the
association to accommodate representation of views on EU 
issues since 1986?
7. How has this affected the handling of transport/ 
pharmaceutical issues within the organisation?
Ill INFLUENCE STRATEGIES & LOBBYING ACTIVITIES
8. Which of the following agencies do you target when lobbying 
about European transport policy ?
Commission
Council of Ministers
European Parliament
European Court of Justice
ECOSOC
Committee of the Regions
Other European Agency
National Ministries 
UK Parliament
220
Other National Agency
9. Has the amount of activity increased, decreased or remained 
the same since 1986?
10. Which institution or institutions are most frequently 
targeted?
11. On any specific lobbying issue do you target more than one 
institution?
12. Who are your main points of contact within the Council of 
Ministers, who are your main points of contact?
13. How often to you meet with Council representatives i.e. 
ministers, and UKREP?
14. Which directorates within the Commission do you have 
contact with?
15. Has the number of directorates you have contact with 
ncreased since 1986 and if so which ones account for the 
increase?
a)Freight transport
b)Pharmaceuticals
16. Which officials do you have contact with within the 
directorates?
17. Which is your usual (most frequent) level of contact?
18. What is the reason for your approach?
19. How frequent is your contact with Commission officials?
20. Which MEPs do you have contact with?
21. How frequent is your contact with MEPs?
22. Do you have contact with any of the following organisations 
as part of your lobbying activity?
CBI London 
CBI Brussels Office 
CBI Brussels Bureau
UK National Assoc. Chambers of Commerce
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European Assoc. Chambers of Commerce
UK Trade Associations Road Freight
European Trade Associations Road Freight
UK Trade Associations Pharmaceuticals
European Trade Associations Pharmaceuticals
Other
23. If there has been an increase or decrease are these related 
these to specific issues? If yes, specify which.
24. Which Committees, either national or European are you a 
member of, and which institutions are these linked to (e.g. 
Ministries, Parliament or Commission)?
25. Who else is represented on these forums?
26. What informal networks exist that you use to monitor EU 
policy and exert influence, for example with other industry 
sectors that may be affected by EU policy making in the 
transport pharmaceutical sectors?
27. Do you liaise with any non-business organisations 
regarding EU issues, for example BEUC?
28. Do you liaise with other Member states industry associations 
when lobbying EU institutions?
31. Will the association's influence strategy for environmental
issues remain the same as that adopted for Single Market 
issues?
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Appendix 7: UK Department of Transport Interview
I. DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE
1. What is the department's structure?
II. EU POLICY
2. How is the development of European policy issues monitored ?
3. Have there been changes in the way EU policy is monitored since 1986?
If so, what are these changes?
4. Has monitoring activity increased, decreased or remained the same since 1986?
5. How are policy responses co-ordinated?
6. What Committees involving Business interests have been established?
7. What involvement does the Department have in Council Meetings?
8. Who attends these? (numbers and level)
9. How does the department's work relate to that of UKREP?
10. What contacts does the department have with the Commission?
11. Which directorates does the department have contact with?
12. Has contact with the Commission increased, decreased, or remained the same 
since 1986?
13. What contacts does the department have with the European Parliament?
14. Have contacts with Parliament increased, decreased or remained the same since 
1986?
15. What direct contact does the department have with representatives of the 
two committees (ECOSOC and ComReg)?
16. Has contact with the Committees increased decreased or remained the same 
since 1986?
17. What is the role of the European Secretariat of the Cabinet and how does the 
department relate to this in terms of EU issues?
18. What is the role of the ECMT and how does its work relate to the formation of . 
EU policy?
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III. CONSULTATION WITH BUSINESS INTERESTS
20. How is consultation with business interests organised?
21. Does this involve:
Freight Companies
Pharmaceutical Companies
Other sector companies
FTA
RHA
IRU
ABCC
Eurochambres
CBI
UNICE
Other
21. Which are the priority contacts ?
22. Have contacts with any of these organisations increased since 1986?
If yes, specify organisations.
23. In terms of overall contact levels, what percentage are initiated by the 
department, and what percentage initiated by business or business 
representative organisations?
24. Has the amount of business initiated contact increased decreased or remained 
the same since 1986?
25. If it has increased, where has this increase been focused?
26. Which issues linked to EU policy have caused the most negotiation with 
business interests (in order of priority)?
Cabotage
Customs and border controls
Weights
Drivers hours
Taxation
Environment (e.g. carbon tax and vehicle emissions)
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Appendix 8: UK Department of Health Interview
I. DEPARTMENT STRUCTURE
1. What is the department's structure?
II. EU POLICY
2. How is the development of European policy issues monitored ?
3. Have there been changes in the way EU policy is monitored since 1986?
If so, what are these changes?
4. Has monitoring activity increased, decreased or remained the same since 1986?
5. How are policy responses co-ordinated?
6. What Committees involving Business interests have been established?
7. What involvement does the Department have in Council Meetings?
8. Who attends these? (numbers and level)
9. How does the department's work relate to that of UKREP?
10. What contacts does the department have with the Commission?
11. Which directorates does the department have contact with?
12. Has contact with the Commission increased, decreased, or remained the same 
since 1986?
13. What contacts does the department have with the European Parliament?
14. Have contacts with Parliament increased, decreased or remained the same since 
1986?
15. What direct contact does the department have with representatives of the
two committees (ECOSOC and ComReg)?
16. Has contact with the Committees increased decreased or remained the same
since 1986?
III. CONSULTATION WITH BUSINESS INTERESTS
17. How is consultation with business interests organised?
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18. Does this involve: ?
Pharmaceutical Companies
Other sector companies
ABPI
PAGB
CBI
Other
19. Which are the priority contacts ?
20. Have contacts with any of these organisations increased since 1986?
If yes, specify organisations.
21. In terms of overall contact levels, what percentage are initiated by the 
department, and what percentage initiated by business or business 
representative organisations?
22. Has the amount of business initiated contact increased decreased or remained 
the same since 1986?
23. If it has increased, where has this increase been focused?
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Appendix 9: European Commission Interviews (DG VII, DGXI))
I. DIRECTORATE STRUCTURE
1. What is the directorate's structure?
IL E U  POLICY
2. How is the development of national environmental policy issues monitored in 
the directorate?
3. How is policy development in other directorates monitored and co-ordinated?
4. What committees and working groups exist as part of the policy-making 
process?
III. CONSULTATION WITH BUSINESS
5. How is consultation with Business organised?
6. Who do you consult?
Freight Companies
Other sector Companies
UNICE
CBI
IRU
FTA
RHA
Eurochambres
ABCC
Other Business Organisations 
Non-Business Organisations 
Other
6. Which are you priority contacts?
7. Has the pattern of consultation changed since 1986 and if so how?
8. How is consultation with Non-Business organised?
9. Has the pattern changed since 1986 and if so how?
10. Do any of the following organisations contact you in order to lobby? 
Professional Lobbying Consultants
Legal F irm s..............................................................................................
Accountancy Firms
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Non- Business Interest Organisations
Other
11. Has the level of contact with Business organisations increased/decreased or 
remained the same since 1986 ?
12. Has the level of contact with road freight companies increased/ decreased or 
remained the same since 1986?
13. Which issues have caused the most reaction from business organisations and 
companies and where has this reaction stemmed from?
14. How are transport and environmental issues being co-ordinated in terms of the 
consultation process for businesses? Does this differ from previous identified 
arrangements?
15. How was input to the 1992 CTP managed ?
16. What committees and forums existed to facilitate consultation on this issue?
17. What was the role of l)the European Parliament and 2 )ECOSOC in this 
process?
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Appendix 10: MEP interview
I. ROLE
1. What is you role as a Member of the Transport and Tourism Committee?
II. BUSINESS CONTACTS
2. What contact do you have with the following organisations regarding road 
freight issues?
Road Freight Companies 
Other Sector Companies 
National Trade Associations 
European Trade Associations 
National Industry Associations 
European Industry Associations 
Chambers of Commerce 
Eurochambres 
Lobbying Firms 
Other
2. How frequent is contact with any of the above?
3. Has the contact with the above increased/decreased or remained the same?
4. What formal consultation processes between the EP and business interests 
exist?
5. If you need to consult on particular ad hoc issues, how do you go (the EP) 
about this?
6. What are your links with UK MPs?
7. In your view, do UK business interests (companies or associations) approach 
UK MPs for referrals to the EP, or come directly to you?
8. What is your impression of UK freight companies understanding of the role 
and powers of the EP, and have there been any changes recently?
9. What is your impression of the role of local Chambers of Commerce in 
representing UK business regarding EU policy initiatives?
10. What is your impression of the overall level of lobbying activity focused on
the EP for 1) road freight issues and 2)generally?
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Appendix: 11 UK Representation Interviews
I. REPRESENTATION STRUCTURE
1. How is UKREP structure and how are l)Transport issues and 2) Road Freight 
issues handled within that structure
II. EU POLICY
2. How are Transport policy developments monitored within UKREP?
3. What is the role of the ECTM in relation to EU policy development and what 
involvement, if any does UKREP have with this forum?
III. BUSINESS CONTACTS
4. What contact do you have with the following organisations regarding Road Freight 
issues?
Road Freight Companies 
Other Sector Companies 
National Trade Associations 
European Trade Associations 
National Industry Associations 
European Industry Associations 
Chambers of Commerce 
Eurochambres 
Lobbying firms 
Other
5. If you have been approached by individual companies is this for information or for 
lobbying purposes?
6. How frequent is this contact?
7. Has the frequency of this contact increased/decreased/ remained the same?
230
8. Do non-business interests approach you about road freight issues, for example 
environmental groups?
9. Have 'environmental' policy proposals (Vehicle emissions, C02 tax) resulted in 
UKREP being lobbied by road freight interests?
10. Do you foresee any change in levels of business lobbying activity (from the sector) 
as a result of environmental policy development in transport.
